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INTRODUCTION

The picket line is a time-honored economic weapon employed by
unions in a variety of contexts to achieve equally time honored union
objectives. Its efficacy as a weapon is, however, a matter of the respect
shown for it by employees-its signal effect1 upon employees who encounter it.
This article examines the employee's act of honoring the picket
line in terms of two issues: (1) The question of the protection afforded
that act by Section 7 of the Labor Act,2 and (2) the question of the
derivative effect of the illegality of a particular picket line upon that
protection. The article examines these questions as a vehicle for
criticizing prevailing understandings of the meaning of Section 7 and
of the appropriate analysis to be employed in interpreting Sections
1. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 619
(1980) (Stevens, J. concurring); Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S.
769, 776-77 (1942) (Douglas, J. concurring).
2. 29 U.S.C. S 157 (1976). By "Labor Act" I mean the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley and Landrum Griffin Acts.
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7 and 8(a)(1)3 of the Act. Because it raises most starkly the difficulties
here perceived in those understandings, the analysis concentrates most
particularly upon a common factual context in which the honoring
employee, an employee of employer A, encounters a picket line established by employer B's employees over a dispute between B's
employees and B. The critique of prevailing understandings proceeds
from the proposition that they reflect a failure to identify precisely
who possesses Section 7 rights in any given context-an individual
employee, the group of fellow employees of a common employer, a
group of employees of some other employer, or employees writ
large-and, consequently, a failure to recognize that Section 7 may
grant distinct types of rights to distinct possessors of those rights.4
I.

BACKGROUND: SOME "RULES"

The legal issues presented by an employer's discharge or
discipline of an employee for honoring a picket line are generally' two:
Was the employee's refusal to cross the picket line "protected concerted activity" within the meaning of Section 76 of the Labor Act,
3.

29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1) (1976).

4. Although I make no claim to the consistency of my conclusions with Professor Brousseau's recent criticism of Labor Law, the distinction he draws between
group and individual rights has significantly influenced what follows. See generally
Brousseau, Toward A Theory of Rights for the Employment Relation, 56 WASH. L. REV.
1 (1981). For an earlier effort at analysis from the distinction, see Blumrosen, Group
Interests in Labor Law, 13 RUT. L. REV. 432 (1959).
5. In some instances, an employer who discharges an employee for honoring
a picket line may find himself running afoul of Section 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)
(1976). In particular, an 8(a)(3) violation occurs where the discharge is shown to have
been motivated by an employer's desire to punish the employee for prior union activity or adherence or where the employer would not have discharged the employee for
refusing to work under non-union induced circumstances. See, e.g., NLRB v. Alamo
Express, Inc., 430 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971). On occasion, however, the Board frames the 8(a)(1) issue as an 8(a)(3) issue-that is, as whether
the employer acted without business justification. See Congoleum Ind., Inc., 197 NLRB
534 n.1 (1972). Cf. NLRB v. William S. Carroll, Inc., 578 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1978) (application of 8(a)(3) proof scheme to 8(a)(1) issue). With respect to the scope of Section
8(a)(3) and its relationship to Section 8(a)(1), see generally P. Cox., A Reexamination
of the Role of Employer Motive Under Section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 161 (1982).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976):
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement re-
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and did the discharge or discipline constitute "interference, restraint,
and coercion", and therefore an unfair labor practice, within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) 7 of the Labor Act?
Those issues arise in a variety of complex factual circumstances,
and distinctions in circumstances have, at least in the commentary
on the refusal-to-cross question,8 been thought to warrant distinct
resolutions of those issues. Material distinctions may be catalogued
in the form of the following questions: (1) What is the relationship
between the honoring employee and the persons engaged in the
picketing? (2) What is the relationship between the honoring employee
and the picketed employer? (3) What is the relationship between the
honoring employee and the dispute giving rise to the picket line? In
the usual terminology, these relationship questions are framed as
whether the honoring employee honored a fellow-employee or
"stranger" picket line,' but the terminology masks substantial complexity. The term "stranger" may be taken to refer to a picketed
employer who is not the honoring employee's employer; 0 to pickets
quiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment
as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
158(a)(1): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
7. 29 U.S.C.
employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7".
8. See Haggard, Picket Line Obserranceas a Protected Concerted Actirity. 53
N. CAR. L. REV. 43, 46-48 (1974). See also Axelrod, The Statutory Right to Respect a Picket
Line, 83 DICK. L. REV. 617, 621-27 (1979); Carney & Florsheim, The Treatment of Re;usals
to Cross Picket Lines: "By-Paths and Indirect Crookt Ways", 55 CORNELL L. REV. 940,
943 (1970). For further commentary on the question of refusals to cross picket lines,
see generally R. GORMAN. BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw. 322-25 (1976); Connolly, Section 7
and Sympathy Strikes: The Respectire Rights of Employers and Employees, 25 LAB. L.J.
760 (1974); Connolly & Connolly, Employers Rights Relatire to Sympathy Strikes, 14
DUQ. L. REV. 121 (1976); Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressureby Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1205-11, 1222-30 (1967); Haggard,
Picket Line and Strike Violence as Grounds .r Discharge, 18 Hous. L. REV. 423 (1981);
Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA: Part 1, 4 INDus. REL. L.J.
335, 372-80 (1981); Kennedy, The "Right" to Relitse to Cross a Picket Line: Limitations
Imposed by Courts and Legislation, 2 ST. Louis L. REV. 66 (1952); Rubin, To Cross or Not
to Cross: Picket lines and Employee Rights, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 419 (1981); Schatzki, Some
Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer- "Protected" Concerted Activities,
47 Tx. L. REV. 378, 393-95 (1969); Thatcher & Finley, Respect jbr Picket Lines, 32 NEB.
L. REV. 25 (1952); Note, Picket Line Observance: The Board and the Balance oflInterests,
79 YALE L.J. 1369 (1970); Note, Respect br Picket lines, 42 IND. L.J. 536 (1967).
9. See NLRB v. Gould, Inc., 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 930 (1981); NLRB v. William S. Carroll, Inc., 578 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1978).
10. See NLRB v. Alamo Express, Inc., 430 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1021 (1971).
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who are not the honoring employee's fellow employees;" to a dispute
which does not, at least directly, affect the honoring employee;' 2 or
to the geographical premises upon which picketing occurs where such
premises are not owned or controlled by the honoring employee's
employer. 3
For present purposes, it is nevertheless useful to adopt a rather
well-worn analytical scheme 4 and to describe the "rules" governing
judicial and Board treatment of the refusal-to-cross question in terms
of distinct but recurring factual patterns giving rise to the fellow
employee or stranger picket line distinction.
A.

Fellow Employee Picket Lines Directed
At A Common Employer

The paradigm case of a fellow employee picket line is a case in
which the honoring employee, in his capacity as an employee, 5 honors
a picket line established at his employer's premises by employees of
that employer. There are, however, two variations: (1) The picket line
may be established by employees (or the union representing
employees) in the honoror's bargaining unit over a dispute with the
honoror's employer; or (2) The picket line may be established by
employees (or the union representing employees) not in the honoror's
bargaining unit (but nevertheless employees of the honoror's employer)
over a dispute with the honoror's employer.
It is possible to characterize a fellow employee represented by
a union (even the honoror's union) in a bargaining unit distinct from
the honoror's unit as a "stranger." The dispute giving rise to the picket
line is not likely to be a dispute in which the honoring employee has
a direct interest precisely because it is a dispute between the employer
and a bargaining representative which is not the honoring employee's
bargaining representative." The Board and the courts have nevertheless held that there is no Section 7 distinction, absent contractual
11. See NLRB v. Gould, Inc., 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 930 (1981).
12. See NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 426 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970).
13. See NLRB v. William S. Carroll, Inc., 578 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978).
14. See Axelrod, supra note 8, at 621-28; Carney & Florsheim, supra note 8,
at 943; Haggard, Observance, supra note 8, at 46-48.
15. The employee might refuse to cross a picket line in his capacity, e.g., as
a consumer, when not engaged in his employer's business. Discharge for such a refusal
would presumably constitute a Section 8(a)(3) violation.
16. See Haggard, Observance, supra note 8, at 97-103.
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limitations upon employee conduct, 7 between the "same" and "different" bargaining unit cases, 8 and both categories of cases may
therefore be said to entail in the contemplation of current law, concerted activity by fellow employees. In both instances, the honoring
employee's refusal to cross the picket line is "protected" by Section
7, and his "discharge" is a Section 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice. 9 The
honoring employee is treated as a participant in the picketing
employee's strike," and, as a striker, is subject to the usual Board
rules governing permissible employer response to strikes.2 Specifically,
"replaced"
the honoring employee may be permanently or temporarily
23
(not discharged),' but retains reinstatement rights.
B.

Stranger Employee Picket Lines Encountered
At a Stranger Employer's Premises

The most common example of a case raising the stranger picket
line problem is that of a deliveryman encountering a picket line at
the place of delivery, that place being the premises of an employer
not the employer of the deliveryman. 2 There are three variations on
the pattern: (1) The picket line may be established by employees of
the picketed stranger employer over a dispute with the stranger
employer;2 5 (2) The line may be established by persons not employees
17. The honoring employee may be subject to a no-strike or more specific
clause in the collective bargaining agreement governing his unit. See infra notes 55-57
and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d 162 (lst Cir. 1977); Newspaper
Production Co. v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp.,
440 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971); NLRB v. Southern Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 426 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n
v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1967) (dicta). But see NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951).
19. See, e.g., NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1977); NLRB
v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971); NLRB
V. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 427 F.2d 170 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833 (1970);
NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 426 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970).
20. See, e.g., NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 826 (1971); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 224 NLRB 341 (1976).
21. Hoffman Beverage Co., 163 NLRB 981, 982f (1967). See Laidlaw Corp., 171
NLRB 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
22. NLRB v. International Van Lines, 409 U.S. 48 (1972); NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
23. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); Laidlaw Corp., 171
NLRB 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
24. See NLRB v. Alamo Express, Inc., 430 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1021 (1971).
25. See, e.g., NLRB v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1981);
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of the picketed stranger employer over a dispute with the stranger
employer; 8 (3) The line may be established by persons not employees
of the picketed employer over a dispute with some third party, neither
the picketed employer nor the honoring employee's employer."
Two general, but competing rules may be identified as controlling this category of cases-at least absent illegality of the picket
line-in different forums28 or in the same forum at different times.29
The first such rule is that an employee's refusal to cross a stranger
picket line established in a dispute with a stranger employer is protected activity under Section 7. An employer's discharge of the honoring employee is therefore a violation of Section 8(a)(1) unless the
employer had, at the time and under the particular circumstances,
an overriding business justification for the discharge.3" The business
interests of the employer (e.g., in making a delivery) and the Section
7 interests of the employee in honoring the picket line are therefore
"balanced" on a case by case basis.2 ' One factor in determining the
weight assigned (and credibility of) the employer's business interest
is whether the employer hired a replacement for the discharged honoring employee upon or shortly following the discharge."
The second, competing, rule is that a refusal to cross is protected
under Section 7 and that the honoring employee may not be discharged
but may be "replaced."3 The honoring employee is, in short, to be
NLRB v. William S. Carroll, Inc., 578 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978); Teamsters Local 657 v.
NLRB, 429 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
26. Cf Giant Food Markets, Inc., v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 18 (6th Cir. 1980) (area
standards picketing and threat of trespass action as 8(a)l) violation).
27. See Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 189 NLRB 879 (1971), enforcement denied,
455 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1972).
28. Compare NLRB v. Gould, Inc., 638 F.2d 159, 163 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980) with
Gould, Inc., 238 NLRB 618 n.3 (1978) enforced 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1980).
29. Compare Torrington Constr. Co., Inc., 235 NLRB 1540 (1978) with Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 NLRB 1545 (1962), enforced sub. nom, Teamsters Local 79 v.
NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
30. See Overnite Transport Co., 154 NLRB 1271 (1965), enforced in part sub
nom., Truck Drivers Local 728 v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also, e.g.,
NLRB v. William S. Carroll, Inc., 578 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Alamo Express,
Inc., 430 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); Teamsters Local
657 v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
31. Haggard, Observance, supra note 8, at 83-93. See NLRB v. William S. Carroll, Inc., 578 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1978).
32. See Overnite Transport Co., 154 NLRB 1271 (1965), enforced in part sub
nom., Truck Drivers Local 728 v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 NLRB 1545 (1972), enforced sub nom., Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB,
325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1966).
33. Torrington Constr. Co., Inc., 235 NLRB 1540 (1978). See also Rockaway
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treated as a sympathy striker under the rules that would be applied
to his "participation" (through honoring a fellow employee picket line)
in a strike against his employer."4
The distinction between these competing rules is that the latter
rather clearly applies the "strike-replacement-reinstatement" ' analogy,
while the former permits "discharge" (and therefore presumably imposes no duty of reinstatement36 ) upon an individual showing of
business necessity. Whether there is a real distinction between the
rules is, however, dependent upon whether the Board will apply a
presumption that replacement is lawful under the replacement rule."
If replacement is conditioned upon proof of business necessity in particular cases,3" the replacement rule imposes a burden of justification
upon the employer which can be expected to deter replacement. If
replacement is presumptively lawful without proof of business necessity, the replacement rule provides the employer far more flexibility
than would be the case in a mere grant of a discharge privilege conditioned upon proof of business necessity. 9
C.

Stranger Picket Lines Encountered At the Premises
of The Honoring Employee's Employer

A case falling within this category may involve (1) a picket line
established by persons not fellow employees of the honoror at the
premises of the honoror's employer and over a dispute with the honoror's employer"0 or (2) a picket line established by persons not fellow
News Supply Co., 95 NLRB 336 (1951), enforcement denied, 197 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1952),
affd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
34. Torrington Constr. Co., Inc., 235 NLRB 1540, 1541 n.11 (1978).
35. Id.
36. See NLRB v. William S. Carroll, Inc., 578 F.2d 1, 3 n.2 (1st Cir. 1978);
Swain & Morris Constr. Co., 168 NLRB 1064 (1967). But see Thurston Motor Lines,
Inc., 166 NLRB 862 (1967) ("The employer's right to replace is no greater than its
proven need to carry on its business. It is not a punitive right."). Compare NLRB
v. L.G. Everist, Inc., 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964), with NLRB v. Southern Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 426 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970).
37. Compare NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (in effect
creating a presumption that replacement of economic strikers is lawful) with Southern
Cal. Edison Co., 243 NLRB 372 (1979) (in effect requiring case by case proof of business
necessity as a justification for replacement of an honoring employee), enforced, 646
F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1981).
38. See Southern Cal. Edison Co., 243 NLRB 372 (1979), enforced, 646 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir. 1981).
39. See Haggard, Observance, supra note 8, at 88-93.
40. See the facts in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
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employees of the honoror at the premises of the honoror's employer
and over a dispute with some third party.4' In the latter variation,
the third party is typically a stranger employer present on the
premises or on a "common situs" and doing business with or in conjunction with the honoror's employer.' 2
Upon the assumption that the picket line in question is lawful
(most particularly, that it is a "primary" and not a "secondary" picket
line 3 ), and upon the further assumption that no union may be characterized as having otherwise induced the employee action," the rule
generally applied is that the honoring employee is a sympathy striker
who may be replaced but not discharged."5 It should be clear, however,
that, at least in a case falling within the second variation, the "stranger
dispute" would appear to make the case more closely analogous to
the case involving a picket line at a stranger employer's premises
than a case involving fellow employees, and this is so despite
geography.6
D.

Fellow Employee Pickets Encountered At Stranger Premises
This category of case essentially involves a Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B)'

41. NLRB v. Gould, Inc., 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
930 (1981).
42. Id.; Congoleum Ind., Inc., 197 NLRB 534 (1972).
43. See Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 664 (1967);
Local 761, Int'l Union of Electrical Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667
(1961); NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951); Truck Drivers Local
413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964).
44. See Grain Elevator, Flour & Feed Mill Workers, Local 418 (Continental
Grain Co.), 155 NLRB 402 (1965), enforced, 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 932 (1967).
45. Newbery Energy Corp., 227 NLRB 436, 437 (1976). See NLRB v. Gould,
Inc., 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1980) enforcing 238 NLRB 618 (1978); Congoleum Ind.,
Inc., 197 NLRB 534 (1972). But cf NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d 162 (1st Cir.
1977) (sympathy strike protected on assumption of common employer; S 8(b)(4) issue);
Newspaper Prod. Co. v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1974) (same).
46. Although picket line cases are often discussed and distinguished in terms
of the location of the picket line, location appears at best only marginally relevant.
Cf. United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492 (1964) (secondary boycott
issue). It is, rather, the coincidence that location will often affect the relationship of
the pickets, the honoring employee and the picketed employer that gives location its
descriptive utility. Location is, in short, something of a shorthand for assuming that
these relationships are not, in a particular case, the relationships between a fellow
employee picket line, the honoring employee, and a common employer.
47. 29 U.S.C. S 158(bX4)(i)(B) (1976):
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents-
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"ambulatory situs" issue, but is useful for descriptive purposes to illustrate the irrelevance, at least in principle, of geography to the issue
under discussion. An example is the deliveryman who encounters
fellow employee pickets at a delivery site where the pickets' appeal
is essentially that the deliveryman join a strike against their common employer. 8 The location of the appeal (and, if successful, the act
of honoring the picket line) is an element in a description of the context, but the question of the protected nature of the refusal to cross
in this context is indistinguishable from that question in the context
of a fellow employee appeal at a common employer's premises.
E.

The Unlawful Picket Line

It is generally said that the honoring employee, because he
derives the Section 7 protection afforded his refusal from the protected character of the picket line he honors, enjoys no protection
for his refusal to cross an unlawful picket line.49 The employee's
derivative "right" is therefore limited by the possibilities that the
picket line is secondary,' is established in violation of organizational

(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work
on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services . . . where . . . an object thereof is:
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain
with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless
such labor organization has been certified as the representative of
employees under the provisions of section 9[;]: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not
otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing;
48. See Sailors' Union of the Pacific, 92 NLRB 547 (1950) (appeal to primary
employees on secondary premises).
49. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 231 NLRB 556, 561-62 (1977) (ALJ). See
Newspaper Prod. Co. v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 821, 825 (5th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Louisville
Chair Co., 385 F.2d 922, 928 n.3 (6th Cir. 1967); United Furniture Workers v. NLRB,
336 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 838 (1964); Pacific Tel. & Tel., 107 NLRB
1547 (1954).
50. See NLRB v. Gould, Inc., 638 F.2d 159, 163 n.2 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 930 (1981); NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1977); Truck
Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964).
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picketing prohibitions 5' or is established in violation of contractual
limitations, such as a no-strike clause,"2 upon the rights of the pickets.
Although courts have generally strictly applied the derivative right
But cf. NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409, 417-18 (5th Cir.
1955) (strike misconduct).
51. 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(7) (1976): It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to
be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees
of an employer to accept or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining-representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees:
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with
this Act any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of this Act,
(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election
under section 9(c) of this Act has been conducted, or
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition
under section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to
exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided,
That when such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without
regard to the provisions of section 9(c)(1) or the absence of a showing
of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an
election in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof; Provided further, That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity
for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers)
that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with,
a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any
individual employed by any other person in the course of his employment,
not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any
services.
See National Packing Co. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1965). But see Local Union,
Highway & Local Motor Freight Drivers No. 707 (Claremont Polychemical Corp.), 196
NLRB 613 (1972). In Claremont, the employer lawfully discharged employees who participated in picketing in violation of Section 8(b)(7)(B), but unlawfully discharged
employees who "struck for recognition" but did not themselves picket. The rationale
is that striking (as distinguished from unlawful picketing) for recognition is protected
under Section 7; the striking employees' protection is not, under such circumstances,
derivative. A different case would presumably be presented if the objective of the
strike (as well as the picket line honored by the striker) is illicit. See American News
Co., 55 NLRB 1302 (1944). But see NLRB v. Local 18, International Union of Operating
Engineers, 503 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1974). In a case in which the honoring employee
encountered an unlawful (under 8(b)(7)) picket line directed at a stranger employer,
the honoring employee would have difficulty in asserting an independent (Claremont)
right to honor the picket line.
52. See American Tel. & Tel. Co., 231 NLRB 556 (1977).
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theory,' it has been argued that an honoring employee should have
notice of illegality before that illegality is used to justify a discharge.'
F.

Contractual Limitations Upon The Honoring
Employee's "Right"

Although a picket line may itself be lawful, the honoring
employee's act of refusal may violate contractual limitations upon his
conduct-most particularly, a no-strike clause or a more specific provision waiving employee rights to engage in sympathy strikes or to
otherwise honor a picket line.5 The issue in a case presenting a problem of contractual waiver is contractual interpretation: most commonly,
the breadth of a no-strike clause. The Board consistently requires a
specific provision waiving the "right" of refusal'; the courts of appeals tend to split on the question; sometimes finding a general nostrike clause sufficient for waiver. 7

II.

A

CRITIQUE OF THE ACCEPTED ANALYSIS: SECTION

7

The rules identified in the last section as governing the honoring of picket lines rest on interpretations of the scope and meaning
of Section 7 of the Labor Act. The protection afforded employee activity by Section 7 is enforced by means of the unfair labor practice
prohibitions of Section 8 of the Labor Act, most broadly and directly
by Section 8(a)(1): it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7."8 The statutory scheme thus requires
a two-step analysis: (1) was the employee activity protected by Section 7 and (2) did the employer "interfere" with that activity. Matters
are not, however, this simple.
53. See Drivers, Salesmen Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
54. See Axelrod, supra note 8, at 639 (relying on Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 107
NLRB 1547 (1941)). But see Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 231 NLRB 556 (1977).
55. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953). Cf. NLRB v.
Keller-Crescent Co., 538 F.2d 1291, 1296 (7th Cir. 1976) (employees bound to arbitrate
coverage of no strike clause before engaging in sympathy strike).
56. See Danial Constr. Co., Inc., 239 NLRB 1335 (1979); Local 18, International
Union of Operating Engineers, 238 NLRB 652 (1978); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 189
NLRB 879 (1971), enforcement denied, 455 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972).
57. Compare, e.g., NLRB v. Gould, Inc., 638 F.2d 159, 164-65 (10th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 930 (1981); Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975); NLRB v. C.K. Smith & Co., 569 F.2d 162
(1st Cir. 1977) with NLRB v. Keller-Crescent Co., 538 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1976); Iowa
Beef Processors, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcherworkman, 597 F.2d 1138
(8th Cir. 1979); Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972).
58. 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1) (1976).
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On its face, Section 7 would seem to require a resolution of the
"protection" issue solely in terms of whether employee conduct was
a "concerted activity" and whether the conduct was engaged in "for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection."'59 There has been in the history of litigation under the
Labor Act no real dispute in either the cases or the commentary about
the protected status, under Section 7, of an employee's "right" to honor
a picket line established by fellow employees in a shared bargaining
unit over a dispute with a common employer. The employee's refusal
to cross in such a context is considered self-evidently a "concerted
activity" for the "purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection." There is, however, a longstanding and continuing"
debate over the Section 7 protection afforded an honoring employee
for a refusal to cross a picket line established by stranger employees
over a dispute with a stranger employer.
The debate has been framed as a debate about the meaning of
Section 7 terminology. One avenue of attack upon the application of
Section 7 is6 a claim that a single employee's act of refusal is not
"concerted." That avenue ignores the pickets: the refusal is an act
in compliance with a signal communicated by others.63 Moreover, it
ignores the possibility that the honoring employee refuses to cross
in behalf of and at the instance of his fellow employees or of the union
representing the honoror and his fellow employees.
These responsive arguments to the attack upon concertedness
are alternatives with very different implications for the content of
Section 7 rights. The first response suggests that an individual
employee's conduct may fall within the protection of Section 7 if that
conduct responds to (and directly aids) a stranger labor dispute. The
focus of such an implication is upon the individual: the individual in
effect expresses his conviction in the justice of labor's cause writ large.
59. 29 U.S.C. S 157 (1976).
60. Such a refusal is in fact participation in a strike-the paradigm case of
"protected concerted activity". NLRB v. McKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938).
61. See NLRB v. William S. Carroll, Inc., 578 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1978). But
cf Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 564-68 (1978) (taking a view of the scope of
Section 7 in another context consistent with protection in the present context),
62. See NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1951). Cf NLRB
v. International Rice Milling Co. 341 U.S. 665 (1951) (interpreting "concerted" in the
context of the Taft-Hartley version of Section 8(b)(4)).
63. Cf. The Capital Times Co., 234 NLRB 309 (1978) (refusal to cross picket
line established by employees who are not employees within the meaning of Section
2(3) of the Act not "concerted").
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The argument that the employee acts on behalf of his fellow employees
has a very different implication. Under that argument, the employee
acts in concert, even where he acts alone in refusing to cross the
stranger picket line, because he participates in the collective demand
of his fellow employees for the benefits to be derived by those
employees from the stranger dispute.
A second avenue of attack upon the application of Section 7 is
the claim that such a refusal-where the picket line is a stranger
picket line-is not an act engaged in for purposes of "mutual aid or
protection" because there is in fact no mutual benefit to be gained
from the act of honoring or because any such gain is too remote to
warrant statutory protection.' The implications of that attack are that
mutuality is a matter either of the likelihood of benefit to the honoring employee or of the utility of the act of honoring in furthering
a preferred policy of labor law and that both likelihood and utility
questions are to be answered after the fact by authoritative institutions of government (the Board and the reviewing courts). A further
implication is of course that these institutions may conclude that in
fact benefit is likely or utility is high and, therefore, that protection
is warranted for these reasons. There is, however, a distinct potential response to the attack upon the mutality of the act of honoring:
mutuality of benefit is properly a question to be decided by the
autonomous private actor granted rights against employer retaliation
by the statute and the right is therefore not subject either to a qualification of likelihood or a limitation of utility so long as that actor
may be said to be acting for a purpose related to employment. The
question raised by this second response is precisely who is the
autonomous actor granted rights by the statute.
These described attacks and alternative responses raise fundamental issues about the meaning of Section 7. The following sections of this article seek to flesh out the attacks and the responses
and to present an argument supporting the following proposed meaning to be ascribed to the phrase "concerted activity for mutual aid
or protection" in the context of the honoring of stranger picket lines:
The act of honoring a stranger picket line is concerted activity under
Section 7 because the honoring employee acts in behalf of his fellow
employees, and this is so whether he acts alone or together with other
fellow employees. The act of honoring is, moreover, for a mutual purpose because it is an act for the purpose of benefitting the honoror's
fellow employees. The honoring employee does not derive protection
64.

See Haggard, Observance, supra note 8, at 93-99.
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from acting in concert with picketing stranger employees or by reason
of the utility of the act of honoring in furthering the efficacy of the
stranger employee's strike weapon. His protection, rather, is a function of his participation in (and the instrumental value of that participation for) the "concerted activity" of the employee group in which
he is a member. His act is, in short, the act of that group, and it
is the group which possesses the Section 7 right to honor. Because
it is the group which is the repository of that right, the decision to
honor is, for purposes of the question of Section 7 protection, properly viewed as the decision of that group, and most particularly, the
decision of that group's exclusive representative.
(A)

The Relationship Between the "Concerted Activity" and
"Mutual Aid or Protection" Elements of the Statute.

It is possible to view the term "concerted" either as quite literally
requiring conduct by two or more employees or as a term of legal
art permitting protection of "activity" by a single employee. For the
most part, the courts have adhered to a literal approach" by requiring either action by two or more employees or action by a single
employee which "looks toward" group action in the sense that it has
as its purpose the initiating of group action. 6 A more liberal view
would label a single employee's effort to enforce his individual claim
under a collective bargaining agreement "concerted" even where his
effort constitutes an act outside the contractual grievance machinery,
upon the theory that enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement preserves the product of pre-agreement concerted activity or
ultimately benefits all employees subject to that agreement. 7 And the
Board has gone as far as concluding that individual employee action
in furtherance of that individual's personal interests is "concerted"
whenever such action may ultimately benefit fellow employees." Both
the Board's 'ultimate benefit' theory-and its less inclusive cousin,
the individual enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement as
65. See, e.g., NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973);
Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964).
66. Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
67. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967). The
Interboro test has been characterized as an inquiry into whether the individual
employees' action in pursuit of his individual interests will ultimately have a "concerted" effect-in the sense of an ultimate benefit-on his fellow employees. Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1980); Note, Constructive Concerted
Activity and Individual Rights: The Northern Metal-Interboro Split, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
152, 160 (1972). But see Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1980).
68. Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 NLRB 999 (1975).
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concerted activity theory-rely upon the speculative long-term impact
of individual action upon employees as a group 9 and therefore ap70
pear grounded upon the group benefit core of the mutuality concept.
This apparent fusion of the concertedness and mutuality
elements, and the doctrinal confusion generated by that fusion 7' are
both evident in and reinforced by the Supreme Court's opinion in
NLRB v. T. Weingarten, Inc.7 ' The Court there held that an individual
employee's request for union representation at an interview conducted
by an employer was a request protected by Section 7 where the
employee 73reasonably feared that the interview would result in
discipline.
In Weingarten, an individual employee requested union representation to further an individual interest in job security where no contractual right to representation existed under a collective bargaining
agreement. The Supreme Court's rationale for its result focused upon
the long-term benefit conferred on the group by the individual's
demand-or, perhaps more accurately, by compliance with the demand:
The action of an employee in seeking to have the assistance
of his union representative at a confrontation with his
employer clearly falls within the literal wording of S 7 that
"[e]mployees shall have the right ... to engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection." This is true even though the employee alone may
have an immediate stake in the outcome; he seeks "aid or
protection" against a perceived threat to his employment
security. The union representative whose participation he
seeks is, however, safeguarding not only the particular
employee's interest, but also the interests of the entire
bargaining unit by exercising vigilance to make certain that
the employer does not initiate or continue a practice of imposing punishment unjustly.'
69. See Anchortank Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980).
70. Compare Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 564-68 (1978) with NLRB
v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1967).
71. Compare Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1980)
(treating Weingarten as dealing with the mutuality question) with Anchortank Inc. v.
NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1980) (treating Weingarten as dealing with the
concertedness question). But see Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286,329
(1982) (apparently advocating an interpretation which would protect individual action
for individual benefit).
72. 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
73. Id. See also ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
74. 420 U.S. at 260-61 (citations omitted).
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It should be noticed that Weingarten postulates an individual
employee right to representation flowing from Section 7, but justifies
that right, as the quoted portion of the opinion makes clear, upon
the ground that the right serves the interests of employees as a
group." The Fifth Circuit has explained that analysis as "seemingly"
adopting the liberal view of the concertedness requirement: individual
action in pursuit of an individual interest is concerted if it has a
beneficial effect on employees as a group.7" The Second Circuit, in
limiting the liberal view to instances in which an individual employee
seeks to enforce a collective bargaining agreement, has explained
Weingarten as concerned only with analysis of the mutuality
requirement;77 according to the Second Circuit the concertedness requirement was satisfied in Weingarten only because the individual
employee's request for group representation was a request which
sought to initiate group action."8 The distinctions between these explanations are fundamental.
(1) The Fifth Circuit View.
The Fifth Circuit's view79 makes concertedness turn on an assess75. See Brousseau, supra note 4, at 37 ("The statutory right which the Board
and the Court have labored so mightily to create in Weingarten is misstated,
miscategorized and thus misunderstood: it is not a right of the employee to have the
union present, it is the right of the union to be present"). That the Board's view of
the right is premised upon an individual conception of the right is at least partially
confirmed by its position in Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1157 (5th Cir.
1980) ("[The Board) argues that the right is bottomed in section 7 . . . and [tlhus, the
right to representation belongs to the employee rather than to the union")
76. Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1980): "Significantly,
the Court (in Weingarten] did not discuss whether the employer's action was designed
to induce or prepare for group action or had some relation to group action in the
interest of the employees.
See also Materials Research Corp., 262 NLRB No.
122 (1982).
77. Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1980)
78. Id. at 844-45:
"Implicit, of course, in the Court's decision in Weingarten is that the action of an individual in requesting the assistance of a union steward met
S7's requirement of concertedness as well. While by definition, an individual acting alone cannot act in concert, S 7 is not limited to concerted
activity per se. Instead, it protects the "right to engage in . . . concerted
activities". If workers have the right to engage in concerted activities
• . . employers cannot obstruct an employee's efforts to exercise those
rights. Individual activity can be protected, therefore, if it is "looking toward
group action". [emphasis supplied]
79. The Fifth Circuit's view is in fact unclear. See NLRB v. DataPoint Corp.,
642 F.2d 123, 129 (5th Cir. 1982). I use that label here as a shorthand for the Board's
position, occasionally accepted by the Courts of Appeal and specifically accepted in
the Fifth Circuit's dictum in Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980).
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ment of the degree to which an individual's action in pursuit of individual interests furthers long-term group interests."s Under that
view, the legal protection afforded the individual is instrumental: the
individual's act has statutory value because it has the effect of serving the interests of the group as a whole. There is much in Weingarten
to support that view; the Supreme Court's analysis in that case rests
on the proposition that the "entire bargaining unit" has an interest
in the "quantum of proof" the employer requires before disciplining
an employee and therefore an interest in the employer's assessment
of individual cases in its disciplinary interviews. 1
Such an instrumental right analysis interprets the concertedness
requirement not as an issue of fact but as an issue of policy: does
the conduct in question serve group interests falling within the scope
of the interests Congress contemplated in the Labor Act.' There are
two implications: (1) Concertedness is to be measured by the tendency
of conduct to further "mutual aid or protection" and is therefore intimately a matter of the mutuality element of the statute; and (2) An
assessment of the substantive merits of the benefit conferred-at least
in the sense of an inquiry into whether an acceptable mutual benefit
will be forthcoming-is a necessary part of the analysis, but the assessment is an assessment made post hoc by the Board or by a reviewing
court."
80. 618 F.2d at 1162.
81. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 261 n.6 (1976) (citing Comment, Union Presence in Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 338 (1974)).
82. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 261-62 (1975) (recognizing
right to representation furthers policy of equalizing bargaining power).
83. This point is illustrated by a question left open in Weingarten: is the
employee's right to representation waivable by his union? If waivable, the Supreme
Court's assessment, in Weingarten, of the benefit to be conferred on the group by
individual demands for representation was not an assessment which removed decision
making authority from the union representing the employee. Under this interpretation of Weingarten, an interpretation consistent with the Second Circuit's rather than
Fifth Circuit's view, the assessment is an assessment only of the group or individual
nature of the interest at stake. If the Weingarten right is not waivable, decision making authority is in the government, and the assessment, consistent with the Fifth Circuit's view, is an assessment of the substantive merits of the group benefit conferred.
Note that the individual's decision making authority with respect to the issue of the
substantive benefit to be conferred is not conceded under either view. If the right
is waivable, the employee's choice is confined to the question whether he will or will
not make claims to the group's aid; the decision to give or to not give that aid is
for the union. If the right is not waivable, the individual employee has a right conferred by the government to the group's aid, but he does not exercise that right because
he has decided that it will aid the group; he exercises it for his individual purposes.
Indeed, the cases invoking the liberal view of the concertedness requirement involve
wholly individual complaints in which the employees do not seek the aid of their union.
See Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 NLRB 999 (1975).
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The Second Circuit's View.

The Second Circuit's view separates concertedness from mutuality. Concertedness, for the Second Circuit, requires either action by
a group or incipient action by a group.84 The right of the individual
is a right to participation in a group action, but the right to action
is a right exercised collectively. To protect the right to collective action, it is necessary that the first individual employee to advocate
group action or to act in contemplation of group action be protected."
An individual's pursuit of representation in Weingarten or of contract
enforcement generally falls within that rationale even where the pursuit is in furtherance of individual interests because it is functionally
participation in group activity; the individual employee's action calls
for the aid of the group or relies upon the product of group effort.86
Concertedness under the Second Circuit's view is therefore not
measured by a policy analysis of its tendency to further substantive
group interests. It is measured, rather, by a factual inquiry into
whether individual action makes claims upon the group. Such a claim
is established either by the lending of limited individual power to the
power of the group or by the invocation of the group in behalf of
individual interests; both claims are claims to participation in group
power. The claims are separable from the mutuality requirement
because determining whether they are present in a particular case
requires a factual inquiry in which the presence or absence of substantive benefit to the group is immaterial. The inquiry may be viewed
as an inquiry into the employee's "purpose""s in the sense of a purpose to invoke the power of the group; it is not an inquiry into the
likelihood of benefit to the group.
At least implicitly, however, the substantive benefit question,
a matter of mutuality, is to be decided, under the Second Circuit's
view, not by the individual employee or by the government but by
the group itself. That is the implication precisely because the Second
Circuit separates the concertedness and mutuality elements. The Fifth
Circuit's fusion of those elements necessitates a government decision
about the benefit of individual action for the group. And the individual's right to assert claims to participation in the Second Circuit
does not necessarily imply a right to insist upon the occurrence of
protected activity. If the group decides mutual benefit questions in
the Second Circuit, the right to engage in concerted activity for mutual
84.
85.
86.
87.

Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1980).
Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964).
See Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840, 844-45 (2d Cir. 1980).
See Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1980).
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benefit is a group right as well as an individual right of participation.
The individual is protected in his right to claim the power of the group,
but it is the group which exercises the right to engage in protected
activity. And in this sense, the individual is protected, even in the
Second Circuit, instrumentally-that is, for the group's ends.8
The Second Circuit's view does not necessarily require a literal
approach to the concertedness requirement. The Fifth Circuit's view
disposes of concertedness by fusing it with mutuality. The Second
Circuit's view preserves the independence of the concertedness element by inquiry into the nature of the claim made by the individual
engaged in the activity in question, not, necessarily, by counting the
number of persons so engaged. Such a counting process, where two
or more employees are counted, substantially eases the difficulty of
that inquiry as a matter of evidence, for such a count is evidence
that the group has responded to the individual's claim to participation by acting as a group. But such a count is not the exclusive means
of proving that such a response has occurred. 8 In some cases, such
as Weingarten itself, the nature of the interests at stake may justify
a presumption that the individual's act is a group act-a presumption
88. Cf. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Assoc. __
U.S. 102 S.Ct. 216, 233 (1981) (Powell, J. concurring and dissenting) (arguing on premises similar to those advocated here, that a confidential employee not includable within a bargaining unit enjoys no Section 7 protection of his participation in
concerted activity).
89. In Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second
Circuit did engage in a counting process and may therefore be viewed as having engaged
in a literal approach. The argument in the text, however, is that OntarioKnife should
not be so narrowly read. There are two grounds for a broader reading. First, the
Second Circuit's opinion characterizes Weingarten as a case invoking individual action
which looked toward group action. 637 F.2d at 844-45. But the only action the individual
"looked toward" in Weingarten was the presence of a union representative at an interview. In short, the individual activity in Weingarten was concerted because the individual invoked the group in the person of the union representing the group and
because there was no indication that the group had rejected the individual's claim.
The group was in effect presumed to have responded to the individual's invocation
without proof of actual response. Cli D. LESLIE. CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW
257 (1978) (If Weingarten rights are waivable, the effect of the decision is to reallocate
bargaining chips-i.e., to require the employer to negotiate away the representation
right.).
Second, the Second Circuit emphasized that, although the individual employee
protest in question in Onhirio Knij'e had been initially approved by at least one other
fellow employee, that fellow employee had not "participated in or alpproved" the discharged employee's later walkout. 637 F.2d at 845. (emphasis supplied) The discharge
occurred for the walkout. Id. In short, the Second Circuit recognized that individual
action on behalf of or at the instance of others may constitute concerted activity. See
id.at 846 (citing Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1980)).
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rebuttable by a clear indication, such as contractual waiver, that the
group has rejected the individual's call for group action.
(3)

Decision Making Authority and an Application
of the Views to the Honoring of Picket Lines.

The individual's role as a decision maker is limited under both
the Fifth and Second Circuit modes of analysis. Under the Fifth Circuit's view, the individual chooses to act, but Section 7 protection is
available for that action only by virtue of a post hoc administrative
or judicial judgment about the tendency of individual action to confer
benefit on the group. Protection is not, under that view, a function
either of the employee's individual or mutual purpose or of the individual or group nature of the employee's claim to protection. The
employee is protected because the government (the Board or a court)
decides that the group benefits from his act, not because the employee
decides either to aid or to demand the aid of the group. The Board
or the reviewing court, if it finds protection, confirms an individual
decision on the basis of a group benefit rationale which may or may
not have occurred to the individual. Under the Second Circuit's view,
the individual employee chooses to act, but Section 7 protection is
grounded on the nature of his claim-does the claim "look toward",
that is, invoke group action. The occurrence of group action in response
to that claim is a decision to be made by the group (or the union
representing the group) on the basis of the group's assessment of
benefit to the group.
In the context of a case in which an honoring employee refuses
to cross a stranger picket line, the employee is thought to act out
of a loyalty to unions or, at least, out of "working class solidarity."
His purposes may be viewed as mutual in either of two senses: he
may deem a victory in the stranger dispute as of ultimate benefit
to him or he may expect reciprocal aid in the future. 0 Although his
decision to honor has often been viewed as an individual decision, 9'
90. See Axelrod, supra note 8, at 633.
91. Although Board doctrine may be viewed, and is viewed here, infra notes
163-76 and accompanying text, as occasionally consistent with a collective characterization of the right to honor, both the Board and the courts often speak in terms suggesting that the right is both individual and "fundamental" in the sense that it is
a right to engage in conduct in the nature of an expression of principle. See, e.g., Kellogg
Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 526 (6th Cir. 1972) (a no-sympathy strike clause narrowly
interpreted because it "relates only to sympathy strikes caused or sanctioned by the
Union and makes no reference to the right of members to refrain from crossing a
picket line"); NLRB v. Southern Greyhound Lines, 426 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970) (confidential employee who by virtue of that status was not represented in office workers
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his union's power to waive his protection or to compel his action92
in this context belies that characterization.
If an honoring employee encountering a stranger picket line acts
in concert with the pickets, the Fifth Circuit's view suggests that his
protection is a function of the tendency of his action to beneift some
group-the stranger pickets directly by virtue of the economic power
he lends, or the group consisting of the honoror and his fellow
employees by virtue of anticipated indirect gain or reciprocal obligation. The unanswered question, in terms of an application of the Fifth
Circuit's view to the honoring of picket lines, is with respect to which
of these groups the tendency to benefit question is to be judged. 3
If the honoring employee is viewed as acting in concert with the
pickets, the Second Circuit's view suggests that the honoring employee's protection is instead a function of his claim to participation in
the stranger picket's activity. If the honoring employee acts not in
bargaining unit had right to refuse to cross picket line established by union representing service workers in another bargaining unit where employee acted from conviction); Keller-Crescent Co., 217 NLRB 685, 692 (1975), enforcement denied, 538 F.2d 1291
(7th Cir. 1976) (Under rule that waiver of statutory rights will not be inferred, bargaining
history does not indicate that union intended to waive its member's right to honor
picket line). Cf. NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir.) (An employee
who refuses to cross from fear rather than from motivations of mutual aid or conviction is not protected), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 526 (1971). On occasion, the notion that
the right is individual is expressly stated. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345
U.S. 71, 82 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting); Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union (Interborough News Co.), 90 NLRB 2135, 2147 (1950) (General Counsel's argument to this
effect rejected by trial examiner); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local
1-128, 223 NLRB 757, 764 (1976) (ALJ); Truck Drivers Union Local 413 (Patton
Warehouse), 140 NLRB 1474, 1485 (1963), enforced, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 916 (1964). See Harper, supra note 8, at 374-75; Schatzki, supra note 8, at 393.
92. See infra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
93. The mode of analysis labeled here the "Fifth Circuit's view" is applied
in contexts in which an employer discharges or otherwise disciplines a single employee
for conduct the employee engaged in singly. It has not, at least facially, been applied
in contexts in which two or more employees engage in conduct claimed to constitute
protected activity. The Fifth Circuit's view would therefore appear to be inapplicable
to the honoring employee's refusal to cross if the honoring employee is viewed as
acting in concert with the pickets.
The Fifth Circuit's view does, however, have relevance here. The mode of analysis
implicit in that view-government assessment of the substantive merits of the mutual
benefit question-is a potential basis, albeit a basis criticized here, for analyzing the
Section 7 protection to be granted the honoring employee. See Haggard, Observance,
supra note 8, at 93-99; infra notes 101-27 and accompanying text. Moreover, it is possible
to view the honoring employee not as acting in concert with the pickets but as acting
as the agent of his fellow employees for the benefit of his fellow employees. See NLRB
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1951); infra notes 117-50 and accompanying text.
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concert with the pickets but, rather, in concert with his fellow
employees in the sense that he acts in behalf of his fellow employees,
his protection is a function of his participation in fellow employee activity. The unanswered question, under the Second Circuit's view, is
whether decision making authority regarding that participation is to
be exercised by the stranger pickets, by virtue of the fact that they
are appealing to the employee for his participation in their concerted
activity, or by the group consisting of the honoring employee and his
fellow employees (or to the union representing that group). The distinction between the unanswered question in the Fifth Circuit and the
unanswered question in the Second Circuit is that the latter asks who
decides; the former assumes that the government decides and asks
on the basis of whose interests the government decides.
It may be argued that the distinction made here between government decision and union decision is unwarranted- that the Board and
the courts always decide. It is the case that the Board and the courts
do decide whether employee action is concerted action for mutual
benefit, but the point of this discussion is that the Fifth and Second
Circuits decide that question in quite different ways pointing in quite
different directions. An analysis which asks whether the group will
benefit from individual action and which grounds protection upon that
benefit is an analysis concerned only with the problem of mutual
benefit.94 That concern permits the Board or a reviewing court to ignore the question of decision making authority and to therefore confer Section 7 protection on an individual who makes no claim to group
power so long as mutual benefit is at least potentially forthcoming.
And the question of potential is decided by the Board or the court
not as a matter of whether there is a mutual interest some private
decision maker may seek, but as a matter of whether an individually
sought personal interest has some tendency to confer mutual benefit.
By contrast, an analysis which asks only whether an individual
employee's action makes a claim on the group" leaves unresolved both
the question whether the group will act, on that claim and the question of mutual benefit." It is true that a court employing the analysis
may be called upon to resolve those questions, but it will resolve them
94. See Oklahoma Allied Tel. Co., 210 NLRB 916 (1974).
95. See Ontario Knife Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1980).
96. I have argued elsewhere that the right to participate in concerted activity has a dual aspect: the individual right to participate and the group's right to the
instrumental value of that participation. Employer responses to the individuals decision to participate are, under that argument, to be distinguished from employer
responses to the group's use of concerted activity. See P. Cox, supra note 5, at 255-64.
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in the context of reviewing decisions made by private actors under
standards permitting those actors wide latitude in their decision making. It will resolve them on the premises (1) that an individual
employee's claim to statutory protection is a function of that individual's claim to participation in group activity rather than a function of the court's view of the effect of an individual action upon group
interests and (2) that the relevant actor (the actor with a claim to
decision about the occurrence of concerted activity) for purposes of
the court's assessment of protection is the group.
(B) Mutual Aid or Protection: Alternative Rationales
Section 7 requires that concerted activity be undertaken for purposes of "mutual aid or protection." The dictionary definition of
"mutual" postulates two distinct understandings of the term: (1) a common thing, action, relationship or sentiment,97 and (2) a reciprocal relationship, sentiment or action.9" There is of course substantial danger
of distortion in relying upon dictionary definitions, but these distinct
understandings may be viewed as expressive of competing understandings of Section 7's protection: The "aid or protection" which is the
objective of concerted activity may be viewed as protected if possessed
in common-that is, if shared.9 Or the aid or protection which is the
objective of concerted activity may be viewed as protected if conferred
reciprocally -that is, if the subject of an obligation, or, at least, expectation of exchange or return. '
(1) Mutuality as Shared Benefits
The theory that an employee of employer A, by honoring a picket
line established by employees of employer B in a dispute with
employer B, share at least indirectly in the benefits conferred on
employer B's employees (if B's employees are successful), is economic:
Where A and B are competitors in a product market, benefits conferred by B on B's employees serve as a precedent for A and A's
employees. 1 ' Moreover, organization of both A and B, or, at least,
standardization of wage levels for A and B employees' will eliminate

97. VI OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 803 (1970).
98. Id. (characterizing such a usage as nevertheless incorrect).
99. See Cyril de Cardova & Bros., 91 NLRB 1121, 1135 (1950).
100. See NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503,
506, (2d Cir. 1942).
101. Axelrod, supra note 8, at 632-33.
102. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180, 206 N.42 (1978); Houston Building and Constr. Trades Council (Claude Everett
Construction Co.), 136 NLRB 321 (1962).
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competition in the labor market.1 1 3 Even where A and B are not competitors in the same or interchangeable product market," ' a rise in
the compensation levels of employees generally is of indirect benefit
in putting upward pressure on the compensation level of the honoring employee.0 '
The argument that no such shared benefit phenomenon occurs"0 6
is equally economic: higher compensation levels for labor are reflected
in higher prices rather than lower profits."' The precedential effect
of a rise in employer A's employee's benefits is therefore ultimately
flat or declining real compensation.0 8 Moreover, as a rise in labor's
compensation has the effect of reducing, where capital and labor are
interchangeable, employment levels," 9 it is the "burden" of unemployment rather than the "benefit" of increased compensation which is
"shared"... 0
103. Compare Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) ("an elimination
of price competition based on differences in labor standards is the objective of any
labor organization"), with Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295,
310 (1925) ("Itlhere was substantial evidence . . . to show that the purpose . . . was
to stop production of non-union coal . .. where it would by competition tend to reduce
the price of the commodity and affect injuriously the maintenance of wages for union
labor in competing mines.
...).
104. By interchangeable product market, I mean a context in which products
may, in the absence, at least, of union-imposed restraints, be readily substituted. See
NLRB Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507 (1977); National Woodwork Mfrs.
Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
105. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 569-70 (1978) ("The Board was
entitled to note the widely recognized impact that a rise in minimum wage may have
on the level of negotiated wages generally."). However, a union's wage policy with
respect to particular employers is likely to be different in a context in which it has
organized a competitive industry than in a context in which it has organized employers
who are not in direct competition. A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS, 57-58
(2d ed. Rev. 1977).
106. The most emphatic attack upon the shared benefit theory in the present
context is Professor Haggard's. Haggard, Observance supra note 8, at 94-99.
107. Id. at 94-95. Professor Haggard recognizes that real wage increases are
both possible and have occurred, but argues that (1) rises in real wages are attributable
to rises in marginal productivity and rises in the marginal productivity of labor are
attributable to capital, id. at 95 n.219 (citing M. ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY AND STATE
519 (1970)) and (2) rises in real wages will therefore occur "as surely" in non-unionized
system as a unionized system. Haggard, Observance, supra note 8, at 95.
108. Haggard, Observance, supra note 8, at 95-96, relying primarily upon E.
SCHMIDT, UNION POWER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1973).
109. On the trade-off between compensation and employment generally see, e.g.,
C. MULVEY, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TRADE UNIONS 26-30 (1978); R. POSNER. ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW, 244-46 (2d ed. 1977). For a specific example of the trade off in action
see United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
110. Whether either burdens or benefits are in fact "shared" is a subject of
far more complexity than Professor Haggard's analysis- despite his recognition of the
complexity, Haggard, Observance, supra note 8, at 98-would indicate. In particular,
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The difficulty with both arguments is that they require
government-that is administrative and judicial -assessment of the
substantive economic merits of employee demands and therefore subject Section 7 protection to the vagaries of whichever economic theory
currently most bemuses the courts, the Board, or academics. The relevant legal question, if that question is to be framed as a matter of
substantive economic policy, is what economic theory most bemused
the Seventy-Fourth Congress"'- whether or not ultimately viable as
substantive economic theory. 12 If, however, Section 7 mutuality is to
it may be that increases in real compensation and, perhaps, maintenance of employment levels are affected by demonstrations of union workers solidarity across
employers-at least increases and maintenance for some employees. In short, solidarity may have the effect of redistributing both benefits and burdens in a manner which
does make economic sense to the honoring employee. It is other employees or potential employees (including, concededly, some who are honoror's despite their self-interest)
who are adversely affected. For example, the interests of more productive employees
may be sacrificed to the interests of less productive employees (assuming rational
managers) by uniformity of wage rates; the interests of non-union employees may be
sacrificed to the interests of unionized employees by the imposition of union versus
non-union wage differentials, and the interests of younger employees may be sacrificed to the interests of senior employees by reduced employment in combination with
seniority principles. Redistribution of benefits and burdens, whether or not conducive
to efficiency from a societal viewpoint, is not necessarily inconsistent with the selfinterest of the honoring employee. See MULVEY, supra, note 109, at 103-118 (relative
wages); POSNER, supra note 109, at 245 (effect of minimum wage is unemployment of
marginal workers, not union workers). Cf. Isaacson, OrganizationalPicketing: What
is the Law? Ought The Law To Be Changed, 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 345, 364-67 (1959) (conflict in interests between organized and unorganized workers).
It is also the case, of course, that the interests of the honoring employee and
the pickets may be inconsistent. Indeed, Haggard is quite correct in suggesting that
the "political slogan" of worker solidarity masks substantial conflicts of interest between workers. Haggard, Observance, supra note 8, at 98. Recognizing such conflicts
is, however, responsive to the shared benefit theory only if "mutual aid or protection"
is to be analyzed in substantive economic terms-and then only partially so. The legal
question, in the face of economic complexity, is who will decide the substantive economic
merits of the self-interest question.
111. I say the 74th Congress (the Wagner Act) rather than the 80th (TaftHartley) or 86th (Landrum Griffin), because the aspect of Section 7 under discussion
was not modified by subsequent amendments. To the extent that employer interests
were recognized in subsequent enactments; those interests-and the redressing of a
perceived imbalance in economic power-were preserved by means of specific limitations upon union conduct. Amendment of Section 7 proceeded from a recognition of
individual employee interests in freedom of choice, not from an overhauling of the
economic theory of 1935.
112. The economic philosophy of the 74th Congress appears clearly more consistent with the views of Mr. Alexrod, supra note 8, than of Professor Haggard, Observance, supra note 8, whatever the economic merits of the latter. See Hearings on H.R.
6288 Before the Committee on Labor, House of Representatives, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1935) (statement of Senator Robert Wagner), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 2485 (1949).
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be understood in terms of benefits shared in common-and as therefore requiring that the honoring employee participate in the spoils
exacted from a stranger employer by its picketing employees-the
honoring employee, not the board or a reviewing court, must be
granted the primary authority to assess the prospects for a participation in the spoils. It is the primary authority of the honoring employee
because, if that employee has an individual right to engage in concerted activity,"13 that right cannot be viably divorced from the right
to choose between competing versions of self-interest. Judicial or administrative assessment of the economic merits effectively forecloses
choice, and thus contravenes the fundamental underlying policy of the
Labor Act-that the merits of labor disputes, and therefore of
employee self interest, are to be decided without governmental
intervention."'
It is not an answer to this argument that ceding primary authority for the economic merits of a mutuality decision to the honoring
employee is an abrogation of judicial or administrative responsibility
for determining the scope of Section 7. The present issue is only
mutuality; accommodation of the interests of others-of employers or
of society-are not properly addressed in analysis of that issue.''5
Moreover, the primary authority of the honoring employee or of the
union representing that employee is not without limit. The subject
matter of the employee's assessment is confined by the proposition
that Section 7 grants protection to employees and must therefore be
understood as concerned with mutual aid or protection with respect
to employment."6
113. See Brousseau, supra note 4, at 27. Brousseau views the union - the group
- as the holder of the "right" to engage in concerted activity for mutual purposes.
Id. at 26. But he views the right of non-participation as individual. Id. at 27. The result
suggested in the text would follow equally if the individual honoror's right is placed
on the ground that it is the individual's right to "assist" labor unions under Section
7. Id. at 26.
114. Cj:, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agent Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (there
is no Board authority to balance economic weapons because such an authority would
involve the Board in the merits of dispute); NLRB v. American Nat'l. Ins. Co., 343
U.S. 395 (1952) (there is no Board authority to judge merits). But cf., e.g. First Nat'l
Maint. Corp. v. NLRB 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (subjects of bargaining); Fibreboard Paper
Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (same).
Although Section 8(a)(1) makes it clear that the rights conferred upon employees
by Section 7 are rights against employers, at least one of the purposes of Section
7 was to affirmatively declare lawful employee action historically viewed with hostility by government-i.e., the courts. See International Union, UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 257-58 (1949). Section 7 may be viewed
in part, then, as conferring rights against government.
115. See infra notes 391-425 and accompanying text.
116. Compare Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978) with Firestone Steel
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However, there is another and more persuasive answer to the
argument. It is that neither the honoring employee nor the government has a Section 7 right to assess the prospects for a share of the
spoils. Assessment of the economic merits of the prospects for a share
of the spoils is a right possessed by the union representing the honoring employee, and that union may be disabled from acting on an assessment favoring participation in the stranger pickets' "protected activity"
by direct statutory prohibitions limiting its section 7 right and to
engage in "protected activity.'. 7
The proposition that it is the honoring employee's union which
is the repository of the right to concerted activity is not supportable
by reference to direct authority-the right to engage in protected
activity is generally thought to be a right possessed by individual
employees." 8 But it is a proposition" 9 supportable by reference to two
accepted tenets of labor law in tension with that general understandProducts Co., 224 NLRB 826 (1979). The Court in Eastex rejected the notion that the
scope of "employment" for purposes of such an analysis is limited to matters over
which the employee's employer has "control" and therefore disapproved of cases adopting that notion, e.g., NLRB v. Leslie Metal Arts Co., 509 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1975); Shelly & Anderson Furniture Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1974). That disapproval would seem to eliminate the major theoretical basis for finding the honoring
of a stranger picket line unprotected.
117. See 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4)(B) (1976) (secondary boycott prohibitions); Truck
Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964).
With respect to the picket line proviso to Section 8(b)(4)(B), see infra notes 379-82 and
accompanying text. The union may also be limited by contract -i.e., by a no-strike clause.
The extent to which the honoror's union is disabled from requiring the honoror
to honor a stranger picket line where the picketing union does not violate 8(b)(4) by
appealing to the honoror, Local 761, Intern. Union of Electrical Radio & Machine
Workers v. NLRB [General Electric], 366 U.S. 667 (1961), is unclear. The issue is examined infra notes 292-359 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Eastex Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); NLRB v. J. Weingarten,
Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). Recent criticism of Supreme Court interpretation of the NLRA
from a more radical perspective recognizes the "incoherence" of the individualist and
collectivist/institutional strands of that interpretation, but alleges that the predominant theme has been collectivist in the sense that worker rights under Section 7 have
been sacrificed to union bureaucracy. See Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New
Historiographyof Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450 (1981); Lynd, Government Without Rights: The Labor Law Vision of Archibald Cox, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 483
(1981); Lynd, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activity After Union Recognition, A
Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. L.J. 720 (1975). It should be understood, however,
that the "individualist" alternative is not, for such critics, individualist in traditional
senses. Worker rights are, rather, viewed as communitarian rights but are also viewed
as unstructured in the sense that they are not subject to externally imposed legal
obligations or to utilitarian policy justifications for unions as institutions.
119. Cf. Brousseau, supra note 4, at 26 (right to engage in concerted activity
is a group, not an individual, right).
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ing: it is the group, through the union representing the group, which
assesses and formulates positions regarding the economic interests
of the group and therefore, of individuals within the group, 2 ' and it
is the group, again through the union, which controls the instrument
of group power-concerted activity.'
The underlying issue (who is to decide what is and is not of
economic benefit) cannot be divorced from the economic issue (the
share of the spoils question) because it must be decided whether there
will or will not be a sharing of spoils. The honoror's union is the
observed decision maker when it seeks, contractually, to either protect the honoror from the honoror's employer or to waive statutory
protection'"-contractual protection or waiver sought, at least in part,
on the basis of that union's assessment of the prospects for participation in the spoils. The honoror's union is equally the observed decision maker when it seeks to require a refusal to cross another union's
picket line' 23-on the basis of its contemporaneous assessment of the
prospects for participation in the spoils. And the honoror's union is
in legal contemplation the decision maker when either the contractual protection it sought or its contemporaneous efforts to force
employees it represents to honor picket lines run afoul of express
statutory limitations upon union, qua union conduct.2"
The generally accepted proposition that it is the individual
employee who is the decision maker when that employee confronts
a stranger picket line and where his union has not formally acted

120. J.L. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Medo Photo Supply Co. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944). See 29 U.S.C. i 159(a) (1976) (exclusivity).
121. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50 (1975); NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 430 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co.,
318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944); United
Aircraft Corp., 192 NLRB 382 (1971); enforced in part sub noa., I.A.M. v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976). But see Pabst
Brewing Co., 236 NLRB 1543 (1978). See generally Gould, The Status of Unuthorized
(nd "'Wildcat" Strikes Under The National Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNEl. L.Q. 672
(1967); Finkin, The Limits of Majorily Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REV.
183, 189-90 (1980). But see Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); A. Cox,
The Right To Engage in Concerted Actirities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 332 (1951); Finkin, The
Truncation of Laidlaw Rights by Collective Agreement, 3 INDUS. REL. L.J. 591 (1979).
122. See NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953); Truck Drivers
Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964).
123. See. e.g., Adamszewski v. Local Lodge 1487 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, 496 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1974); Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers,
223 NLRB 757 (1976).
124. See qupra note 117.
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to either protect or force a refusal to cross is grounded on the
unrealistic notion that the union is a nonparticipant absent formal
action.12 Given that notion however, the proposition is viable only to
the extent that the employee acts from motives independent of gain
through a sharing of spoils-or at least exercises a right the source
of which is independent of the right to seek mutual gain. If the
employee exercises a right to seek a share of the spoils, it is a right
necessarily exercised on behalf of the employee group in which he
is a member-for the economic consequences, good or ill, will, by the
terms of the economic benefit theory, be borne by that group."' And
the group, at least where organized, makes its assessments through
the mechanism of its exclusive representative. The statutory decision
maker with respect to issues of economic advantage or disadvantage
is the honoring employee's union."2
If the proposition that the honoring employee acts on behalf of
his fellow employees when he acts for a share of the spoils is for
the moment accepted, it follows that he derives his Section 7 protection, to the extent that that protection requires mutuality, from the
125. Cf. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 423 n.10 (1981) (Powell,
J., concurring) (proof of union participation in wildcat strike may be circumstantial);
Truck Drivers Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539, (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916
(1964) (rejecting union argument that protective picket line clause merely permits voluntary individual employee action); United States v. UMW, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C.
1948) (tacit union approved of wildcat strikes), affd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 871 (1949) (tacit union approval of wildcat strikes).
126. It is true that the economic consequences will be borne, as well, by others
and that others do not, under the the argument, have a voice in the decision. But
the question here is statutory protection of the employee from his employer, and the
statutory scheme grants the union representing the employee the right to pursue the
interests of the employees it represents vis-A-vis their employer without regard to
the consequences for others.
127. Cf. Note, Picket Line Observance: The Board and the Balance of Interests,
79 YALE L.J. 1369, 1381 (1970) (arguing that protection for honoring employees should
be left to collective bargaining and arbitration).
It is true that an employee's activity may be protected under Section 7 in the
absence of a union, NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962), and that
such protection would be logically compelled by the shared benefit theory even where
an employee not represented by a union honors a stranger picket line. See generally
Johnson, Protected Concerted Activity in the Non-Union Context: Limitations On The
Employer's Right To Discipline or Discharge Employees, 49 Miss. L.J. 839 (1978). But
cf. NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Ass'n, ____U.S. -,
.
102 S.Ct. 216, 232-33 (1981) (Powell, J. concurring) (arguing that such would not be
the case with respect to confidential employees). But employee activity in the nonunion context must be group activity. See, e.g. NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d
1079 (8th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, Inc., 481 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir.
1973). But see Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 245 NLRB 1053 (1979).
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group consisting of his fellow employees and, therefore, through the
union which expresses the will of that group whether or not the union
has expressed that will. It is true that in a case in which the union
purports not to have itself acted, decision making authority is in the
honoring employee, but the decision that employee makes is, at least
by the terms of the shared benefit theory, about the prospects for
sharing of spoils by the group in which he is a member. An individual
right conception of Section 7 would suggest that the union's nondecision in such a case leaves the "right" in the employee as nondelegated. Under a collective right conception of Section 7 the union,
even where it purports not to decide, has the right of decision, and
has therefore in fact decided by delegation of its authority to the
employee.
Section 7 protection afforded the employee is, under a collective
conception, derivative-if there is protection, it is because the
employee's union has at least implicitly, if not formally and expressly,
decided that the employee's action will further the group's prospects
for a share of the spoils. Section 7 protection is to be measured, under
this interpretation, by reference to the union representing the honoring employee.
(2)

Mutuality As Reciprocity

The best known statement of the reciprocity theory of mutuality is Judge Learned Hand's in NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss
Chocolates Co., Inc."' In that case, a union official was discharged after
the union representing employees of Peter Cailler attacked, by means
of a published union "resolution," Peter Cailler's support of one of
two factions of dairy farmers engaged in a dispute over a milk boycott.
The dairy farmers supported by the union were not "employees"
within the meaning of the Labor Act, and a finding that the union
"resolution was a 'concerted activity' for the 'mutual aid or protection' of the farmers on the one hand and the members of [the union]
on the other"" was therefore precluded. But Judge Hand nevertheless
found the resolution protected insofar as the resolution was a concerted activity for the purpose of the aid and protection of the union
members themselves'3:
If [the union] thought that the resolution might help to
secure for them the favor of [the farmer group], it was no
128.
129.
130.

130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942).
Id. at 505.
Id.
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objection that [the farmer group] was not made up of
"employees" . . . . [The union] might well believe that
the
support engendered by that favor might prove as important
in future disputes with the chocolate company as the support of other unions in its own craft or in other crafts.'31
The attractiveness of the reciprocity theory 132 as a justification
for affording an employee who honors a stranger picket line Section
7 protection is obvious: by honoring a stranger picket line, the
employee makes a deposit in the currency of economic coercionthe adverse effect of the refusal to cross on the picketed employer's
ability to operate. That deposit may be withdrawn, should the occasion arise, by a draft on the coercive power of the stranger pickets.
Today's picketing employee may be tomorrow's delivery person. Of
course the reality does not follow a perfect model of reciprocity; the
account into which these deposits are made is a joint account with
many drawers, and drafts on the account often occur in the form of
appeals to worker solidarity rather than in the form of references
to particular past favors.' 33 But the reciprocity notion nevertheless
holds true: there is, in "worker solidarity", an element of an expectation of return on today's investment.
Is reciprocity what Section 7 contemplates? Although distinct
from the shared benefit theory, both theories possess in common the
notion that the honoring employee must get something for the refusal
to cross. Under the reciprocity theory it is a claim to future aid the
honoring employee gains; under the shared benefit theory, it is indirect participation in the spoils of a successfully resolved stranger
131. Id. at 506. The most widely quoted portion of Judge Hand's opinion is
that postulating a context not present in the case and a context presenting a far less
difficult issue:
When all the other workmen in a shop make common cause with a fellow
workman over his separate grievance, and go out on strike in his support, they engage in a "concerted activity" for "mutual aid or protection",
although the aggrieved workman is the only one of them who has any
immediate stake in the outcome. The rest know that by their action each
one of them assures himself, in case his turn ever comes, of the support
of the one whom they are all of them helping; and the solidarity so
established is "mutual aid" in the most literal sense, as nobody doubts.
Id. at 505-06.
132. The Supreme Court has adopted, and intermixed, both the shared benefit
and reciprocity theories. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 563-70 (1978). The
lower federal courts often rely upon Peter Cailler in picket line cases. See, e.g., NLRB
v. Difco Labs, Inc., 427 F.2d 170 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833 (1970); NLRB
v. City Yellow Cab Co., 344 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1965).
133. See Haggard, Observance, supra note 8, at 98.
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dispute. But the claim to future aid is not a claim exercisable by the
honoring employee. It is a claim exercisable by the honoring
employee's exclusive representative for the same reasons that it is
the honoring employee's exclusive representative which has the right
to assess prospects for shared, indirect benefits.'34 The group is a
statutory drawer on the economic coercion account, not the
individual. 35'
The point may be illustrated by examining Judge Hand's analysis
in the Peter Cailler case. Section 7 provides protection to "employees"
and the dairy farmers directly aided by the union in Peter Cailler
were not "employees" within the meaning of the Act.'36 If "mutual
aid or protection" under the Section refers to aid or protection shared
by both the persons engaged in the concerted activity in issue and
the persons benefitted by the aid or protection, the farmers were not
qualified beneficiaries, and mutuality was therefore not satisfied. Judge
Hand circumvented this difficulty by suggesting that the aid or protection was conferred, by virtue of an expectation or reciprocity, upon
the employees of the chocolate company.'37 Mutuality is satisifed if
the benefit of future reciprocal obligation will be enjoyed by the
statutory employees who engage in concerted activity. The union's
purpose therefore must have been to benefit the group it represented,
and not to benefit the group it did not (and could not with impunity)
38
represent-the farmers.'
The union had, then, no recognized claim to Section 7 protection
for the exercise of union power on behalf of the farmers; its claim
to protection was grounded on its exercise of union power for the
ultilrfate benefit of the employees it represented. The discharged union
official's right-that is, his right to Section 7 protection from employer
retaliation-was a right grounded, first, upon the benefit derived by
the union (employees of the chocolate company as a group) from that
134. See supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
135. A case such as NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974), holding that
the group may not waive individual employee rights to solicit support for either an
incumbent or rival representative, is distinguishable as entailing a distinct form of
right-the individual employee's right of choice. See infra notes 183-206 and accompanying text.
136. See 29 U.S.C. S 152(3) (1976).
137. 130 F.2d at 505. But see Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567-68 (1978)
("We may assume that at some point the relationship becomes so attenuated that an
activity cannot fairly be deemed to come within the "mutual aid or protection" clause.")
138. Id. at 505-06. The Board does not follow this rationale where a single
statutory employee aids non-employees-the activity in such a case is said to be not
"concerted." The Capital Times Co., 234 NLRB 309 (1978).
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protection and, second, upon the utility of the farmers as an instrument for achieving the union's future objectives. The individual official's right was therefore an instrumental right-a right recognition
of which was necessary to further the ultimate end of the group's
participation in the farmer's power.
If the union official's claim to Section 7 protection in Peter Cailler
was a claim derived from the union's right to seek enhanced power,
is an individual employee's claim to protection in refusing to cross
a stranger picket line similarly grounded? That question may be
answered in part by examining an analogy used by Judge Hand in
support of his conclusion in Peter Cailler: Employees who strike in
protest of their employer's discharge of a single fellow employee are
engaged in concerted activity for a mutual purpose because they anticipate that employee's future aid.139
In one sense, Hand's argument may be read as postulating
reciprocal individual claims: employee X's activity in behalf of
employee Y is mutual where X may anticipate Y's activity in behalf
of X. But this scenario is merely a description of individual motivation for group organization. Individuals form groups to enhance individual power, thus furthering individual interests. As a description
of that motivation, it tells us something about the meaning of mutuality in the statute because it suggests that the purposes for which
concerted activity will be protected are purposes consistent with the
reasons for the formation of unions.'40 But it does not tell us how such
a purpose is to be formulated or by whom it is to be formulated, and
because it does not do these things, it misdescribes events: X may
well wish to aid Y in anticipation of reciprocal aid, but X engages
in a strike to confer that aid at the instance of his union.'41 At least
in a context in which employee X is represented, he does not decide
either whether to use the strike weapon in protest of a fellow
employee's discharge or whether protest of such a discharge is a
desirable end. The union makes that decision, either contemporaneously or by virtue of its past negotiation of a no strike clause. The union's
use of the strike weapon (or, more realistically, its invocation of a
contractual grievance procedure) in the context contemplated by Judge
Hand's analogy is an exercise for a mutual purpose in the sense that
139. 130 F.2d at 505.
140. Cf. 29 U.S.C. S 151 (1976) ("The inequality of bargaining power between
employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contact,
and employer's . . . substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce ... ").
141. Where there is no union, X does so at the instance of, or as a participant
in, the group. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
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it is an exercise for a group purpose. The exercise may be consistent
with individual reciprocity as the motivation for group formation, but
the strike is undertaken for the benefit of the group in the sense
of the groups' purposes as a group."'
The union facially appears to be the repository of authority to
decide issues of mutuality, because the union may choose to decline
to engage in concerted activity for a purpose which would entail reciprocity and because it may effectively waive the Section 7 "rights"
of employees to engage in concerted activity for such a purpose.'
In short, the union at least generally controls the concerted activity
of the employees it represents. It therefore necessarily controls decisions about reciprocity to the extent of its control of concerted activity.
Moreover, so long as the reciprocity notion is defined in terms of a
tacit exchange of power, the union should be characterized as the decision making authority in making the exchange. Such a characterization is factually accurate both where union A seeks to aid employees
it represents in disputes with the employee's employer and where
union A actively seeks to aid union B in a dispute with a stranger
employer.'" But it is the contention here that the characterization (for
purposes of Section 7 protection, the irrebuttable presumption) is appropriate where employees represented by union A seek to aid union
45
B without the active connivance of A.1
It is appropriate because the reciprocity notion is not grounded
142. Cf. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 261 n.6 (1975) (union, in
providing representation to the individual, insures employer adherence to disciplinary
standards for the group).
143. See, e.g., Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (union waiver
of right to strike by no strike clause); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95 (1962) (substitution of grievance and arbitration procedure for the protest strike
contemplated by Hand in Peter Cailler); NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345
U.S. 71 (1953) (union waiver of "right" to honor a picket line). But see generally Harper,
Union Waiver, supra note 8, at 335 (taking a narrower view of union authority to
waive). The union may, of course, so neglect mutuality that the motivation for group
formation-reciprocal obligation-disappears, but this is an internal issue or an issue
of choice of representative, NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974), not an issue
of definition.
144. See NLRB v. Retail Clerks Union Local 1179, 526 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1975).
145. It should be made clear here that I am not contending that the honoring
employee invariably acts as his union's agent for purposes of Unfair Labor Practice
provisions directed against union conduct. I am contending rather, that the employee's
protection is to be measured by the union's protection, and prohibitions on union conduct which would disable the union from directing "concerted activity" equally disable
the employee even where union direction of the employee's conduct is not provable.
Contra: NLRB v. Gould Inc., 638 F.2d 159, 163 n.2 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
930 (1981). See infra notes 364-91 and accompanying text.
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upon an expectation by an individual employee that by aiding stranger
employees he will be directly aided in the future by stranger employees, ' but upon the notion that he will be indirectly aided in the future
through the enhancement of the power of the group in which he is
a member. When employee X, represented by but not instructed by
union A, offers his power to union B, the offer is an offer to aid B
in achieving B's objectives, but it is an offer which is for a mutual
purpose, under the terms of Hand's reciprocity notion, only because
made for A's future purposes.
When union A eventually calls upon B (or the employees
represented by B) for aid, it is A which will control the purposes for
which such power will be used and the occasions for its use. Employee
X, except in extremely rare circumstances,'4 7 cannot individually control or seek B's future aid.'48 Because union A will control the circumstances and purposes in which and for which union B's future aid
will be sought, the tacit exchange of employee X's present aid for
union B's future aid is an exchange for union A's present purposesfor the purpose of enhancing A's power. Union A should not be permitted to escape that characterization by taking a neutral stance on
the question whether employee X should or should not cross B's picket
line. Formal neutrality may suggest present indifference to enhanced
power and may suggest caution about the applicability of prohibitions
upon A's conduct as union conduct, but union A's control over future
circumstances and purposes makes employee X's reciprocal exchange
of power A's exchange of power. One may argue that X is in fact
not contemplating an exchange-that he acts from conviction or from
fear rather than calculation-but so long as X's Section 7 protection
is a function of reciprocity, X's subjective motivation is immaterial." 9
146. It is possible to conceive of an employee or employees seeking the aid
of a stranger union or of stranger employees in a dispute with their employer where
their own union will not seek that aid or is hostile to that aid, but it is at least unlikely that the effort will be successful in the absence of stranger union or stranger
employee hostility to the union representing the employees who are parties to the
dispute. The "signal effect" of pickets is a phenomenon most likely the product of
a loyalty to unions as a cause. The at least tacit approval of a wildcat strike by some
union with representational interests is generally a practical prerequisite to the honoring
of picket lines. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 418 n.1 (1981)
(Powell, J. concurring). But see id. at 422.
147. But see Harper, Union Waiver, supra note 8, at 374-75.
148. Cf. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1977) (proviso to Section
8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4) (1976), does not protect persons who honor a picket line
established in a wildcat strike).
149. Compare NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971) (a refusal to cross motivated by fear rather than principle
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In short, because the individual employee who refuses to cross a
stranger picket line is doing his union's bidding in the sense that the
mutual purpose which renders that refusal protectable is enhanced
group power (a power in which the employee may seek to participate
but does not individually control), the employee's Section 7 protection should be judged by reference to his union.
(3)

The Competing Versions of Mutuality: Mutuality
as License, Mutuality as Rationalization and Mutuality
as Worker Solidarity Across Employers.

The argument thus far made here has been that the Section 7
right to engage in concerted activity for mutual purposes is a collective right. The premise of that argument is that the actor claiming
Section 7 protection has no Section 7 right unless that actor has the
right of decision regarding its exercise. The mutuality element of the
statute is, under that premise, something more than a mere description of the ends for which concerted activity will be protected. Mutuality is instead the defining element in a grant of a license to the actor
engaged in concerted activity to pursue ends the actor views as advantageous. The grant of such a license does not mean that its scope
is unlimited; the license is limited both by the terms of Section 7 (activity, to be protected, must be concerted and for mutual aid or protection) and by other statutes or laws (e.g., the secondary boycott prohibition). The license does mean, however, that the actor's protection,
in the absence of a prohibition limiting the license, is dependent solely upon meeting the terms of Section 7; protection is not dependent
upon the Board's or a court's after-the-fact view of the desirability
of the activity from the standpoint of policies independent of Section
7.150 The actor therefore has the right of decision in the sense that
the actor has the right to decide what mutual ends it will pursue
within a broad discretion. The Board or a court's after-the-fact judgment about whether the ends fit within the scope of mutuality is
rendered on the basis of an understanding of mutuality viewed from
the perspective of the actor, not on the basis of an understanding
of mutuality infused with the Board's or a court's view of desirable
labor policy.
There are other and contrary views of the meaning of mutuality. The first of these contrary views is suggested by what was termed
renders refusal not protected) uith Browning-Ferris Industries, 259 NLRB No. 9 (1979)
(employee's motive for refusing to cross is immaterial).
150. Cf. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l. Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (Board
may not balance economic weapons).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1982

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 [1982], Art. 2
156

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

here the Fifth Circuit's position on the question of concerted activity.'
Under that view, mutuality's function is only descriptive; Section 7
protection is afforded concerted activity where the tendency of that
activity is to further mutual ends"' or where the motivation for activity may be characterized as mutual," but tendency and motivation are rationalizations for decisions favoring protection on other
grounds. Those other grounds reflect substantive policy: protection
is desirable because the employee activity in issue tends to further
socially desirable ends which may be characterized, as a matter of
rationalization, in terms of mutuality. The authority to make decisions
about the desirability of ends is, under this view, the Board's or a
court's authority, not the actor's authority." Section 7 protection,
under such a view, is instrumental protection in the sense that protection is afforded for substantive policy reasons independent of the
terms of Section 7 itself.
This description of the first contrary view is admittedly largely
caricature; it is not a description actively advocated by either the
Board or the courts. It is nevertheless the contention of the present
article that the view is implicit, even if not articulated, in administrative and judicial positions taken in the present context."' And
whether or not that contention is accepted, the view serves as a useful
point of contrast for purposes of assessing the nature of the rights
conferred by Section 7. The distinction between mutuality as license
and mutuality as rationalization as alternative explanations of the right
to honor a picket line is that the former explains the right by identifying the actor who makes the decision to honor; the latter explains
the right in terms of the usefulness of the act of honoring for labor
policy-e.g., by justifying protection not on the ground that honoring
a picket line advances the interests of the honoring employee and
his fellow employees, but because it preserves the efficacy of the strike
weapon."'
151. See supra note 79.
152. See Gorman and Finkin, supra note 71, at 354-55.
153. See NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 826 (1071).
154. See supra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text; infra notes 339-41 and accompanying text.
156. See NLRB v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1363 (9th Cir. 1981);
NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp., 440 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826
(1971); West Coast Casket Co., 97 NLRB 820, 823 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 902 (9th
Cir. 1953); Schatzki, supra note 8, at 394; infra notes 247-68 and accompanying text.
The point is perhaps best illustrated by comparing Judge Hand's rationale in NLRB
v. Peter Cailler Swiss Chocolates, 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942) discussed supra notes
136-48 and accompanying text, with the Board's rule that a single employee who honors
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The second contrary view, again something of a caricature but
implicit in some decisions 7 and even explicit in some commentary,'
is that mutuality means worker solidarity. Under this view the locus
of the Section 7 right to honor is in the individual, and Section 7 protection is justified on the theory that an individual seeks individual
shared benefit and reciprocal power. 9 But the underlying notion supporting the view is that employee activity has a mutual purpose if
it reflects worker solidarity across employers; the honoring employee
need not expect shared benefit or reciprocal power because the right
exercised is a personal right in the nature of expression."6 The distinction in result between the mutuality as license and mutuality as
solidarity explanations of the right to honor is suggested by the
distinct positions each view takes on the question of union waiver,
by collective bargaining agreement, of the right to honor: the former
explanation assumes a power of waiver while the latter explanation
denies such a power. 6'
It has been said here that the two contrary views described are
largely caricature. In fact all three views may be seen at work in
different cases at different times. 62 The purpose of the next section
of this paper is to criticize both the solidarity and rationalization versions of mutuality and to advocate in more detail a preference for
the license version of mutuality.
C.

Some Counterarguments: Of Individual and Collective Rights
Two doctrinal developments support the notion that the honor-

a picket line established by persons not defined as employees under the Act is not
protected because he does not act in concert with employees. Capital Times Co., 234
NLRB 309 (1978). The latter rule treats the picket line as the concerted activity deserving of protection; the act of honoring is a mere incident of the picket line having no
independent claim to protection. It is true that the Capital Times rule may be derived
from the view that the individual honoring employee must act in concert to be protected, but Judge Hand's rationale permits the concertedness criterion to be met by
focusing upon the group consisting of the honoror and his fellow employees rather
than the pickets.
157. See cases cited supra note 91.
158. See authorities cited infra note 166.
159. See Harper, supra note 8, at 372-73.
160. See Klare, supra note 118, at 479. The Klare and Harper positions are
distinct on this point, for Harper appears to believe that the individual worker may
be accurately characterized as seeking individual mutual gain. Harper, supra note 8,
at 372-73.
161. See infra notes 227-46 and accompanying text.
162. For a recent example of the conflicting themes suggested in the text compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Materials Research Corp., 262 NLRB No.
122 (1982).
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ing employee's Section 7 protection should be measured by reference
to his exclusive representative: (1) the employee's union may contractually waive the Section 7 protection he would otherwise enjoy when
confronting a stranger picket line,'" and (2) that the union may, without
violating Section 8(b)(1)(A),' 64 discipline union members for crossing a
lawful stranger picket line.'
The rule that a union may waive the right to honor is necessarily premised on the view that the act of honoring is a subject matter
within the statutory competence of the exclusive representative. Such
a premise is consistent with the interpretation given here to Section
7's mutuality requirement: under either the shared benefit or reciprocity views of mutuality, it is the group-the honoring employee and
his fellow employees-who claim both benefits and reciprocal power
and group claims are made through and controlled by the exclusive
representative. 6 ' But the premise is not consistent with the view that
163. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
164. 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(1)(A) (1976): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
union or its agents . . . to restrain or coerce . . . employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the
right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition
or retention of membership therein ....
165. See International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Union 18 (DavisMcKee, Inc.), 238 NLRB 652 (1978). A union which disciplines an employee for refusing to cross a picket line directed at a stranger employer runs substantial risks that
it will be found to have thereby violated Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(4) upon the theory
that such conduct is secondary. Those risks are particularly acute under the regime
imposed by Building and Construction Trades Council of New Orleans (Markwell &
Hartz, Inc.), 155 NLRB 319 (1965), enforced, 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 914 (1968) in the construction industry. See, e.g., Orange County Dist. Council
of Carpenters, 242 NLRB 585 (1979); Local 153, Int. Bhd. Electrical Workers, 221 NLRB
345 (1975). Although most cases involving the question of a union authority to discipline
for crossing a stranger picket line are disposed of either on the secondary boycott
ground or upon the ground of waiver by contract, Local 1197 Communication Workers
(Western Electric Co., Inc.), 202 NLRB 229 (1973), the union's right to discipline in
the stranger employer context cannot be distinguished from the union's right to
discipline in the sister local (common employer context) absent invocation of the secondary boycott ban. See Communications Workers Local 6222 of America, 186 NLRB
312 (1970). With respect to the question whether and to what extent the secondary
boycott ban disables the union from exercising what would otherwise be its authority
in the stranger employer context, see infra notes 270-93 and accompanying text.
166. A relevant analogy involves cases in which employees engage in concerted
activity against their employer under circumstances in which the employee's right
has not been waived and the activity is at least generally in support of their union's
bargaining position, but the activity is not directed by or is opposed by the union.
Although the Board has on occasion found employee activity in such a context protected insofar as not inconsistent with the union's position, Draper Corp., 52 NLRB
1477 (1943), enforcement denied, 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944), the Courts of Appeal have
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the Section 7 right to honor is vested in the individual employee':
been generally unreceptive to protection in such circumstances. See NLRB v. Sunbeam
Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661, 663 (7th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 430
F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir.
1969). See generally Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 672 (1967); Cantor, Dissident Worker
Action, After the Emporium, 29 RUT. L. REV. 35 (1975). But see Harper, supra note 8,
at 368-71.
167. See supra note 91. The distinction between individual and collective
understandings of Section 7 is an oversimplification useful for present purposes only
if certain of the complexities masked by it are understood. The collective, group or
union right understanding of concerted activity proposed in the principal argument
(the argument that the individual honoror is the instrument of his union) is an institutional understanding. The bases for such an understanding are, alternatively, (1) Section 9(a) exclusivity, or (2) Section 7 itself, as informed by Section 1 (congressional
understanding), Section 9(a) (exclusivity) and the definitional rationales for both concertedness and mutuality as previously discussed. See generally Emporium Capwell
Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). Support for the understanding may be found both in the accepted proposition that an employee's Section 7 rights
may be waived by the exclusive representative and in the accepted proposition that
employees may not engage in concerted activity for purposes inconsistent with the
authority of the exclusive representative. Id.
A second potential understanding of the collective or group right notion is noninstitutional. It may be viewed as communal in the sense that it does not proceed
from the individualistic assumption that human intercourse is a zero sum game, see
Lynd, Qovernment Without Rights, supra note 114, at 494, but is individualist in the
sense that communal rights are exercisable independently of and in conflict with institutional arrangements initially designed to express communal sentiment. In statutory
terms, the source of such an understanding is Section 7; Section 9 is a limitation upon
Section 7, but is itself more, Lynd, Legislative History, supra note 118, or less, Harper,
supra note 8, limited. The clearest example of a state of affairs consistent with the
understanding is concerted activity by unorganized employees; Section 9(a) is not, under
such circumstances, applicable.
A wholly individualist (non-communal) understanding of Section 7 rights is suggested both by the example of employee choice (e.g., choice of bargaining representative and choice in the sense of attempts to influence a bargaining representative),
NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974), and by the argument that individual
employees obtain individually vested and individually enforceable rights under a collective bargaining agreement through an individualistic interpretation of the proviso
to Section 9(a), Summers, The Individual Employees Rights Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representation, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 251, 255-56
(1977)-an argument which has been extended by one commentator to infer an individual Section 7 right to employ economic coercion to achieve individual ends. See
Lynd, History supra note 118, at 748-49.
It is possible to view these competing versions of rights as mutually exclusive;
Section 7 adopts only one of the versions. Compare Lynd, Legislative History, supra
note 118 with Lynd, Government Without Rights, supra note 118, at 484 n.11. In fact,
Section 7 codifies all three. Any resulting "incoherence" (Klare, Labor Law As Ideology,
supra note 118, at 469) is the product not so much of inherent incompatability as it
is of judicial failure to clearly identify distinct contexts in which one or another version is appropriately dominant. See generally Brousseau, supra note 4.
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if the employee's union may waive his right to honor a picket line,
The communal understanding is expressly predicated by its advocates upon the
example of concerted activity in the non-union context. See Lynd, Legislative History,
supra note 118, at 724-25 n.19, 748-49 and n.120. Section 9(a) exclusivity is not an issue
in such a context, and the institutional version of collective right is clearly inappropriate:
There is in such a context no institution. There is, however, a group-the necessity
of such a group is ensured by the concertedness requirement. It is quite true that
the relevant group may be substantially less than employees of a particular employer
as a whole, but the mutual purpose requirement as previously interpreted here may
be as easily measured by reference to informal group purposes as to institutionalizd
group purposes. In specific terms, unorganized employees who honor a stranger picket
line do so no less in behalf of their fellows and are protected, if at all, no less by
virtue of their fellows.
But the extension of the communal understanding to contexts in which Section
9(a) is applicable is unwarranted. The extension argument is that communal rights
survive exclusivity and, therefore, that subgroups of employees may engage in concerted activity independently of their exclusive representative. See Lynd, Legislative
History, supra note 118, at 748-49; Harper, supra note 8, at 372-80. For purposes of
the present subject matter, the extension argument, if accepted, would require both
evaluation of the issue of Section 7 protection for the honoring employee without
reference to the exclusive representative and withdrawal of the exclusive representative's authority to both direct individual employee action with respect to stranger
picket lines and to waive protection.
My difficulities with extension of the communal understanding are two. First,
the argument grounded upon, and part of, a general critique of post World War II
Labor Law which calls for a radical reevaluation and reorientation for that jaw. See
generally Kennedy, CriticalLabor Law Theory: A Comment, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 503, 504
(1981); Klare, Labor Law as Ideology. supra note 118; Klare, Judicial Deradicalization
of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-41, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 265 (1978); Lynd, Government Without Rights, supra note 118; Lynd, Legislative
History, supra note 118; Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90
YALE L.J. 151 (1981). Although I have termed this paper "revisionist", it is not revisionist
in the sense of an attack, like Lynd's or Klare's, upon the pro-institutional thrust of
post-World War II Labor Law. The paper is revisionist, rather, in the sense that it
seeks to identify and extend the premises of that thrust-particularly by emphasizing
the institutional character of the Section 7 rights apparently recognized by that thrust.
Second, the communal theory appears rather clearly grounded upon a mistrust
of labor unions-a mistrust founded on the premise that unions have been used to
side-track the class struggle and have therefore perpetuated worker oppression and
alienation. The desirability of reinvigorating the "class struggle" aside, it is not apparent either that reinvigoration was ever intended by Congress or, therefore, that
the predominant post-war conception of worker rights-a largely institutional conceptions modified by the hope that internal union democracy will reduce the risks inherent in the conception-is unwarranted. With respect to this second reason for my
disagreement see particularlyEmporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975); NLRB v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). But
see Lynd's criticism of the Emporium case in Legislative History, supra note 118.
Lynd's criticism proceeds primarily from a critique of the Court's treatment
of the proviso to Section 9(a)-a proviso which states that employees
shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer
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the union, not the employee, has the power of decision concerning
exercise of the right."8
The rule that a union may permissibly coerce the employees it
represents with respect to the exercise of the right to honor is equally
inconsistent with the individual right characterization: the rule denies
individual employee choice in the matter and places that choice-the
decision-making authority with respect to exercise of the right- in
the collective. It is true that there is a fundamental distinction betand to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent
with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement in then
in effect.
29 U.S.C. S 159(a)(1976). The Court read the proviso as in effect conferring a right
on employers to adjust grievances individually without running afoul of the unfair
labor practice provisions of the Act for violating the exclusivity principle. 420 U.S.
at 61 n.12. Lynd views the proviso as granting an individual right to present grievances
to the extent not inconsistent with the bargaining agreement-a right he conceives
of as "fundamental." Legislative History, supra note 118. But, granting for purposes
of argument Lynd's version of the meaning of the proviso, he goes much further by
contending that inherent in the right to present a grievance is the right to engage
in "concerted activity"- i.e., to take reasonable economic measures against the employer
to secure successful resolution of the grievance-independently of the exclusive
representative. Id. at 724-25 n.19, 748-49. See also Gorman & Finkin, supra note 71,
at 354-56. There are two difficulities with Lynds argument. First, he relies upon NLRB
v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960), for the proposition that, because
a union may engage in a slowdown without violating S 8(b)(3), individual employees
are protected under S 7 for picketing over an individual grievance. The conclusion
does not follow. InsuranceAgents was concerned with Board authority to intrude upon
the collective bargaining process and expressly recognized the proposition that a
slowdown is protected activity subject to lawful employer response, 361 U.S. at 492-93.
Lynd may mean that the lesson of Insurance Agents-the Board may not intrude into
collective bargaining-supports the proposition that employees who engage in concerted activity in pursuit of individual objectives are protected because their activity
is not subject to attack on the grounds that it makes for disorderly bargaining. See
Getman, supra note 8, at 1245. That argument won't wash: Insurance Agents precludes
Board intrusion into the process of collective bargaining for fear that such an intrusion will result in regulation of the substantive terms of agreement; it does not purport to define the scope of protected activity. To the extent that employee activity
independent of union authorization was at issue in Insurance Agents, that activity was
viewed as unprotected. 361 U.S. at 493.
The second difficulty with the Lynd thesis is that it confuses rights to the use
of economic coercion with a right to communication between employer and employee.
Despite his denigration of that distinction, Legislative History, supra note 118, at 749,
the distinction is quite real. See Harper, supra note 8, at 355 and infra notes 186-207
and accompanying text.
168. It should be noted that what the union controls is the question of protection. The union may, in effect, order employees to cross a picket line, and such an
order is subject to being interpreted as a waiver of the employee's protection. See
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ween the source of the union's authority to waive the right to honor
and the union's authority to coerce employees. The former is a function of exclusivity and the latter is a function of the union's right,
as a private association, to compel its members to adhere to its internal union rules.169 But that formal distinction, albeit a basis for arguing that internal union discipline is a matter independent of the meaning of Section 7, ignores the dual role in which the union acts-both
as an exclusive representative and as a private membership
association.
The union membership which provides a basis for union discipline
is most often an incident of employment.17 Although a union may
discipline from institutional motivations transcending its role as the
exclusive representative of particular employees in their relationship
with a particular employer, it cannot wholly escape that role. 17' A
International Bhd. of Boilermakers Local 667 (Union Boiler Co.), 245 NLRB 719 (1979).
On the other hand, the union may generally not use as a means of enforcement procuring from the employer the discharge of the disobeying employee, and this is the
case where the employee disobeys an order to cross, id. at 727-28 (ALJ). But see International Bhd. Electrical Workers Local 1547 (Rogers Electric), 245 NLRB 716 (1979)
(Although there is a presumption that union may not use the employment relationship
as a means of discipline, that presumption is rebuttable where necessary to union's
effectiveness as an exclusive representative); International Bhd. of Operating Engineers,
Local 18, 204 NLRB 681 (1973) (same).
169. The Supreme Court has limited Board authority to review union discipline
under Section 8(b)(1)(A) on the ground that the proviso to that provision-precluding
intrusion into internal union affairs- prevents such review absent discipline which either
affects the employer-employee relationship or is otherwise prohibited (i.e. prohibited
independently of Section 8(b)(1)(A)) by the Act). See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67
(1973)); Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969); NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine
& Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175 (1967). The source of a union's authority to discipline is therefore the union's
status as a private entity, and its authority is limited to its membership. See NLRB
v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
170. Union security clauses in collective bargaining agreements are of course
intended to ensure membership. Although such clauses are theoretically limited under
federal law to preventing free riders-i.e., to what are in effect agency shop agreements,
NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963), that limitation is rarely conveyed
either by the language of such agreements or independently to employees. See R. GORMAN, supra note 8, at 686; Wellington, Union Fines and Workers Rights, 85 YALE L.J. 1022,
1051-64 (1976).
171. The clearest indication of this linkage appears in the Supreme Court's
opinon in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 175 (1967), where the Court
justified a broad reading of the Section 8(bXl)(A) proviso on the basis of the role of
the union as an exclusive bargaining agent with control over economic weapons. See
also NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods Inc., 430 F.2d 786, 789 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Tanner
Motor Livery' Ltd., 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969). See generally Gould, Some Limitations
Upon Union Discipline Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis
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union's motivation for discipline will be truly independent of its status
as an exclusive bargaining agent for the employees it disciplines only
where it acts for reasons which transcend the bargaining unit-e.g.,
where it acts to achieve its bargaining objectives in some other
bargaining unit.'" But in such a case, the members subject to discipline
derive their statutory protection against employer retaliation from
Section 7, not from any right of membership in a private association.
And statutory prohibitions of union conduct-and, therefore, statutory
withdrawal of protection for employees-are for the most part dependent for their application upon the relationship between particular
employees as employees and a particular employer as employer, not
upon membership."' In short, a union's legal capacity to command
employee action may be a function of membership rather than exclusivity, but that capacity is subject to an assessment of Section 7
protection.' To the extent that the union fails to undertake that
assessment, or commands employee conduct inconsistent with Section
7, it places the employees it represents at risk, and that risk may
be expected to adversely affect the employees' willingness to support
their representative.
Chalmers, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1067. Much of the criticism of Allis-Chalmers is grounded upon
the notion that Section 7 confers individual rights. See Atleson, Union Fines and Picket
Lines: The NLRA and Union Disciplinary Power, 17 UCLA L. REV. 681 (1970); Cramer,
The Boeing Decision: A Blow To Federalism, Individual Rights and Stare Decisis, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 556 (1974).
172. See Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union (Interborough News Co.), 90
NLRB 2135 (1950). Such union action raises substantial secondary boycott issues. See
infra notes 270-391 and accompanying text.
173. Such is the case under both Sections 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(7) (1976),
and 8(bX4), 29 U.S.C. S 158(bX4) (1976). Moreover, Section 8(bX1XA), 29 U.S.C. S 158(bXlXA)
(1976), is violated where a union disciplines employees for crossing an unlawful picket
line. See, e.g., NLRB v. Glaziers & Glassworkers Local 1621, 632 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1980);
NLRB v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1179, 526 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1975); International
Longshoremens Local 30, 223 NLRB 1257 (1976), enforced, 549 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1977);
Local Union 153, Int'l Bhd. Elec. Workers, 221 NLRB 345 (1975).
174. Two examples may serve to illustrate the point (1) Union A, the exclusive
representative of Employer A's employees seeks to organize Employer B's employees
by picketing B under the circumstances contemplated by Section 8(bx7)B). Union A
disciplines two employees: X, an employee of Employer A who crossed when making
a delivery to Employer B, and Y, an employee of B who crossed the line for the purpose of his employment with B. The legality, under Section 8(b)(7)(B), of the picket
line is dependent upon whether a valid election had been conducted with respect to
B's employees in the preceding 12 months. 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(7)(B) (1976). Upon the
assumption that such an election had been conducted, X, if X had refused to cross,
would not have been protected under Section 7 from employer A's discharge. As X
did cross an unlawful picket line, union A's fine is a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A).
See NLRB v. Retail Clerks Union Local 1179, 526 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1975).
Employee Y's status is more complex. To the extent that a refusal to cross,
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It is, then, myopic to view the prerogatives of a private membership association as independent of the problem of the character of
Section 7 rights. That Congress exempted internal union discipline
from a prohibition of union interference with Section 7 rights1 7 1 in
a proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) suggests precisely that Congress viewed
collective control over concerted activity, albeit control subject to a
theoretical individual option to withdraw from membership, sufficiently
consistent with Section 7 to warrant a proviso authorizing that control. Such is the suggestion implicit in the Supreme Court's interpretation of that proviso, for the interpretation, although grounded on the
union's character as a private association for purposes of distinguishing
between employees and union members, rests on the Court's view
that the policy of the proviso is preservation of the union's statutory
function as an exclusive representative.1
Although both the doctrine of waiver and the doctrine of per-

had he refused, would merely constitute strike activity, he would have arguably been
protected from discharge under Section 7. See Claremont Polychemical Corp., 196 NLRB
613 (1972) ("economic strikers" in S 8(b)(7XB) context). See also NLRB v. National Packing Co., 377 F.2d 800, 804 (10th Cir. 1967) (employees "had the right to strike but
they did not have the right to picket in violations of the Act."). As Y did cross the
picket line, the question of the legality of the fine under Section 8(b)(1)(A) turns on
whether the "fines otherwise prohibited by the Act" exception to the Section 8(b)(1)(A)
proviso, NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973), makes Section 8(b)(1)(A) a mere ancillary enforcement mechanism for other statutory prohibitions or was intended by
the Court to preclude union fines which coerce unprotected activity. If the former
is the case, Y's fine violates the policy of 8(b)(7)(B). If the latter is the case, Y's fine
arguably does not coerce unprotected activity. The 9th Circuit has adopted the former
view. NLRB v. Retail Clerks Union Local 1179, 526 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1975).
(2) Union A, the exclusive representative of Employer A's employees fines X,
an employee of Employer A, for crossing a picket line established by Union A over
an economic dispute with Employer B at Employer B's premises. Union A is also the
exclusive representative of Employer B's employees. If X had refused to cross the
picket line, his protection from discharge by Employer A would have been dependent
upon (1) The provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between Union A and
Employer A governing strikes and picket lines; (2) Section 7 mutuality, and (3) the
legality of the picket line. As X crossed the picket line, the legality of Union A's
fine is dependent upon (1) X's memberhip in A; (2) the relationship between Employer
A and Employer B under the Ally doctrine, e.g., Newspaper Production Co. v. NLRB,
503 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics
Conference Board, Local 459, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962
(1956); (3) the relationship between X's work and B's business, Local 761, Int'l Union
of Elec. Radio & Machine Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961), and (4) the provisions
of the- Collective Bargaining Agreement between Employer A and Union A.
175. 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(1)(A) (1976).
176. See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973); NLRB v. Allis Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss2/2

Cox: On Honoring Picket Lines: A Revisionist View
PICKET LINES

1983]

missible union discipline support the collective right characterization
of the right to honor, there are two grounds for counterargument.
First, it has been argued that a union should not be permitted to
waive the honoring employee's right because the statutory source of
waiver authority- Section 9(a) exclusivity"-is not so broad as to encompass that power."' That argument proceeds from the view that
Section 7 rights are both individual and only partially vested in an
exclusive representative by delegation. 7 ' It is at least arguably supported by the Board's reluctance to find contractual waiver in picket
line cases-no strike clauses are narrowly construed when an employer
seeks to apply them in a refusal-to-cross case.1
Second, the doctrine that an honoring employee's refusal to cross
a stranger picket line is not protected under Section 7 where the
picket line is unlawful' is facially inconsistent with the argument that
the employee's right is his union's right. The employee's protection
in an unlawful picket line case is measured by reference to the pickets,
not the honoring employee's union. That reference implies that the
honoring employee's right is individual or that his right is collective
but vested in stranger employees or their union.'82
(1) The Exclusivity Principle, The Problem of Economic
Coercion and Restrictive Interpretation of No Strike Clauses.
The argument that the exclusivity principle is not so broad as

29 U.S.C. S 159(a) (1976):
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have
the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have
such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining
representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms
of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity
to be present at such adjustment. (emphasis supplied).
178. Harper, supra note 8, at 372-80.
179. Id. at 373.
180. Id. at 375-76. See, e.g., W-I Canteen Serv. Inc. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 738 (7th
Cir. 1979); Gary Hobart Water Corp., 210 NLRB 742 (1974), enforced, 511 F.2d 284
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975).
181. Drivers Local Union No. 695 v NLRB, 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 244 NLRB 1081 (1979); Pacific Tel & Tel Co., 107 NLRB 1547 (1954).
182. See infra notes 248-69 and accompanying text.
177.
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to permit union waiver of the right to honor a picket line proceeds
from two premises. First, some Section 7 rights have been treated,
as well as merely labelled, individual rights because individual
employees have been held to be protected in the exercise of those
rights despite union waiver." If at least some Section 7 rights are
exercisable independently of a union, the instrumental explanation of
Section 7 protection for individual employees is not a complete explanation. Second, the exclusive representative's authority is a bargaining authority exercisable with respect to a particular bargaining unit;
it is not an authority coextensive with all employment issues of concern to employees"'. If the exclusive representative's authority is so
limited, it is arguably not present in the stranger picket line context
precisely because that context does not involve the honoring
employee's bargaining unit. 85
(a)

Exclusivity and Coercion

It may be conceded that Section 7 grants individual rights and
grants rights occasionally exercisable independently of an exclusive
representative without impairing the collective right explanation of
the honoring employee's Section 7 protection.
Section 7 grants rights of individual choice, association and
expression, 6 but those rights are not rights to concerted activity in
the sense of economic coercion. They are rights to organization and
183. Harper, supra note 8, at 342-502.
184. Id. at 373-74.
185. Id. at 374.
186. See Brosseau, supra note 4, at 26-27; P. Cox, supra note 5, at 251-64.
There is an independent basis for finding an individual right in Section 7 which
does not encounter the difficulties I have expressed here with the concerted activity
for mutual aid or protection basis for such a right. Section 7 provides, in addition
to the concerted activity clause, that "employees shall have the right . . . to form,
join or assist labor organizations." 29 U.S.C. S 157 (1976). See Cyril de Cordova Bros.,
91 NLRB 1121, 1135 (1950); Axelrod, supra note 8, at 632. That right may be viewed
as individual, and the view is strengthened by one's suspicion that the effort to critically
explain the honoring employee's motivation (as distinguished from the reason for the
law's protection) in terms of mutuality is fictional; the employee more probably acts
from personal conviction-that is, loyalty to labor's cause without reference to shared
benefit or reciprocal power. See NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71,
73 (1953).
Moreover, the generally accepted statutory explanation for Section 7 protection in the stranger picket line situation-Section 2(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. S 152(3)
(1976)-appears to reinforce this view. "Employee" is defined in that section to "include any employee, and [the term] shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer .. " Id. Hence, any employee, even an employee of an employer
not involved in the dispute over which a picket line is established, has a "right ...
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to participation exercisable primarily with respect to a particular
employee's employer and, to the extent that they are exercisable with
to assist" the labor organization involved in the dispute. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1976)
("The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment .. . regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.").
There are, however, two difficulties with the argument: (1) The 74th Congress
had in mind two problems when defining "employee" and "labor dispute." First, it
wished to permit free employee choice of the "outside union"-i.e., to permit employees
to choose as a representative a non-employee of a particular employer. See H.R. Rep.
No. 972 (On S1958), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935); Hearings On S1958 Before the Senate
Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 603 (1935) (Statement of Robert
C. Graham) (criticizing the bill on this ground); Id. at 440-41 (colloquy between Sen.
Wagner and Robert T. Caldwell); Id. at 498 (Statement of Harvey Ellord) (in opposition); 79 CONG. REC. 9701 (1935) (Congressman Blanton in opposition). Second, Congress
wished, by the definitions, to make it clear that a legitimate objective of organization
across employers was that of equalizing bargaining power and eliminating wage competition between employers. H.R. Rep. No. 972 (On S1958), 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1935). Both congressional purposes are concerned with union objectives as group
objectives.
(2) The second difficulty is that Section 7 was, at the time of its original enactment, consistently thought to constitute merely a restatement of Section 7(a) of the
National Recovery Act, with the prohibitory provisions of the NRA removed to Section 8 of the NLRA. Sen. Rep. No. 573 (on S1958) 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1935);
H.R. Rep. No. 972, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. 13 (1935); Comparison of S2926 and S1958:
Memorandum of March 11, 1935 preparedfor Sen. Comm. on Education and Labor Comparing S.1958 (74th Cong., 1st Sess) with S2926 (73rd Cong., 2d Sess) 25-26 (1935).
Section 7(a) of the NRA read as follows:
Every code of fair competition, agreement and license approved, prescribed,
or issued under this title shall contain the following conditions: (1) That
employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents,
in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection; (2) that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company
union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing; and (3) that employers shall comply with the
maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other conditions of
employment approved or prescribed by the President. (emphasis supplied).
What the language of Section 7(a) contemplated was an individual employee's
right to assist a labor organization in its dealings with that employee's employer. The
"assist" term is included in a sentence intended to preclude forced membership
in
employer dominated unions and appears therefore to have been intended to foster
the formation of independent bargaining agents. That the use of the "assist" term
in Section 7 of the NLRA was intended to serve that same end is suggested not only
by the congressional understanding that Section 7 duplicated Section 7a and by the
use of the term "assist" with the terms "form" and "join" in Section 7, but also by
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respect to subject matters outside that employment relationship,'
rights of communication, not of economic coercion.'

are

Senator Wagner's 1935 criticism of Section 7a of the NRA from a perspective which
emphasized the group rights nature of the original bill (S2926) he advocated as a replacement for Section 7a:
Failure to meet the company-union challenge has not been the only
defect of section 7(a) of the Recovery Act. This section provides that
employees shall be free to choose their own representatives. It has been
interpreted repeatedly to mean that any employee at any time may elect
to deal individually with his employer, even if the overwhelming majority of his coworkers desire a collective agreement covering all. Such an
interpretation is detrimental to the practice and contrary to the theory
of collective bargaining. It permits an unscrupulous employer to divide
his employees against themselves by dealing with innumerable small groups
or with individuals.
78 CONG. REC. 4229 (1934) (New York Times Article of March 11, 1934, authored by Senator
Wagner and printed in the Congressional Record, March 12, 1934).
What emerges from the legislative history is a congressional conceptualization
of the "form, join, or assist" clause of Section 7 of the NLRA which viewed individual
employees as having rights to choice and participation with respect to their bargaining representative in their economic relationship with their employer. Control of that
relationship-and of the economic relationship between employees and stranger
employees or employers-was viewed as firmly placed, as a matter of Senator Wagner's
"theory of collective bargaining" in an exclusive representative once the individual
right of choice was exercised. But see Gorman & Finkin, supra note 71, at 331-46.
187. Eastex Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978).
188. Professor Harper has argued that employee activity outside the employeremployee relationship directed to improving that employee's working conditions should
be protected as a non-waivable right-a conclusion he derives from Eastex, Inc. v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978). Harper, supra note 8, at 355-56. Eastex in fact involved
union-sponsored communication concerning subject matters not within employer control, but I agree with the view that Eastex may be read to protect individual communication. But see Teamsters Local 515 (Roadway Express, Inc.), 248 NLRB No. 20
(1980).
Professor Harper interprets Eastex as a case recognizing communication rights
as distinct from rights to engage in concerted activity over economic issues, id. at
353, 355, but grounds his argument that an individual employee's right to concerted
activity not directed to economic issues involving the employee's employer is nonwaivable on the Eastex Court's recognition that activity outside the collective bargaining
relationship may be protected. Id. at 353. My difficulty with this argument is that
it confuses a right to communication with a right to the use of economic coercion.
The communication at issue in Eastex was communication about economic questions to be answered in the political process rather than in the context of the employeremployer relationship. The Court justified Section 7 protection of that communication
on both the shared benefit and reciprocity theories of mutuality. 437 U.S. at 570. If
the communication was successful-that is, if the government made political decisions
consistent with the communication-those decisions would, under the shared benefit
and reciprocity theories, eventually affect the economic relationship between the
employee communicators and their employer. But these facts do not establish either
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Moreover, Section 7 grants rights to engage in concerted activity in the sense of economic coercion in contexts in which there is
(1) the equivalency for Section 7 purposes of an employee's communication and an
employee's refusal to cross a stranger picket line or (2) a limitation upon the scope
of authority of the employees' bargaining representative grounded upon that representative's indifference to an economic issue not subject to the control of the employer
with which it deals.
The "concerted activity" at issue in Eastex took the form of "pure speech"-the
distribution in the workplace of literature advocating economic and political positions.
The concerted activity at issue in a picket line case is the act of refusing to cross
a stranger picket line. The immediate objective of that act is to pressure the stranger
employer, and the act is coercive both in intent and in effect. The act also has, however,
a repercussion treated by prevailing case law as merely incidental: The honoring
employee's employer is adversely affected because the honoring employee is refusing
to complete his assigned task. The employee is in effect engaged in a partial work
stoppage.
But the effect is not merely incidental. The mutuality justification for the partial work stoppage is that its immediate effect will have a long-term impact upon the
economic relationship between the honoring employee, that employee's fellow employees
and the honoring employee's employer. Although the immediate objective is the
economic relationship between the stranger employer and the stranger employees, protection is afforded precisely because the long-term objective is the economic relationship between the honoring employee's employer, and that employer's employees.
Economic coercion directed at the stranger employer and adversely affecting the honoring employee's employer is the means to ultimate ends which concern the honoring
employee's employer. Economic coercion in these circumstances is not merely directed
at the stranger employer, it is directed at the honoring employee's employer, even
though that employer cannot respond to it, because the rationale for legal protection
of that coercion is the ultimate effect on the honoring employee's employer.
The honoring employee's exclusive representative cannot be viewed as indifferent either to the ultimate purposes of the employee's refusal to cross the picket
line or to the means by which those purposes are achieved for the simple reason that
it is the exclusive representative's function to control economic coercion. It is the exclusive representative's function from the point of view of employees because the exclusive representative is the statutory means by which collective power is achieved
and expressed. See NLRB v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967). It is the
exclusive representative's function from the standpoint of the employer because the
exclusive representative is the means by which the employer avoids the chaos of multiple and potentially inconsistent employee demands. See Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975); Getman, supra note 8, at 1246;
Meltzer, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,The More Remedies
the Better?, 42 U. CHi. L. REV. 1, 34 (1974).
It is not, however, the exclusive representative's function to control communication qua communication. Rights to comunication are individual and nonwaivable both
because they are essential to the internal control of the exclusive representative (unions
are, or are supposed to be representatives, not tyrants), and because an effort to regulate
communication either on the part of the exclusive representative or the government
requires content-based distinctions neither can be trusted to make. It is true that,
in Eastex, the communication in issue would have repercussions for the economic relationship between the employer and his employees and that the basis for legal protec-
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no union and, therefore, no exclusivity principle applicable.'89 But the
right exercised remains a group right-the concertedness requirement
ensures that much.'" And the collective right explanation of the honoring employee's protection is not jeopardized by such a right: an
unorganized employee's refusal to cross may be explained under the
mutuality principle in terms of the benefits or power to be derived
by the employee's fellow employees whether or not those employees
are represented.
Finally, Section 7 grants the right to engage in concerted activity independently of an exclusive representative where exclusivity is
itself in issue-that is, where the exclusive representative's status
is threatened either legitimately, through a rival union's organizing
effort,'9 ' or illegitimately, through an employer's unfair labor
practices.'" But exclusivity is not at issue in this sense in the context
to the
of a stranger picket line; there is, in such a context, no 9threat
3
honoring employee's exclusive representative's status.'

tion of that communication was said by the Court to be those repercussions. It is
therefore equally true that the legal basis for protection in Eastex is "like" the legal
basis for protection in the picket line case. But the argument for making Eastex rights
not subject to the control of an exclusive representative is not the representative's
indifference, it is the nature of the right exercised.
189. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
190. See supra notes 65-97 and accompanying text.
191. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
192. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Arlans Dept. Stores,
133 NLRB 802 (1961).
193. Professor Harper recognizes the individual character as well as the
communication-association explanation of the rights recognized in Magnavox, Harper,
supra note 8, at 344-47, but seeks to extend their substantially beyond their context.
Id. at 362-80. For further explication of the communicational right notion, see Brosseau,
supra note 4, at 38-39.
Neither Magnavox nor Mastro Plastics supports the proposition that an exclusive
representative does not or should not always control concerted activity. In Magnavox,
exclusivity itself was at stake, and the employee rights in issue were rights of communication, association and choice of bargaining representative-all of which are
preeminently individual in nature and none of which involve economic struggle with
an employer. In Mastro Plastics, exclusivity was again at stake-for employer unfair
labor practices threaten the status of that representative. Employee action in support
of that status was protected in Mastro Plastics because waiver of the right to engage
in such action when the waiver contemplated economic struggle and therefore assumed
exclusive bargaining status was simply inapplicable. What these cases demonstrate
is that there are employee rights of an individual or communal nature exerciseable
independently of an exclusive representative where exclusivity is in issue.
194. See Getman, supra note 8, at 1211. Professor Getman reads NLRB v.
Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 16 (1962), as rejecting the reasonableness inquiry. But, as Professor Getman recognized, Getman, supra note 8, at 1211, the portion of the Court's opinion rejecting a "reasonableness" inquiry was concerned with
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The preceding categorization of rights proposes two distinctions:
(1) the distinction between a right to the use of economic coercion
and a right to association and communication, and (2) the distinction
between the appropriate decision-making authority with respect to
exercise of the right to use economic coercion in contexts in which
exclusivity is both present and unchallenged and the appropriate
decision-making authority where exclusivity is either absent or
challenged. The distinctions are supported, albeit not expressly, by
two observed phenomena in the case law.
First, the protected status under Section 7 of economically coercive activity in contexts in which the employees engaged in that activity are unorganized is subject to a much-criticized 4 judicial insistence that it be "reasonable" in the sense that the means used are
appropriate to the end sought. 95 The reasonableness inquiry is, with
notable exceptions,'" not a permissible inquiry in contexts in which
the meaning of "labor dispute", not Section 7 protection. 370 U.S. at 16. See also NLRB
v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 334 (1938). Indeed, the Court's language
in Washington Aluminum may be read to authorize a reasonableness inquiry with respect
to the Section 7 issue:
The activities engaged in here do not fall within the normal categories
of unprotected concerted activities such as those that are unlawful, violent
or in breach of contract. Nor can they be brought under this Court's more
recent pronouncement which denied the protection of S 7 to activities
characterized as "indefensible" because they were found to show a disloyalty to the workers' employer which this Court deemed unnecessary to
carry out the workers' legitimate concerted activities [citing NLRB v. Local
Union No. 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers [Jefferson Standard], 346 U.S.
464 (1953).
370 U.S. at 17. (Emphasis supplied). Although Jefferson Standard involved employee
activity undertaken in the course of a strike called by the employees' union, the court
emphasized that the employees in issue (who had distributed leaflets disparaging their
employer's product) had purported to act independently of their union: "The fortuity
of the coexistence of a labor dispute affords these technicians no substantial defense.
While they were also union men and leaders in the labor controversy, they took pains
to separate those categories. In contrast to their claims on the picket line as to the
labor controversy, their handbill . . . omitted all reference to it." Id. at 476.
195. See, e.g., Henning & Cheadle, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1975);
Dobbs House, Inc. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1963). But see NLRB v. Phaostron
Instrument & Elec. Co., 344 F.2d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Holcombe, 325
F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1963).
196. See, e.g., UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949);
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939). The grounds for finding
union induced employee activity unprotected are not, however, normally framed in
terms of unreasonableness. Rather, such activity is unprotected where (1) violent, (2)
unlawful by reason of labor act prohibitions, or (3) too effective, in the sense that
the employer is unable to respond to it.
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an exclusive representative's use of economic coercion is challenged.'97
This phenomenon is empirical evidence of the importance, as viewed
by the courts, of industrial peace as a primary objective of the Labor
Act, but the contrast between the phenomenon and the scope of permissible inquiry in contexts in which concerted activity is directed
by an exclusive representative reflects the role assigned unions as
institutions in achieving that objective. Industrial peace is to be
achieved by means of collective bargaining with the exclusive representative of employees, not by means of leaving employees free to pursue their individual ends.
Second, to the extent that the Supreme Court has found economically coercive activity protected under Section 7 despite an exclusive representative's prior waiver of protection for that activity,
protection has been afforded in cases in which an employer has
challenged the status of the exclusive representative in the sense that
the employer, through its unfair labor practices, has attacked the
Absent such an employer attack, employee conduct
representative.'
inconsistent with an exclusive representative's decision has been held
protected where the conduct was of an associational or communicational variety,' but has been held unprotected where in derogation
of an exclusive representative's decision regarding bargaining or
regarding the use of economic coercion." ° One explanation of this
phenomenon is that Section 7 contemplates a "sliding scale" of protection dependent upon means and ends, and upon the relative disruption of means and relative importance of ends."' The difficulty with
the sliding scale explanation is the wide latitide it permits in administrative and judicial assessments of Section 7 protection. A second explanation is that distinct rights, exercisable by distinct actors
with distinct roles, are implicated in distinct contexts: individuals have
197. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). The
employee conduct in InsuranceAgents was assumed to be unprotected; the Court-merely
precluded the Board from finding that the union had, by reason of that conduct, failed
to bargain in good faith. The assumption was grounded, however, upon the traditional
notion that a partial strike is unprotected activity-a notion itself based upon the
difficulty of employer response rather than unreasonableness in the sense of the appropriateness of means to ends. See First National Bank v. NLRB, 413 F2d 921, 923-24
(8th Cir. 1969); A. Cox, The Right To Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319,
339 (1953).
198. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
199. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
200. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S.
50 (1975).
201. Haggard, Picket Line Violence, supra note 8,,at 439 n.76, citing Eastex,
Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 568 n.18 (1978).
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Section 7 rights of association and communication; unions have Section 7 rights to the use or nonuse of economic coercion; and the right
to economic coercion is exercisable by individuals only where the
assumption underlying the normal allocation of that right to the
union-the union's representative status-has been questioned by the
employer's conduct.
As applied to the subject matter of the instant discussion, a conclusion that the right to honor is the union's right to the use or nonuse
of economic coercion assumes that the act of honoring is an act of
economic coercion. The superficial difficulties with that assumption
are that the act is not directed at the honoring employee's employer
2
') and that
(the effects of the act on that employer are "incidental""
the act may be viewed as having something of a speech component
2 3
for stranger
(the employee engages in a "gesture of support""
employees).
It is true that the honoring employee's employer is not the immediate target of the act of honoring. The immediate target is the
target of the picket line itself. The honoring employee's employer is
not in a position to respond to the demands either of the picketing
employees or of the honoring employee because those demands may
be met only by the picketed employer. And the honoring employee's
employer cannot therefore be said to be "coerced" (except in the sense
that it is in some degree coerced into refusing to deal with the
picketed employer). But these considerations do not alter the essential character of the act of honoring; they characterize only the object of the act. The act of honoring is part and parcel of the picketing
and, most often, of the primary strike which the picketing is designed
to enforce. The picket line's fundamental purpose is to deny the
picketed employer a work force and to deny that employer the goods
and services of other employers.0 4 The act of honoring constitutes
the latter denial and is therefore clearly an act of economic coercion.
If the fact that the immediate target of the act is a stranger employer
is relevant to the question of who engages in that act, it must be
by reason of the scope of an exclusive representative's statutory function as an exclusive representative; not by reason of the nature of
the act.
202. See Axelrod, supra note 8, at 634; Carvey & Florsheim, supra note 8, at
943; Getman, supra note 8, at 1226-27 n.133; Schatzki, supra note 8, at 395. But see
Getman, supra note 8, at 1225.
203. Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill Workers, Local 418 (Continental Grain
Co.), 155 NLRB 402, 412 (1965), enforced, 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
932 (1967).
204. See infra notes 289-99 and accompanying text.
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20
The view that the act of honoring is a form of communication 1
is erroneous for two reasons. First, it ignores the notion that the act
is more than a "gesture of support"; it is an act of coercion as well.
Second, the view invokes a jurisprudence of fundamental rights0 6 not
properly invoked in the present context. At bottom, the question
presented by the act of honoring is whether the honoring employee's
employer may retaliate for the act of honoring. The government does
not seek to retaliate; its role is only that of deciding whether a private
employer may retaliate. The right to honor, even if viewed for purposes of argument as including a communication component, may be

205. By characterizing the notion that the right to honor is "fundamental" as
a view that there is a speech component to economically coercive concerted activity,
I do not mean that the view has been explicitly stated by either the Board or any
particular critic of the Board. My claim, rather, is that such a notion draws specifically upon the First Amendment as either the source or analog of the statutory right
to engage in such activity. See Lynd, Legislative History, supra note 118, at 734. But
see Lynd, Employee Speech in the Private and Public Workplace: Two Doctrines or One?,
1 IND. REL. L.J. 711, 713 (1977) (making such an analog claim but limiting the claim to
pure speech).
The act of honoring should be distinguished from the act of picketing. The latter more clearly involves a communication component and is more clearly the object
of government regulation. See St. Antoine, What Makes Secondary Boycotts Secondary?
SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 11TH ANN. INST. ON LABOR LAW 5, 8-15 (1965). But see
NLRB v. Local 100, Retail Store Employees Union, 444 U.S. 1011 (1980) (In effect,
picketing may be regulated because it constitutes a signal inducing action.).
206. See Lynd, Legislative History, supra note 118, at 726-34. Cf. Gorman &
Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 33646 (1981) (reviewing aspects of the legislative history
indicating that Congress had in mind the model of political liberty when it sought,
as an objective of the Labor Act, industrial democracy). Professors Gorman and Finkin
argue that the Act's protection of group action does not necessarily imply that individual action was not contemplated as protected as well. Id. at 329. They then suggest that the Act's policy of fostering industial democracy provides a basis for concluding that protection of individual action was intended by Congress. Id. at 344-45.
My difficulty with this analysis is that, although it is clear that industrial democracy
was an objective of the legislation, and although freedom of individuals was thought
an aspect of industrial democracy, the statutory means by which these objectives are
to be accomplished is essentially collective. Compare id. at 342-43 (describing position
of proponents of company unionism as one which sought the right of individuals to
grieve) with note 186 supra (discussing Senator Wagner's distaste for the company
union). Indeed, Professors Gorman and Finkin appear to recognize that a collective
means was the congressionally chosen device to achieve industrial democracy by conceding that exclusivity limits the individual right they propose, id. at 356, and by
emphasizing the right to communicate grievances to the employer (as distinguished
from the right to bring economic pressure to bear on an employer). Id. at 343, 356.
But see id. at 355 (discharge should not be an available employer remedy for individual
employee disruption of work).
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treated as "fundamental"- in a sense distinct from other statutory
rights to the use of coercion-only if so conceived by the statutory
scheme, and it is the statutory conception which is in issue.
(b)

Waiver by the No Strike Clause

The argument that the right to honor a stranger picket line
should not be waivable by the honoring employee's employer is derived
from the language of Section 9(a) itself:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by a majority of employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such a unit for the
purposes of collective bargainingin respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ207
ment ....
The emphasized language suggests that the exclusive representative's
exclusive control is limited to the relationship between employees in
the unit it represents and the employer of those employees.' Because
a stranger dispute does not, by definition, involve that relationship
and because such a dispute is not resolvable by the action of the honoring employee's employer, the exclusive representative of the honoring employee lacks authority over that employee's conduct in his encounter with a stranger picket line.' The right to honor a stranger
picket line is, by this line of argument, individual rather than collective.
Although the argument from the language of Section 9(a) appears
reinforced by the Board's treatment of scope of waiver issues in picket
line cases 210 that treatment may also be viewed as reinforcing the collective right characterization. The issue of the breadth of a no strike
clause in the picket line context may arise in cases presenting two
distinct and more general issues: (1) cases in which the employer who
discharges an honoring employee is charged with a violation of Sec207. 29 U.S.C. S 159(a) (1976) (emphasis supplied).
208. See Harper, supra note 8, at 373.
209. Id. at 374.
210.
To the extent that the Board declines to give effect to contemporaneous
union waiver or contemporaneous union concessions that a no strike clause constituted
a waiver of the right to honor, it appears clearly to be emphasizing the individual
character of the right to honor and to be deemphasizing the role of the union to the
vanishing point. See Union Boiler Co., 245 NLRB 719 (1979). But see Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Meat Cutters & Butcherworkmen, 597 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1979); American
Cynamid Co., 246 NLRB 87, 90 (1979).
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tion 8(a)(1), and defends on a waiver theory"', and (2) cases in which
a union is charged with violating Section 8(b)(1)(A)1 2 for disciplining
an employee for crossing a picket line where the union defends on
the ground that it has not waived the right to honor.213 Until the
Board's decision in InternationalUnion of OperatingEngineers Local
1821 standards for finding waiver in these cases differed-waiver being the more likely finding in cases falling within the latter category
rather than cases falling within the former.21 5 In Local 18, the Board
applied its strict construction standard, previously confined to the
employer as respondent case, in a case in which the union was charged
under Section 8(b)(1)(A) for disciplining employees for crossing a
stranger picket line. The union escaped the charge on the following
grounds:
a waiver of the right to strike for the purpose of coercing
an employer into granting demands with respect to wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment is not
equivalent to a requirement [Sic] that employees cross
stranger picket lines. We will not infer a waiver of the protected right to engage in sympathy strikes solely from an
agreement to refrain from all "stoppages of work." '
The first matter to be noticed about this reasoning is that the
"right" to engage in a sympathy strike was-a right exercised in Local
18 by the union. It is true that the union exercised that right on the
formal basis of its authority as a private association over its
members," 7 but the sole choice left to individual employees was
whether to be a formal member of the union.28 The member's decision to honor or not honor a stranger picket line is made, under the
Board's opinion, by the union." 9 A conclusion that the union may per211. See, e.g., American Cynamid Co., 246 NLRB 87 (1979); Daniel Constr. Co.,
239 NLRB 1335 (1979).
212. 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(1)(A) (1976).
213. See, e.g. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers Local 18, 238 NLRB 652 (1978);
Local 12419, United Mine Workers (National Grinding Wheel Co.) 176 NLRB 628 (1969).
214. 238 NLRB 652 (1978).
215. See id. at 653-54.
216. Id. at 652-53.
217. See supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
218. See Booster Lodge 405, IAM v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973); NLRB v. Granite
State Joint Board, Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972).
219. The patent fiction that court-enforced union fines are non-coercive, NLRB
v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967), has been abandoned by the Court
in favor of a policy analysis of Section 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(1)(A) (1976), which
emphasizes the role of the union in collective bargaining. See NLRB v. Boeing Co.,
412 U.S. 67 (1973).
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missibly coerce employee members with respect to the exercise of
the right to honor a picket line denies employee choice in the matter
and is therefore inconsistent with a characterization of the right as
individual.' °
The second matter to be noticed is that the Board's reasoning
treats the no strike clause in its application to the direct relationship
between an employer and that employer's employees differently than
in its application to a stranger dispute. That distinction is grounded,
in the Board's opinion in Local 18, on the proposition that waiver of
the right to honor cannot be a part of the quid pro quo for an arbitration clause because stranger disputes are nonarbitrable under such
a clause."' That ground for decision expressly recognizes the notions
that the stranger dispute is outside the relationship between the
employer and that employer's honoring employees and that the
stranger dispute is not subject to the control of either that employer
or the union in its capacity as the representative of that employer's
employees.222 Yet recognition of those notions was not used in Local
18 as the basis for limiting the exclusive bargaining representative's
authority; it was used, rather, as the basis for confirming the
representative's authority to direct, absent explicit waiver, the actions of the employees it represented with respect to the stranger
dispute.
The explanation of the Board's treatment of scope of waiver in
Local 18 may be found by examining the employer. The honoring
employee's employer has no control over either the merits or the occurrence of the stranger dispute and has therefore no control over
the mutual gain to be had by honoring a stranger picket line. That
is, the employer cannot grant its employees either thereciprocal power
220. It should be noted that the individual right which does remain under the
Supreme Court's interpretations of Section 8(b)(1)(A)-the full membership decision-is
a "right" which,if-exercised by non-membership, substantially limits the employee's
participation in the exclusive representative's policy formulation.
The distinction between the individual character of the right to make membership decisions-and the right to seek individually a change in exclusive
representatives-and the right to engage in concerted activity is suggested by Board
treatment of a union's choice of fines, rather than expulsion, as penalties for dissidents.
Compare Molders Local 125 (Blackhawk Tanning Co.), 178 NLRB 208 (1969), enforced,
442 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1971) with Tawas Tube Products, Inc., 151 NLRB 46 (1965).
221. 238 NLRB at 654. The Board relied, of course, upon the Supreme Court's
distinction between arbitrable and nonarbitrable disputes for purposes of federal court
injunctions, under the Norris La Guardia Act, against strikes in breach of no strike
clauses. Compare Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976) with
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
222. Compare 238 NLRB at 654 with Harper, supra note 8, at 375.
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or the shared benefit the union seeks when the union requires
employees, by threat of discipline, to honor the stranger picket line.
The employer cannot grant shared benefits because its shared control over the indirect effect of the settlement of the stranger dispute
is the subject matter of its future negotiations with the union
representing its employees, and the employer has no power over the
terms of that settlement. The employer by definition cannot grant
reciprocity- control of the stranger employees' future behavior
vis-vis the employer is in the hands of their union. On these premises,
the reason for requiring a more explicit waiver of the right to honor
a stranger picket line is not the lack of union authority over the conduct of the employees it represents in a stranger dispute; it is the
lack of employer control over the benefit to be gained from participation in a stranger dispute. The union waives its right to strike in
exchange for arbitration of disputes with respect to which the
employer is a party2"-and probably in exchange for other substantive concessions by the employer as well. 4 But the right to participate
in a dispute with respect to which the employer is not a party is
a right to seek indirect benefit and reciprocal obligation- gains of a
distinct character potentially requiring distinct employer concessions
in exchange for union forbearance from pursuing those gains. This
explanation implies Board allocation of bargaining chips, but the allocation is founded upon contractual interpretation: a general no strike
clause is restrictively interpreted because it is viewed as contemplating
a quid pro quo not inclusive of the stranger picket line situation.
An equivalent analysis supports the Board's restrictive view of
no strike clauses where the employer is charged with a Section 8(a)(1)
violation for disciplining an honoring employee. Although that view
may be explained as premised upon a Board assumption that the right
to honor is individual and not within the normal authority of the exclusive representative to control, it is equally explicable by reference
to the distinct character of the union gains to be had by striking and,
therefore, by making a no-strike concession and the union gains to
be had by honoring a picket line established over a stranger dispute. 5
223. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970).
224. See Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcherworkmen, 597 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1979).
225. I am not contending that any given employer concession is traceable to
a given union concession. The point, rather, is that the no strike clause most clearly
contemplates the primary strike and, as a matter of contractual interpretation, may
be said not to contemplate a distinct subject matter absent evidence indicating that
all work stoppages were contemplated by the parties. See American Cynamid Co., 246
NLRB 87 (1979).
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The latter explanation is the better explanation not only for
reasons of symmetry with Section 8(b)(1)(A) doctine, but because the
argument that the right to honor is individual and is not within the
exclusivity principle is inconsistent with both the shared benefit and
reciprocal commitment rationales for mutuality."' If the exclusive
representative and the group it represents are, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, treated as indifferent to the honoring
employee's conduct, it is at least odd that the employee's protection
is grounded upon the notions that his group will share in the benefits
of stranger employee success or will gain power for its own future

226. Professor Harper argues that his position is consistent with both rationales.
With respect to the shared benefit theory, his argument is that a bargaining agent
has exclusive control only "over employee attempts to extract better terms of employment from their employer". Harper, supra note 8, at 374 n.165, and that "indirect
benefits do not justify union control" of sympathy strike activity any more than they
justify bargaining over permissive terms involving management's rights to direct the
enterprise. Id. The first argument assumes its conclusion: The bargaining agent's scope
of control is narrow only if it can be argued that it should be narrow. The argument
in the text here is that is should not be narrow because the shared benefit questionthe possibility of shared benefit is a question-is appropriately answered by the exclusive representative. The second argument conceives of preexisting employee rights
to engage in concerted activity as "like" preexisting employer rights to direct the
enterprise-both are only partially limited by the presence of an exclusive representative. But the likeness of these "rights" also requires justification. Specifically, likeness
requires a conclusion, by the terms of the rationale for distinguishing mandatory and
permissive subjects of bargaining, First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452
U.S. 666 (1981), that the harm done employee rights by imposing union control outweighs
the benefit to be gained by union control. That balance, I suggest, favors union control precisely because the question, under the shared benefit theory, is benefit to the
group represented by the union. One might, of course, conclude that the harm done
the "employee right" is nevertheless too great, but this requires an understanding
of the employee right which views that right as having an importance and character
(e.g. associational or communicational) distinct from the mere question of economic
benefit. One could not otherwise justify union control of "direct" economic issues vis-i-vis
the employer.
With respect to the reciprocity rationale, Professor Harper argues that the rationale directly supports the conclusion that the honoring employee's union should have
no control over the act of honoring a stranger picket line. Harper supra note 8, at
372-73. The argument is that the right to engage in a sympathy strike in expectation
of future aid is not controlled by the honoror's union because that union does not
control the objectives of the sympathy strike-i.e., the objectives of the stranger pickets.
Id. at 374. It is true that the honoring employee's union does not control the objectives of the sympathy strike, but the question, within the terms of the reciprocity
rationale, is whether the honoring employee's union should control the assessment
of prospects for future reciprocal assistance. As it is the honoring employee's union
which will control the objectives of future strikes on behalf (directly) of the honoring
employee and the occasions for use or non-use of the strike weapon, I give an affirmative answer to that question.
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purposes through the employee's action. Even if the employee's mutual
purpose is viewed as his wholly individual judgment that he will eventually gain from the aid he provides the stranger employees, neither
the exclusive representative nor the group it represents can be indifferent in fact to that purpose, for the honoring employee's judgment,
by the terms of the mutuality rationale, affects that group.
There remains, however, the language of Section 9(a) itselflanguage which grants a union exclusivity for the purpose of collective bargaining, not "mutual aid or protection."' Reconciliation of that
language with the foregoing analysis may be found in legislative intent. Section 1 of The Labor Act-the congressional statement of
Labor Act policy -duplicates in part the language of Section 7, but
differs from the language of Section 7 in the crucial respects that
Section 1 elevates the practice of collective bargaining to the primary
objective of the Act and that it makes "mutual aid or protection" a
purpose to be achieved by institutional means:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
to eliminate the causes of certain obstructions to the free
flow of commerce . . . by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection. 8
The three "freedoms" granted are in the nature of individual
rights of choice', but the stated congressional purpose was to protect individual choice exercised in favor of institutional arrangements -association, organization and representation. And the purposes
for which those institutional arrangements are to be chosen include
mutual aid or protection. By contrast, Section 7 protects rights of individual choice in clauses independent of its clause protecting concerted activity,' and protects concerted activity undertaken for either
of two independent purposes- collective bargaining or mutual aid or
protection:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec227.
228.
229.
230.

See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. S 151 (1976).
See Brousseau, supra note 4, at 26-27.
Id. at 27.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss2/2

Cox: On Honoring Picket Lines: A Revisionist View
1983]

PICKET LINES
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.... ."

It is the case that the language of Section 7 cannot be ignored in
favor of the language of Section 1, but Section 1 may (and should)
be viewed as informing judgment about the meaning of Section 7.
The information Section 1 provides is that "mutual aid or protection",
as an employee objective, was conceived as an objective to be achieved
by associational, organizational and representative means. The question is whether this conception finds support in the Act read as a
whole.
The principal statutory argument for the conclusion that the
honoring of a stranger picket line is protected activity is based on
the definitional sections of the Labor Act.232 The term "employee" is
defined by the Act to "include any employee, and [is further defined
so that the term] shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employee ..
.""' Hence, any employee, even an employee of an
employer not involved in a dispute over which a picket line has been
established, has a "right ... to assist" the labor organization involved
in that dispute2' and to engage in the concerted activity of honoring
the picket line for a "mutual" purpose. Moreover, the term "labor
dispute" is defined by the Act to "include any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment . . . regardless of
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
'
and employee."235
The definition of "labor dispute" is chiefly important for purposes of the definition of "employee": an employee of
employer A who quits work over a labor dispute involving employer
B remains, for statutory purposes, an employee of A. 236
On their face, these definitions appear to confirm an individual
conception of the right to honor a stranger picket line: 21 the absence
of an employment relationship requirement appears to confirm the
231. 29 U.S.C. S 157 (1976).
232. See Getman supra note 8, at 1227.
233. 29 U.S.C. S 152(3 (1976).
234. See Cyril de Cordova & Bros., 91 NLRB 1121, 1135 (1950).
235. 29 U.S.C. S 152(9).
236. 29 U.S.C. S 152(3).
237. Brousseau, supra note 4, at 26, 40. But cf. P. Cox, supra note 5, at 258
(arguing that the right to assist includes the right to participate in concerted activity). Although I view the right to participate as individual, it is a right limited to freedom
from employer retaliation for an individual assertion of the claim to participation. The
occurrence or nonoccurrence of concerted activity are alternatives for the union to
choose between. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
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argument that the honoring employee's representative is legally
disinterested. But the legislative purposes underlying the definitions
suggest a conclusion consistent with the policy bias favoring institutional arrangements in Section 1 of the Act. The first such purpose
was the incorporation into the Labor Act of definitions found in the
Norris LaGuardia Act.' The latter definitions were designed to overturn the judicial doctrine' that secondary activity was not immunized
from antitrust exposure by Section 20 of the Clayton Act.40 The second purpose of the NLRA definitions was to permit free employee
choice of the "outside union" as a representative -i.e., to permit
employees to select non-employees as a representative. 2' The third
purpose, related to the first, was to make it clear that a legitimate
objective of organization across employers was that of equalizing
bargaining power and eliminating wage competition. 2 What Congress
contemplated in having these three purposes in mind was institutional
activity -including, at the time of the Wagner Act, secondary activity. The contemplated activity was institutional both because it had
historically been institutional (unions had sought by secondary activity and by organization across employers to better achieve their
objectives)..3 and because the objectives sought by the unions through
that historical activity were institutional objectives: organization across
employers, increased bargaining power for the unions as representatives, and elimination of wage competition between individual
employees.
The congressional scheme disclosed by the foregoing summary
was a scheme founded upon a collective conception of the activity to
be protected by the Labor Act.2 " It is true that the chief evils Con238. Compare 29 U.S.C. SS 152(3), 152(9) with 29 U.S.C. S 113 (1976).
239. See United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926); Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
240. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
241. H.R. Rep. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1935); Hearings on S1958 Before
the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 603 (1935) (Statement
of Robert C. Graham) (criticizing the Wagner bill on this ground); Id. at 440-41 (colloquy between Senator Wagner and Robert T. Caldwell); Id. at 498 (statement of Harvey
Ellrod) (in opposition); 79 CONG. REC. 9701 (1935) (Congressman Blanton in opposition).
242. H.R. Rep. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935).
243. See cases cited supra note 206. See also Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
244. Senator Wagner's criticism of Section 7a of the National Recovery Act,
albeit criticism founded on a fear of company unions, displayed a strong pro exclusivity bias as a necessary premise to his conception of the theory and practice of collective bargaining. See 78 CONG. REC. 4229 (1934) (quoted supra note 186).
It should be noted that Section 4 of Sen. 2926, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG.
REC. 3444 (1934), a bill Senator Wagner introduced in the 73rd Congress and the
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gress sought to mitigate by that conception were the twin evils of
judicial and employer resistance to a collective conception and that
the problem of the operation of the conception in a context in which
an individual employee seeks participation in a stranger dispute was
not-except to the extent that Congress recognized as legitimate
secondary activity and organization across employers-explicitly
considered.24 But the scheme does inform the meaning of "mutual aid
or protection" at least to the extent that the phrase was more likely
intended as a description of purposes consistent with the scheme than
as a description of individual rights independent of the scheme." 6
predecessor of Section 7 of Sen. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 79 CONG. REC. 2368 (1935),
the bill which became the Wagner Act, differed from the latter in its explicit recognition that "concerted activity" may be engaged in outside a labor organization:
Employees shall have the right to organize and join labor organizations,
and to engage in concerted activities, either in labor organizations or otherwise, for the purpose of organizing and bargaining collectively through
representatives of their own choosing or for other purposes of mutual
aid or protection.
Sen. 2926, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REc. 3444 (1934). The Senate Committee on
Education and Labor, Sen. Rep. No. 1184, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), redrafted Section 4 of Sen. 2926 as originally offered as Section 3(1) of the reported bill. Section
3(1) provided that "It shall be an unfair labor practice ... for an employer to attempt,
by interference or coercion, to impair the exercise by employees of the right to form
or join labor organizations, to designate representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection." Id. at 27. A 74th Congress Senate Committee print declares that
Section 7 of Sen. 1958 (Section 7 of the Wagner Act) "is drawn from Section 3(1) of
last year's bill, although the form has been somewhat changed." Memorandum Comparing S.1958, Seventy-Fourth Congress, First Session, A Bill Introduced By Senator
Wagner on February 21, 1935, To Create A National Labor Relations Board, And For
Other Purposes, With The Bill Reported By Senator Walsh on May 26, 1934, As A
Substitute For S.2926, Seventy-Third Congress, Also Introduced By Senator Wagner 2
(Committee print 1935), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT 1322 (1949). What is noteworthy in this bit of legislative history is that
the Committee redrafted the original Wagner Bill (S. 2926) so as to omit a specific
recognition of a right to engage in concerted activity independently of a union, and
that the portion of the second Wagner bill (Sen. 1958) which became Section 7 adopted
that omission.
245. See Carney & Florsheim, supra note 8, at 944-45.
246. The argument that the scheme is not, however, implicated in the
stranger picket line problem is that the scheme is dependent upon the bargaining
unit: The exclusive bargaining agent's authority is limited to the bargaining unit for
which the union is the exclusive representative, and, because the union does not possess
that authority with respect to a stranger bargaining unit, it cannot waive protection
for an employee who acts in concert with stranger pickets. Harper, supra note 8, at
373. The difficulty with the argument is that it jeopardizes protection, not waiver.
To the extent that the protected status of a refusal to cross a stranger picket line
has been judicially questioned, it has been questioned on the ground that the picket
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Derivative Non-Protection: The Problem of the Unlawful
Picket Line

The oft-repeated (by way of dictum)1 7 and occasionally enforced"'
general rule is that an honoring employee is not protected under Section 7 where he honors a picket line which is itself "unlawful" because
established in violation of the prohibitions of the Labor Act. 9 or in
line bears no relation to the interests of the honoring employee and his fellow employees.
The common counterargument is a counterargument from the mutuality theories
previously discussed here. But that counterargument is a counterargument consistent
with a collective view of the scheme. It is true that there are limitations upon a union's
authority to seek "mutual aid and benefit" by organizing and bargaining across both
bargaining units and employers. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965) (antitrust exposure where union agrees with an employer to impose
identical terms on other employers); Utility Workers Union (Ohio Power Co.), 203 NLRB
230 (1973), enforced, 490 F.2d 1383 (6th Cir. 1974) (alteration of bargaining unit is a
permissive term). But a union effort to impose uniform wage rates, to engage in pattern bargaining, and to generally seek to eliminate competition in the labor market
are accepted and permissiable union objectives. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665 n.2 (1965); U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 298 F.2d
873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 919 (1962); Houston Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council
(Claude Everett Constr. Co.), 136 NLRB 321 (1962). It is the case that a union's interest (and the interests of employees in a particular bargaining unit represented by
that union) are more clearly implicated where a stranger dispute involves a common
employer or occurs in a common product market than where the dispute appears wholly
unrelated to an honoring eriiployee's bargaining unit, but that observation is a matter
of degree. If the shared benefit and receprocal power justifications for protection of
the refusal to cross a picket line have validity, they are explanations of a given collectivity's (bargaining unit's) economic and political interests in a stranger dispute. See
Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. NLRB, 111 F.2d 869, 974 (7th Cir. 1940).
247. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gould, Inc., 638 F.2d 159, 163 n.2 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 930 (1981); NLRB v. Louisville Chair Co., 385 F.2d 922, 928-29 (6th
Cir. 1967). There is a distinction between the notions that an employee's conduct is
unprotected under Section 7 and the notion that the Board will not (or lacks the power
to) remedy a discharge where an employee has engaged in misconduct. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(c) (1976); A. Cox, supra note 121, at 324 n.24. See also Southern Steamship Co.
v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (employee misconduct unlawful under external law); NLRB
v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939) (same). The courts and Board speak
in the present context, however, both in terms of nonprotection and in terms of lack
of remedial power. See, e.g., Local Union 707, Hwy. and Local Motor Freight Drivers
(Claremont Polytechincal Corp.), 169 NLRB 613 (1972) (no remedial power as to pickets);
Chevron USA, Inc., 244 NLRB 1081, 1084 (1979) (honoring employees unprotected); National Packing Co. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 1967) (no remedy for pickets).
248. See, e.g., Chevron USA, Inc., 244 NLRB 1081 (1979); American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 231 NLRB 556 (1977); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Col, 107 NLRB 1547 (1954). See also United
Furniture Workers of America v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 738 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 838 (1964) (S 8(d) violation). Cf., e.g., NLRB v. Local 30, Int'l Longshoremen, 549
F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1977) (S 8(b)(1)(A) violated by union discipline for crossing a picket
line established in violation of S 8(b)(7)).
249. Chevron USA, Inc., 244 NLRB 1081 (1979). But cf. Local Union No. 707,
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violation of a no strike clause waiving the protected activity rights
of the pickets."5 And the unprotected status of the refusal to cross
under such circumstances is unaffected by the honoring employee's
ignorance of the illicit character of the picket line."1
The rationale for the general rule is said to be that the honoring employee "stands in the shoes" of the picketing employees-nonprotection is vicarious." 2 If the issue of non-protection for the honoring employee is to be resolved at least in part by resolution of the
issue of non-protection for the pickets, may the honoring employee's
protection be viewed as derived from the picket's protection? Under
such a view, the honoring employee is protected instrumentally for
purposes of furthering the collective right of stranger employees as
a group, not fellow employees as a group.
There is more than a conceptual (stands in the shoes) rationale
for such a view. The function of a lawful (particularly non-secondary)
picket line established for economic purposes is to ensure that the
normal and anticipated effects of a strike on a primary employer occur in fact.2" To the extent that the picket line is an appeal to the
employees of the struck employer and to potential replacements for
those employees, it constitutes an effort to achieve the objective of
the strike: loss of the workforce.2" To the extent that the picket line
is an appeal to secondary employees doing related work255, it constitutes an effort to achieve that same end.2' For example, an honorLocal Motor Freight Drivers (Claremont Polychemical Corp.), 196 NLRB 613 (1972)
(Where there is a protected right to strike but picketing is prohibited by Section 8(b)(7),
only employees who picket are unprotected.).250. See American Tel. & Tel. Co., 231 NLRB 556 (1977).
251. See cases cited supra note 248.
252. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 231 NLRB 556, 562 (1977).
253. See United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492, 499 (1964);
Local 761, Int'l Union of Electical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 680-81 (1961); Lesnick,
The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1394-98 (1962). A picket
line established for organizational purposes or for area standards purposes has an
ultimate objective somewhat distinct from the objective of a picket line established
in an economic strike, but its immediate objective (inducing loss of workforce) is likely
to be the same. See Houston Bldg. & Const. Trades Council (Claude Everett Constr.
Co.), 136 N.L.R.B. 321 (1962). However, some forms of picketing for organizational purposes are subject to express prohibitions of appeals to secondary employees. See 29
USC § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976) (publicity proviso).
254. Cf. Lesnick, supra note 253, at 1412 (providing this explanation of the
primary/secondary distinction in the context of the application of Section 8(b)(4), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976), to appeals to secondary employees).
255. See Local 651, Intern. Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667
(1961).
256. See Lesnick, supra note 253, at 1417-19.
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ing (secondary) employee assigned the task of delivering materials to
a struck (primary) employer would not be assigned that task if the
strike against the primary had successfully deprived the primary of
its workforce. The refusal to cross is, then, an effect that would constitute the normal and anticipated effect of a successful primary
strike."7
If such is the lawful function of a picket line, the protection from
employer retaliation afforded the honoring employee may be viewed
as necessary because essential to the effectiveness of the picket line
as a weapon in policing a primary strike-protection is afforded the
honoring employee not because the honoring employee seeks "mutual
benefit" either for himself or for the collective with which he is
associated, but because such protection is part and parcel of the
stranger employee's strike weapon.258
There are two difficulties with the argument. First, stranger
employees do not control the decision to honor. The most convincing
rationale for protecting the act of honoring might well be the act's
utility in preserving the primary strike weapon, but the right exercised by picketing stranger employees is only a right to make an appeal. The right to respond to that appeal is either a right possessed
by the honoring employee or a right possessed by that employee's
union. If exercised in favor of honoring the picket line, the honoring

257. Although the rationale for protected picketing suggested in the text was
formulated in the caselaw and commentary for purposes of analysis of secondary boycott
prohibitions, it finds support in some ,cases which deal specifically with the question
of Section 7 protection for the act of honoring. See NLRB v. Union Carbide Corp.,
440 F.2d 54, 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971); West Coast Casket Co.,
97 NLRB 820, 823 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1953). See also Schatzki, supra
note 8, at 394. Moreover, the rationale may be viewed as a rationale in other statutory
contexts. To the extent that a strike is protected but picketing to enforce the strike
is prohibited-the problem in the Section 8(b)(7) context-it is precisely the effect of
organizational picket lines on secondary employees which the statute seeks to preclude.
The strike conduct of primary employees is not prohibited. See National Packing Co.
v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 1967); Local Union No. 707, Local Motor Freight
Drivers (Claremont Polychemical Corp.), 196 NLRB 613 (1972). The prohibition is, then,
a prohibition against the use of the union's most effective means of policing the strike-a
means thought by Congress to coerce individual employee choice and to subject
employers to repeated pressures even after employee choice had been exercised against
union representation. See NLRB v. Retail Clerks Union, 526 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1975)
(S 8(b)(1)(A) violated by union's discipline of members for crossing another union's picket
line established in violation of S 8(b)(7)).
258. This is the reason that the effect of the refusal to cross on the honoring
employee's employer may properly be viewed as merely incidental. See authorities
cited supra note 156.
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employee may be viewed as acting in concert with the pickets and
therefore as participating in the stranger strike, and in this sense
his Section 7 protection is difficult to separate from the strike. But
the right to decide whether to respond is distinct from the right to
strike if the right to decide is not exercisable by the stranger
employees or their union.
The second difficulty with the argument is that derivative
non-protection is not automatically a basis for concluding that protection is derivative as well. It is at best difficult to justify Section 7
protection for the act of honoring without considering its relationship
to the strike weapon and the Act's protection of the strike, but an
honoring employee's Section 7 protection cannot be grounded solely
upon the utility of that protection for the stranger employees' strike;
it must be grounded upon the language of Section 7-language requiring mutuality.
If it is nevertheless the case that Section 7 protection for the
honoring employee is in part justified as a reinforcement of the efficacy of the strike weapon, is such a justification consistent with a
collective characterization of the right to honor? It may be argued
that, as the primary basis for protection is preservation of the strike,
it is the individual honoring employee who acts in concert with the
strikers, and the pickets' appeal should be viewed as directed to the
individual's decision. Such an argument appears inconsistent with the
power of the honoring employee's union to waive that employee's protection, but appears consistent with the doctrine that the honoring
employee's protection is a function of the protected status of the picket
line. These appearances may be reconciled by seeking an answer to
a basic riddle inadequately answered by the conceptualistic notion that
an honoring employee stands in the Section 7 shoes of the picketing
employee: why is non-protection derivative?
Derivative non-protection may be explained as the means by
which the honoring employee's employer is permitted the remedy of
self-help." 9 As at least secondary boycott prohibitions are primarily
designed to protect secondary employers, such an employer should
be permitted to act on that protection.' One response to this rationale
259. See Chevron USA, Inc., 244 NLRB 1081, 1087-88 (1979) (Chairman Fanning
dissenting) (explaining Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 107 NLRB 1547 (1954) as a case involving an employer's defensive lockout).
260. See Chevron USA, Inc., 244 NLRB 1081, 1086-87 (1979) ("To accept Chairman Fanning's view would leave neutral employers helpless in such circumstances to
discipline those who respect such illegal lines, and would, to a large degree, vitiate
the protection afforded then by the statute's secondary boycott provisions.").
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is that the secondary employer has statutory remedies which make
self-help unnecessary"1 , but there is no reason that statutory remedies
should be held exclusive, particularly where there is litigation delay
in making them effective. A more persuasive response is that the rationale does not explain derivative non-protection where the picket
line violates a statutory provision designed to protect the picketed
employer262 or violates a no-strike clause equally designed to protect
the picketed employer. In such instances the self-help remedy of the
secondary employer is of no use to the picketed employer suffering
the effects of an unlawful picket line because the discretion to exercise the self-help remedy (e.g., threatened or actual discharge as a
means of forcing a delivery to the picketed employer) is in the honoring employee's employer. At most, self-help explains the rule of
derivative non-protection only in the sense that it provides the honoring employee's employer a means of countering the effects of an
unlawful picket line on that employer. Self-help is not, under such
an explanation, a direct means of enforcing statutory policy or the
policy underlying the law's recognition of the no-strike clause.
Derivative non-protection may alternatively be explained as a
means of deterring the unlawful picket line. The difficulty with this
explanation is that it is at least doubtful that the effect of unlawfulness
upon potential honoring employees will be a material influence on the
pickets where the effect of unlawfulness on their own protection
proves an inadequate deterrent. If the objective of derivative nonprotection is instead deterrence of individual honoring employees from
the act of honoring unlawful picket lines, non-protection seems an illconceived deterrent. In the first place, the individual employee lacks
the resources to make on-the-spot assessments of the complex issues
inherent in the unlawful picket line characterization.2 "3 In the second
place, the irrelevance of the honoring employee's knowledge of the
illicit character of the picket line suggests that it is not that employee's
decision which derivative non-protection seeks to influence; deterrence
assumes the capacity to avoid the conduct one wishes deterred and
capacity at an individual level of employee conduct would seem to
require knowledge.26 '
261. See 29 U.S.C. SS 158(b)(4), 187 (1976). Cf. Local 707, Highway and Local
Motor Freight Drivers (Claremont Polychemical Corp.), 196 NLRB 613, 619 (1972)
(Member Fanning dissenting) (Remedies for Section 8(b)(7)(B) violation should not include discharge of individual employee participants as both preliminary injunction and
unfair labor practice processes are available); Schatzki, supra note 8, at 399-400 (same).
262. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(7) (1976); 29 U.S.C. S 158(d) (1976).
263. Schatzki, supra note 8, at 399-402.
264. As an empirical matter, the picket line cases are replete with instances
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Finally, derivative non-protection may be explained not solely
by reference to the conduct of the pickets, but by reference to the
obligations of the honoring employee's fellow employees and their exclusive representative. That is, the right to honor, if a right exercised by the collective consisting of the honoring employee and his
fellow employees, implies an obligation on the part of that collective
to assess the legality of the picket line honored-an obligation enforced by means of allocation of the risk of derivative non-protection
to the honoring employee.26 The honoring union is, in short, disabled
from seeking either shared benefits or reciprocal power where a picket
line is unlawful. It is disabled not merely for the conceptual reason
that it should not be permitted to seek gain from the unlawful conduct of others, but because its obligation to assess risks of illegality
provides some protection to both the picketed employer and to the
secondary employer from the effects the law seeks to preclude by
declaring particular picketing unlawful.266
This protection is imperfect for the reason earlier suggested: the
discretion to exercise self-help as a means of moderating those effects is in the honoring employee's (the secondary) employer." 7 But
it is the threat of the exercise of that discretion which is of importance for purposes of the rationale. That threat provides a measure
of deterrence, but it is a deterrence of a distinct character than deterrence of individual decision. It is distinct for two reasons. First, the
obligation implicit in the deterrence is one imposed on a collective
represented by an institution far more likely to have the resources
for assessment than the individual honoring employee. Second, the
in which individual employees sought knowledge and instructions-both from unions
and employers-when faced with picket lines. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gould, Inc., 638 F.2d
159, 161-62 (10th Cir. 1980) (union steward advice); Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcherworkmen, 597 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1979) (union
official); NLRB v. William S. Carroll, Inc. 578 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1978) (employer's agent);
Local Union 684, Int'l Bhd. Elect. Workers (Walsh & Maddox), 246 NLRB 549 (1979);
Torrington Constr. Co., 235 NLRB 1540, 1546 n.14 (1978) (union official); Overnite Transp.
Co., 154 NLRB 1271, 1281 (1965); enforced in part sub. nom, Truck Drivers Local 728
v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (employer); Rockaway News Supply Co., 95
NLRB 336, 343 (1951), enforcement denied, 197 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1952), affd on other
grounds, 345 U.S. 71 (1953) (union vice president).
265. Cf. Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen Local Union 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d
547, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (employee required to make decisions regarding legality of
picket line he proposes to honor will generally be advised by counsel); Schatzki, supra
note 8, at 400 (employee normally honors at instance of his union, but union itself
may err or have a conflict of interest).
266. This rationale is to be distinguished from the self-help rationale. The latter rationale is remedial; the present rationale is a deterrence rationale.
267. See supra text following note 262.
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function of the non-protection rule under this interpretation is not
allocation of a risk of discharge or other discipline to the honoring
employee's collective. The risk of discipline is a fortuity visited on
the honoring employee and dependent upon the discretion of the honoring employee's employer and upon practical restraints upon that discretion. The risk is the internal political consequences on the union of
the occurrence of that fortuity: it is hoped that employees subject
to the risk of discipline at the hands of their employer will seek the
guidance of their union and will, when given no guidance or erroneous
guidance, politically punish those responsible.
The obvious objection to this last rationale for the role of
derivative non-protection is that the immediate and most obvious risk
is one of discipline at the hands of the secondary employer. That risk
is visited upon the individual employee. The first level of response
to that objection is conceptual and assumes premises: the individual's
remedy is internal and it is the collective which is the appropriate
focus. The second response is that it is the law that the individual
runs the risk of discipline and the common observation. 8 that the individual lacks the resources to assess that risk. On those two premises,
it becomes necessary to discover a rationale that will reconcile them.
The rationale proposed is that they are reconciled if their function
is to force, by internal employee pressure, reponsible decision by the
honoring employee's union.269
268. See, e.g., Axelrod, supra note 8, at 639; Getman, supra note 8, at 1230;
Schatzki, supra note 8, at 400.
269. It is only a partially viable objection that repeated Board and judicial
emphasis upon the individual character of the right to honor denies any union obligation. That emphasis clearly demonstrates the absence of an authoritative declaration
of the union's obligation to assess risks of non-protection, but it also exacerbates the
apparent inconsistency between the rule of derivative non-protection and the practical matter of the individual employee's inability to assess that risk. It is also only
a partially viable objection that the honoring employee's union may have a conflict
of interest with the honoring employee. See Schatzki, supra note 8, at 400. That objection is an objection from an individualist premise; the premise of the rationale is that
the employee's remedy is internal.
It is not a viable objection that unions do not or will not respond to the postulated
obligation. A fundamental premise of the statutory scheme, whether or not naive, is
that unions should respond to internal pressure. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 64 (1975). But cf. Sigal, Freedom of Speech and
Union Discipline: The "Right" of Defamation and Disloyalty, N.Y.U. 17TH ANNUAL CONF.
ON LABOR 367 (1964) (criticizing the interpretation given to the union democracy aspects
of the Landrum Griffin Act by some courts as ignoring the union's need to present
a disciplined force in dealing with employers). Nor is it an objection that some unions
do not in fact control the individual employee's actions-i.e., that discretion is left,
purposefully or by neglect, in the individual. The obligation imposed by the threat
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III.
A.

Two

IMPLICATIONS OF A COLLECTIVE CHARACTERIZATION

Picket Lines, Secondary Boycotts And The Section 8(b)(4)
Proviso

Section 8(b)(4) - the statutory prohibition
boycott-contains the following proviso:

of the secondary

Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b) shall
be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to
enter upon the premises of any employer (other than his
own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative
of such employees whom such employer is required to
recognize under this Act. ....
.

The Section 7 protection granted the honoring of picket lines
appears facially incongruous with the prohibition of the secondary boycott: the honoring employee engages in a partial strike against his
employer one purpose of which is rather clearly to cause that employer
to cease doing business"' with the picketed employer. The proviso
precludes that conclusion, but has been interpreted in a fashion which
does not conform to its language. A picket line may be found secondary and therefore prohibited even where established under conditions meeting the terms of the proviso. 7 ' And a picket line may be
found primary and therefore not prohibited even where established
73
over a matter or in a fashion not meeting the terms of the proviso.
By parity of reasoning, the Section 8(b)(4) exposure of the honoring
employee's union, when it involves a refusal on the part of the
employee to, e.g., deliver materials to a primary employer, is not
dependent upon the language of the proviso." Indeed, analysis of both
the picketing union's and honoring employee's union's exposure under

of non-protection is by means of political incentive. It is quite possible that the incentive will be ineffective. An appropriate response to ineffectiveness is a new device
for imposing the obligation; ineffectiveness threatens the rationale only to the extent
that degree of ineffectiveness makes the rationale improbable as explanation.
270. 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4) (1976).
271. See id. S 158(b)(4)(i)(B).
272. See Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen Local No. 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d
547, 549-51 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
273. See Truck Drivers Union Local 728 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964) See also, International Hod Carriers, Local 41 (Calumet
Contractors Ass'n); 133 NLRB 512 (1961).
274. See, e.g., Orange County District Council of Carpenters, 242 NLRB 585
(1979); Bricklayers and Stonemasons Local No. 2, 166 NLRB 117 (1967).
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Section 8(b)(4) for inducing the honoring of real or constructive ' 5 picket
lines has proceeded quite independently of the proviso. Exposure is
a function of the primary or secondary character of union conduct;
7
the proviso, in short, has been read out of the statute.
This phenomenon has generally been attributed to the proviso's
checkered legislative history. 7 The Ball bill" of 1947 became the basis
for Section 8(b)(4) in the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner
Act. That bill had declared the secondary boycott "unlawful" and had
subjected it to civil and criminal remedies in the courts, but had also
contained a limitation similar to the Section 8(b)(4) proviso. 9 Moreover,
the Ball bill exposed individual employees to liability."8 As enacted,
Section 8(b)(4) made the secondary boycott an unfair labor practice
subject to both administrative and judicial remedies,28' subjected only unions to the prohibition 2. and retained the proviso. What is odd
275. By constructive picket line I mean instances in which inducements other
than an actual picket line produce the result a picket line would produce. See, e.g.,
Bricklayers and Stonemasons Union v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Grain
Elevators Flour and Feed Mill Workers Local 418 v. NLRB, 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967).
276. See Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen Local No. 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d
547, 550-51 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lesnick, supra note 253, at 1406-07.
277. Lesnick, supra note 253, at 1403-07. See Tower, The Puzzling Proviso, 1
LAB. L.J. 1019 (1950).
278. S.55, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
279. Id. S 204(a). The "proviso" read as follows:
Nothing contained in clause (1) of this subsection shall be construed to
make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of
any employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such
employer are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative
of such employees whom such employer is required to recognize under
the National Labor Relations Act.
Senator Ball's explanation of the proviso suggests his focus upon preserving
from the unlawfulness characterization the conduct of the employees honoring the picket
line rather than the picket line itself:
The sentence at the bottom of page 27 exempts from clause (1) the refusal
of employees to cross a legitimate strike picket line. We felt that was
a legitimate manifestation of the sympathy of one group of workers for
another engaged in a dispute with their employer, but the exemption would
apply only if the striking union represented a majority of the employees
of the employer being picketed.
Hearings on S.55 and S.J. Res. 22 Before the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
of the Senate, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1947) (statement of Senator Joseph Ball).
280. S. 55, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. S 204 (1947).
281. See 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4); 187 (1976).
282. Id.
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in this legislative history is that the proviso retains the language of
the Ball bill: "nothing contained in this subsection . shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal . . . to enter. . . " Section 8(b)(4)
purports only to declare it an unfair labor practice for a union to (1)
engage in or induce or encourage individuals to engage in a strike
or refusal to handle goods for prohibited purposes,' or (2) to threaten,
coerce or restrain persons engaged in commerce28 for prohibited purposes. It does not purport to reach individual conduct, and does not
itself declare any conduct "unlawful" in a civil or criminal sense.' .
It is possible to view the proviso as an anomaly properly
relegated to oblivion,' but that relegation flies in the face of the canon
of construction, grounded on the principle of limited judicial function
in a democracy, that statutory language is to be given effect." One
means of giving the langauge effect is to suggest only that it
recognizes the legitimacy of a picket line established in support of
a primary dispute,289 but that solution ignores both the focus of the
proviso language upon the act of refusal (as distinguished from the
picket line inducement to refuse) and the caveat that the underlying
strike be ratified by an exclusive representative. The one bit of
legislative history addressing the proviso directly is a portion of the
Senate Report on Taft-Hartley which emphasizes both the focus and
the caveat:
Attached to Section 8(b)(4) is a proviso clause, which makes
it clear that it shall not be unlawful for any person to refuse
to enter upon the premises of any employer (other than his
own), if the employees of that employer are engaged in a
strike authorized by a union entitled to exclusive recognition. In other words, refusing to cross a picket line or otherwise refusing to engage in strikebreaking activities would

283. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976) (emphasis supplied) Note, however, that Section 303 of Taft-Hartley, which in 1947 repeated verbatim the proviso, properly used
the term "unlawful" as that section created a private cause of action for damages
against labor organization and the term "person" in Section 303 includes, as it does
in the NLRB, a labor organization. See 29 U.S.C. SS 142(3), 187 (1976).
284. 29 U.S.C. S 158(b(4)(i) (1976).
285. 29 U.S.C. 5 158(b)(4)(ii) (1976).
286. Axelrod, supra note 8, at 628-29; Lesnick, supra note 253, at 1404-05 n.206.
Note, however, that the proviso refers to a refusal on the part of "any person" and
that "person" is defined in the Act to include labor organization. 29 U.S.C. 5 152(1) (1976).
287. Lesnick, supra note 253, at 1407.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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not be deemed an unfair labor practice unless the strike
is a "wildcat" strike by a minority union."
The language of the Senate Report, like the proviso itself, is incongruous with both the language and policy of the Section 8(b)(4)
proviso if the act of refusal is conceived as an individual act of
refusal." 1 But there is no incongruity if the subject matter of the proviso is the act of honoring rather than the picket line and if the act
of honoring is viewed as the act of the honoring employee's union.
There are two senses in which the act of honoring may be viewed
as the act of the honoring employee's union: (1) The act of honoring
may occur at the instance of the honoring employee's union in the
sense that there is sufficient evidence of union complicity in the act
to warrant application of the Section 8(b)(4) prohibition. (2) The act
of honoring may occur under circumstances where there is not sufficient evidence of union complicity, but, by the terms of the present
discussion, Section 7 protection is to be determined by reference to
the union.
(1)

Secondary Union exposure under 8(b)(4) for the conduct
of individual employees.

Although a finding that a labor organization or its agents 2
engaged in the conduct prohibited by Section 8(b)(4) is an essential
element of the unfair labor practice," any form of union conduct which
may be characterized as an inducement of individual employees is sufficient to warrant that finding.' Thus, union conduct which purports
290.

Sen. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1947) (emphasis supplied),

reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA 429 (1948).
291. See Lesnick, supra note 253, at 1405-06 n.206 (rejecting a construction which
would render the proviso an affirmation of the lawfulness or protected status of "individual refusals to enter picketed premises" on the ground that such an affirmation
is "unnecessary, since individual acts, done by employees not acting as agents for a
").
union, cannot violate S 8(b)..
292. The concept of agency in the Labor Act is much broader than the concept in the Norris La Guardia Act. Compare 29 U.S.C. S 152(13) (1976) with 29 U.S.C.
S 106 (1976). The Labor Act definition is, however, similar to the Section 301 Taft
Hartley definition, 29 U.S.C. S 185 (1976), and the latter definition has been held to
require a finding of common law agency. Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers,
444 U.S. 212 (1979).
293. See 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4) (1976).
294. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); Allied
Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1378-79 (1st Cir. 1981),
(1982); NLRB v. Local Union No. 3, Intern. Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
affd, __
U.S. __
477 F.2d 260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1065 (1973).
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merely to advocate a work stoppage and to leave the decision whether
to engage or not engage in such a stoppage to the individual may
constitute an inducement which, if tied to a prohibited purpose, is
a violation of the statute." s But where a union purports to be wholly
neutral and to leave the decision whether to engage in a work stoppage in support of a stranger dispute to individual employee decision, there is no violation.'
Labor organizations subject to the prohibitions of Section 8(b)(4)
include both the union representing the employees of a primary
employer where such a primary union seeks to induce employees of
a secondary employer to engage in a work stoppage and the union
representing employees of the secondary employer where such a secondary union induces a work stoppage in support of a stranger primary
dispute. The most common example of the former, primary, union's
exposure to the statute is the picket line established at primary
premises in a dispute with a primary employer. The primary union's
exposure under Section 8(b)(4) is dependent upon whether secondary
employees induced to honor such a picket line are doing work for
their secondary employer which is related to the normal operations
of the primary." If related, the inducement is considered lawful
because it is a normal incident of the primary strike."5 The policy
conception underlying that rule is that the normal and anticipated
effects of the loss of the primary's workforce in a successful strike
are not the secondary effects the statute seeks to preclude.29
295. See, e.g., Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill Workers v. NLRB, 376 F.2d
774 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967); Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union
No. 728 v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 693 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964). Cf. Bricklayers
& Stone Masons Union, Local No. 2 v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Section
8(e) violated by attempted application of picket line clause in secondary circumstances);
Truck Drivers Unions Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.) (picket line clause
violates 8(e) to extent it purports to protect employees in secondary circumstances;
union argument that only individual rather than union induced refusals were protected
by the clause rejected), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964).
296. Gould Inc., Switchgear Division, 283 NLRB 618, 622 (1978) (interim report),
enJbrced, 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 930 (1981); Building &
Const. Trades Council of Tampa, 132 NLRB 1564 (1961). See Newbery Energy Corp.,
227 NLRB 436 (1976).
297. United Steelworkers of America v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492 (1964); Local 761,
Int'l Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
298. See Local 761, International Union of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366
U.S. 667 (1961).
299. See Lesnick, supra note 253, at 1417-18. But see Cantor, Separate Gates,
Related Work and Secondary Boycotts, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 613, 633 (1974); St. Antoine,
What Makes Secondary Boycotts Secondary? Sw. LEGAL FOUNDATION, 11TH ANN. INST. ON
LABOR LAW 5, 32-33 (1965).
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The union representing employees of a secondary employer (the
secondary union) might induce those employees by means of declarations of policy,"' threat of discipline," ' or persuasion," 2 to honor a
picket line established over a dispute with a stranger employer and
might seek to induce equivalent action on the part of secondary
employees where there is no picket line or where the secondary
employees do not, as a factual matter, actually encounter a picket
line. 3 Where the picket line, if established, would constitute a secondary picket line under the related work doctrine-i.e., where the picket
line as an appeal to secondary employees would be unlawful-the
secondary union violates Section 8(b)(4) where it induces by declarations, threats of discipline or advocacy, a refusal to do work which
would require a crossing of that picket line. 4
As a matter of the logic of the policy underlying the related work
doctrine, a union representing secondary employees which induced action on the part of those employees equivalent to the honoring of a
stranger primary picket line would not violate the statute: The effect
of such an inducement would, under the related work doctrine, constitute merely the permissible effects on a secondary employer of
primary strike activity',' and the purpose of the inducement, given
300. See Allied Int'l Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368
(1st Cir. 1981).
301. See, e.g., Carpenters District Council of Southern Colorado, 222 NLRB 613
(1976), enforced, 560 F.2d 1015 (10th Cir. 1977); Bricklayers & Stonemasons Local No.
2, 166 NLRB 117 (1967). Cf. Local 30, International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's
Union, 223 NLRB 1257 (1976) (8(b)(1)(A) violation for discipline), enforced, 549 F.2d 698
(9th Cir. 1977).
302. See NLRB v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 477 F.2d
260 (2nd Cir. 1973).
303. See Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill Workers, Local 418, 155 NLRB
462 (1965), enforced, 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967). Cf.
Bricklayers & Stonemasons Union v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (S 8(e) violation); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 1-128, 223 NLRB 757 (1976)
(refusal to refer for employment would violate 8(b)(4), but ally doctrine applies).
304. See, e.g., Orange County Council of Carpenters, 242 NLRB 585 (1979);
Mississippi Gulf Coast Bldg. and Construction Trades Local Union 153, Int'l Bhd. Electrical Workers, 221 NLRB 345 (1975); Packinghouse Employees and Warehousemen's
Union Local 616, 203 NLRB 645 (1973); Local 252, Sheet Metal Workers, 166 NLRB
262 (1967), enforced, 429 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1970); cf., e.g., NLRB v. Glaziers &
Glassworkers Local 1621, 632 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1980) (8(b)(A) violation); Carpenters
& Joiners Local 1620, 208 NLRB 94 (1974) (8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(4) violations).
305. See Grain Elevator, Flour & Feed Mill Workers, Local 418 (Continental
Grain Co.), 155 NLRB 402, 415-16 (1965) (dissenting opinion), enforced, 376 F.2d 774
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967); Cantor, supra note 299, at 653 (but suggesting that a requirement that there first be an appeal by the primary union would
be reasonable).
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those effects, would seem legitimate. But the law, albeit in a state
of some confusion,"O is to the contrary: the union representing secondary employees which induces a work stoppage on the part of those
employees in support of a stranger dispute may violate Section 8(b)(4)
even where a stranger picket line which would induce an identical
work stoppage would constitute, as to secondary employees, an appeal to refuse to perform related work. 07
The explanation of this anomaly is in part a matter of the Board's
insistence upon adhering to. the notions that the situs of a dispute' 8
and the subjective intent of the labor organization" 9 are to control
analysis. In particular, the Board's notion, despite the related work
doctrine, that direct appeals to secondary employees (as distinguished
from appeals to primary employees which incidentally affect secondary
employees) are illicit 10 continues to influence Board decision making
under the rubric of a finding of an illicit objective "under all the facts
and circumstances. 31
306. See Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union (Interborough News Co., 90
NLRB 2135 (1950); Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local 346 (Pure Oil Co.), 84 NLRB 315
(1949). Cf. Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 233, 240 (5th Cir. 1979) (primary union
may make off-situs appeals to secondary employees to honor primary's picket line).
307. Grain Elevator, Flour & Feed Mill Workers, Local 418 (Continental Grain
Co.), 155 NLRB 402 (1965), enforced, 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932
(1967). See NLRB v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 477 F.2d 260,
268 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1065 (1973); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
Local 1-128, 223 NLRB (1976). Cf.Harrah's Club v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 471 (9th Cir.), (union
inducement by telegram appeal to members to not cross a primary picket line was
threat within meaning of section 8(b)(4)(ii) where members were also secondary
employers), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971). But cf. Houston Insulation Contractors
Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 664, 668 (1967) ("Congress was not concerned to protect primary
employers against pressures by disinterested unions, but rather to protect disinterested
employers against direct pressures by any union" quoting United Ass'n of Journeymen,
Local 106 (Columbia-Southern Chemical Corp.), 110 NLRB 206, 109 (1954)).
308. See Building and Constr. Trades Council of New Orleans (Markwell & Hartz,
Inc.) 155 NLRB 319 (1965), enforced, 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967) cert. denied 391 U.S.
918 (1968).
309. See Chevron USA, Inc., 244 NLRB 1081, 1086 (1979) (although picket line
complied with Moore Dry Dock, union official's statements indicate unlawful objective),
310. See Local 761, Int'l Union of Electrical Workers, 123 NLRB 1547 (1959),
enforced, 278 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd, 366 U.S. 667 (1961); Sailors' Union of
the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.) 92 NLRB 547 (1950).
311. See, e.g., Chevron USA, Inc., 244 NLRB 1081, 1085 (1979); Local No. 441,
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 222 NLRB 99 (1976); United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices, Local 60 (Circle Inc.), 202 NLRB 99 n.1 (1973); Millwrights Local Union No.
1102 (Dobson Heavy Haul, Inc.), 155 NLRB 1305 (1965); International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, Local Union No. 11 (L.G. Electric Contractors, Inc.), 154 NLRB 766 (1965).
A somewhat related problem is the application of the related work doctrine
to picketing appeals to secondary employees at a secondary situs. To the extent that
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But there is another explanation for the anomaly: the underly1 2
that a secondary employer's refusal to cross a picket
ing conception"
line is an individual exercise of an individual Section 7 right. The point
is illustrated by two cases: Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union (Interborough News Co.)3 . and Grain Elevator, Flour and Feed Mill
Workers, Local 418 (Continental Grain Co.). 4
In InterboroughNews, newspaper publishers delivered newspaper
to newsstands operated by Interborough. Interborough employees
were engaged in a primary economic strike and were represented by
a union which also represented the delivery employees of the
publishers. Although the union had placed pickets at some of Interborough's stands, it had also made appeals, by direct oral contact with
publisher employees at locations other than Interborough's stands, to
a case raising such a problem does not involve an ambulatory primary situs to which
Moore Dry Dock standards may be applied, Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry
Dock Co.), 92 NLRB 547 (1950), the Board has been reluctant to apply the related
work doctrine in such a context. See, e.g., San Francisco Typographical Union No. 21
(California Newspaper, Inc.), 187 NLRB 542 (1970); General Truck Drivers Local 315
(Insured Transporters Inc.), 195 NLRB 56 (1972). But those contexts involve both the
substantial risk that secondary situs picketing will produce a total work stoppage on
the part of secondary employees (rather that a stoppage of related work), Cantor, supra
note 299, at 647, and the problem that such picketing constitutes an appeal to not
handle "hot goods"-an appeal not immunized by the related work doctrine. See Lesnick,
supra note 253, at 1412-14. The present criticism is only a criticism of the Board's
apparent insistence that union appeals must be primarily directed to primary employees.
The related work doctrine makes it clear that appeals primarily directed to secondary
employees are permissible to the extent consistent with the policy of the statute. See
Lesnick, supra note 253, at 1417-18. Consistency cannot be resolved by reference to
the union's objective or to foreseeable consequences as a test of that objective because
the union's objective will invariably be one within the literal language of the statute.
Consistency must instead be measured by reference to probable secondary effect, degree
of secondary effect, and risks of greater than to be expected secondary effect. See
NLRB v. Retail Store Employers Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 614 n.8 (1980)
Upon the assumption, for purposes of argument, that Building and Constr. Trades
Council of New Orleans (Markwell & Hartz, Inc.), 155 NLRB 319 (1965), enforced, 387
F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968), was correctly decided under
Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961), Board decisions
finding 8(b)(4) violations for union discipline of secondary employees for working behind
otherwise lawful picket lines cannot be criticized on the ground suggested here. On
that assumption, the discipline seeks to enmesh neutrals not engaged in related work.
See, e.g., Carpenters District Council of Southern Colorado, 222 NLRB 613 (1976), enforced, 560 F.2d 1015 (10th Cir. 1977); Orange County District of Carpenters, 242 NLRB
585 (1979); Local Union No. 153, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 221 NLRB 345 (1975).
312. See Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 1-128, 223 NLRB
757, 767 (1976) (ALJ)
313. 90 NLRB 2135 (1950).
314. 155 NLRB 402 (1965), enforced, 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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refuse to make deliveries to the stands. These oral appeals had successfully stopped deliveries at both picketed and not picketed Interborough newsstands. The trial examiner in Interborough concluded that
the union's oral appeals did not violate Section 8(b)(4) on two grounds:
as the oral appeals requested that publisher employees refuse to perform services only at the Interborough premises, there was no prohibited secondary activity."' And the union's appeals were specifically
exempted from Section 8(b)(4) by proviso. 16 The Board, adhering to
its consistent refusal to interpret or rely upon the proviso, affirmed
on the first ground cited by the trial examiner."'
The interesting aspect of Interboroughfor present purposes is"'
that the General Counsel's interpretation of the 8(b)(4) proviso in its
argument on that point rested upon an individual characterization of
the conduct exempted by the proviso: Congress intended only "to reaf3 9
firm the right of an employee as an individiual to refuse to enter.""
By use of the term "unlawful" in the proviso, Congress presumably
meant the concept of unprotected concerted activity.' On individualist
premises, the proviso insures that an individual refusal remains protected, but it has no application to a union's inducement of that refusal.
The trial examiner's rejection of this argument was based on
two grounds: (1) As the Act defines "person" to include labor organizations, and the proviso explicitly refers to the refusal of persons to
enter primary premises, the proviso applies to the conduct of labor
organizations.2 ' (2) The term "unlawful" in the proviso is properly
equated with "unfair labor practice."' The proviso therefore precludes
315. 90 NLRB at 2149-50.
316. Id. at 2146-49.
317. Id. at 2135-36.
318. Note that the Board's decision was grounded upon a geographical view
of S 8(b)(4). Id. at 2135.
319. Id. at 2147.
320. Id. at 2148. Professor Lesnick argues against the General Counsel's interpretation on the ground that the proviso would be "unnecessary". Lesnick, supra note
253, at 1404-05 n.206. Although I am in agreement with Professor Lesnick's argument
that the proviso, if it is to be given any operative effect, must be read as a limitation
on union exposure under Section 8(b)(4), id., I am not in agreement with his ultimate
conclusion that the proviso should not be given operative effect. Id. at 1406-07. At
the same time, disagreement with that conclusion does not imply agreement with the
position the conclusion seeks to rebut-that the proviso is the exclusive limitation
on the breadth of Section 8(b)(4). Compare Lesnick, supra note 253, at 1404 with Comment, "Primary" and "Secondary" Labor Action: The Case of the Neglected Proviso,
1 LAB. L.J. 339, 341 (1950).
321. 90 NLRB at 2147.
322. Id. at 2147 n.20, relying upon Senator Taft's equating of "unlawful" with
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a finding of an unfair labor practice where its terms are met.3"' The
conception underlying the Trial Examiner's view of the proviso is a
collective conception of the conduct the proviso immunizes from Section 8(b)(4). A labor organization (including a labor organization
representing both primary and secondary employees in separate bargaining units) may refuse to enter the premises of a primary employer
engaged in a primary labor dispute.32 ' The General Counsel's argument was grounded on an expressly individualist conception-the conduct immunized from any inference of unlawfulness is individual
conduct.
In Grain Elevator Workers, the Board, although it purported to
distinguish Interborough News and although it ignored the Section
8(b)(4) proviso,325 in effect adopted the General Counsel's argument
"unfair labor practice" in the context of Section 303 of Taft Hartley, 29 U.S.C. S 187
(1976), in the legislative debates. See 93 CONG. REC. 5060 (1947) reprintedin 2 LEG. HIST.
LMRA 1371 (1948).
323. 90 NLRB at 2147.
324. Although the trial examiner's opinion may be read as supporting the view
that the proviso is an exclusive limitation upon 8(b)(4) exposure, Lesnick, supra note
253, at 1404 n.203, that reading is not necessary. It is the case that the proviso contains conditions difficult to give effect if the proviso is read as contemplating conduct
on the part of union in its capacity as the representative of primary employees. In
that event, the primary u'dion's appeal to secondary employees at secondary premises
(in the absence of an ambulatory situs) fails to meet the proviso, and a primary picket
line established for organizational or area standards purposes fails to meet the proviso. If the proviso is read instead to contemplate conduct by a secondary union in
its capacity as the representative of secondary employees which seeks to cause a partial work stoppage by secondary employees, the conditions may be given effect without
addressing the question of the "lawfulness", under Section 8(b)(4), of conduct on the
part of a union which is a party to a labor dispute acting in its capacity as a party.
The question of the primary union's exposure may be answered by an analysis of
statutory policy independent of the proviso. See 29 U.S.C. S 158 (b)(4)(B) (1976) ("nothing
contained in the clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise
unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing ..
").
It should be noted that the conduct of a union in its capacity as the representative of secondary employees in inducing a refusal on the part of secondary employees
to, e.g., unload a primary's ambulatory situs fits the proviso if the ambulatory situs
is viewed as the premises of the primary employer. Compare NLRB v. Local Union
No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 477 F.2d 260, 268 (2d Cir. 1973) (secondary employer
premises are not the premises of the primary) with id..at 268 n.2 (if a common situs,
Grain Elevator Workers applies). Nor is there anything odd in such a characterizationthe characterization is precisely the basis for the Board's treatment of appeals to secondary employees at secondary premises. See Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry
Dock Co.) 92 NLRB 547 (1950).
325. Moreover, the Court of Appeals, in enforcing the Board's order, declined
to reach the question "whether or in what circumstances a secondary union has the
right to appeal to its members to exercise the right assured by [the] proviso." 376
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made in Interborough. Grain Elevator Workers involved a primary
strike called by the Seafarer's Union against a Canadian employer
engaged in the shipping of grain by means of Great Lakes grain ships.
Continental used the Canadian firm to ship its grain, and Continental
employees were represented by the Grain Elevators Workers.
Although the Seafarer's established no picket line at or near the Canadian employer's ships when those ships were located at Continental's
premises to be loaded, Continental employees refused to load the ships.
The Board concluded that this refusal was induced by the Grain
Elevator Workers"0 and that the inducement violated Section 8(b)(4)
even though it was conceded that a Seafarer's union picket line, had
it been established, could have lawfully generated precisely the same
32 7
secondary employee partial work stoppage.
The Board's conclusion was grounded upon two propositions:
First, cases, such as Interborough News, permitting secondary union
inducements of employee action of a nature which could lawfully be
induced by a primary union's picket line actually involved such a picket
line, and the secondary union's inducement in such cases therefore
amounted to no more than an inducement to honor a picket line.328
Second:
[Tihere must be some clear and contemporaneous notice
given by the primary union to the employees appealed to,
and to the neutral employer at whose premises the dispute
becomes active, that the labor dispute involved is between
it and the primary employer. Unless such notice is given,
the dispute takes on the appearance and character of a
dispute between the "inducing" union and the neutral
F.2d at 781 n.17. But cf. NLRB v. Difco Laboratories, Inc., 427 F.2d 170, 172 (6th Cir.)
(It is immaterial whether primary union wished employees to engage in a sympathy
strike if the employees acted in what they viewed as their own best interests.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 833 (1970).
326. See 155 NLRB at 424 (Interim Report). Note that the basis for this conclusion was the wholly circumstantial fact that Continental's employees acted unanimously.
The union therefore must have induced their action. Id. at 424. What is interesting
in this use of circumstantial evidence is that the Board will at least on occasion recognize
that employee conduct is union induced conduct in this context even where no union
official is so incautious as to make a statement later produceable in evidence. Unfortunately, the Board does not always recognize the reality, and analysis therefore tends
to be grounded upon which verbal formulation a well advised or poorly advised union
official adopts. See Gould, Inc., 238 NLRB 618 (1978), enforced, 638 F.2d 110 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 930 (1981).
327. 155 NLRB at 409. See Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.)
92 NLRB 547 (1950).
328. 155 NLRB at 411.
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employer over the latter's dealings with the primary
employer rather than of a dispute between the primary
union and a primary employer.3"
The initial difficulty with the Board's analysis is that Interborough
is not distinguishable on the grounds cited by the Board: only a few
of the newsstands involved in Interboroughwere picketed.' It is possible to distinguish Interborough on the ground that the same union
represented both primary and secondary employees, but that basis
for distinction, albeit not a distinction employed by the Board in Grain
Elevators, forms the more fundamental difficulty with the Board's
analysis in the latter case: the requirement of "clear and contemporaneous notice given by the primary union" rejects the notion that
the secondary union (or any union acting in its secondary capacity)
has a legitimate role to play in the present context.
It is true that the notice requirement may be viewed as serving
functions other than such a rejection. Notice identifying the parties
to a dispute may avoid job action by employees of third-party
employers who encounter the secondary employee's partial work stoppage, and notice may limit the secondary employee's work stoppage
to work which furthers the normal operations of the primary." But
these explanations won't wash. There was no danger of either thirdparty work stoppages or of total secondary employee work stoppages
in the Grain Elevators case itself; 2 the danger of third-party work
stoppages is greater in the case of picketing by a primary union that
it is in the case of oral inducement by a secondary union; 3 and a
total work stoppage directed at the secondary is possible only if one
starts with the premise that secondary employees act individually as
a matter of individual conscience rather than from the sort of carefully
3 34
tailored instructions of their union evident in Grain Elevator.
329. Id.
330. See 90 NLRB at 2141.
331. See 376 F.2d at 780.
332. Id.
333. 155 NLRB at 415-16 (dissenting opinion).
334. Professor Cantor, while criticizing Grain Elevators, suggests that some
primary union notice as a prerequisite to secondary union action is reasonable because
it "insures that the secondary union is responding to a primary appeal, and is not
initiating purely secondary action." Cantor, supra note 299, at 653. The difficulty with
that argument is that the "purely secondary" character of the action induced by the
secondary union is not a function of the primary union's appeal unless one assumes
that only the primary union has a right to make related work appeals. As Professor
Cantor recognizes, the secondary union's appeal in Grain Elevator Workers was an
inducement of primary action under the related work doctrine. Id. The prior notice
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What is wrong with the Board's analysis is precisely that it
started with such a premise, for the Board clearly viewed the appropriate union actor as the primary union. At most, the secondary union's
legitimate role is only that of "taking up" the primary union's
cause 33 5 -presumably only at the direction of the primary. And the
legitimate role of both unions which is protected by the primarysecondary distinction is only that of "appeal[ling] to employees approaching struck "ambulatory" premises to refrain from entering those
premises" ' 31. In short, secondary employees are conceived in the
Board's opinion in Grain Elevator as diverse legal entities distinct
from their union. Legitimate inducements ("appeals") are, under that
conception, made by the primary union (or the secondary union to
the extent deputized by the primary union) and directed to individual
secondary employees rather than to the secondary union as an actor
exercising the right of refusal. 7 In terms of the General Counsel's
argument in InterboroughNews, the Board's failure to reach the question of the application of the proviso was warranted because the pro38
viso protects individuals; it has no application to secondary unions.
And the absence of "notice" by the primary union makes the secondary
union's inducement "take on the appearance"' 9 of illicit secondary activity not because the effect of that inducement is illicit-the effect
was conceded by the Board to be within permissible limits - but
because the secondary union was at least inferentially conceived by
the Board to have no Section 7 interest in that effect-only individual
employees have Section 7 interests.
The implications of GrainElevator are clarified by focusing upon
the Board's specific holding. The Board held that a primary union must
requirement is reasonable if one views it as the functional equivalent of a primary
union picket line in the sense that the primary union has the sole right to initiate
concerted activity against the primary employer, but reasonableness is then a function of the scope of the secondary union's Section 7 right, not of the primary-secondary
distinction.
335. 155 NLRB at 413.
336. Id.
337. See Id. at 412: "[The Moore Dry Dock tests] protect [the primary union's]
right and the right of other unions who could aid its cause, to appeal to all employees
approaching the picket line to extend the union member's traditional gesture of support to the primary union ..
" See also Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Int'l Union,
Local 1-128, 223 NLRB 757, 767 (1976) (interim report): "Neither the collective bargaining
agreement [picket line clause] nor the National Labor Relations Act confers any collective right on the Respondent to decide for its members that they should not cross
a bona fide picket line."
338. See 90 NLRB at 2147.
339. 155 NLRB at 411.
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give "clear and contemporaneous notice" of its appeal to secondary
employees before a secondary union may induce sympathetic action
by those employees. Note carefully that the Board did not impose
the more limited requirement suggested by the Section 8(b)(4) proviso that there be a strike authorized by the union representing the
strikers. The Board's required that the primary union authorize sympathetic activity by providing notice that it desires such activity.
Under the Board's ruling, the primary union controls sympathetic action on the part of secondary employees in the sense that only the
primary union may seek that action either directly or by deputizing
the secondary union. That control implies that the secondary union
may not independently seek shared benefits and reciprocal power as
a matter of its authority to make decisions about the pursuit of such
ends. It implies as well that the Section 7 protection afforded secondary employees in a case in which the primary union directly authorizes sympathetic activity by means of a picket line is Section 7 protection afforded for reasons of preserving the efficacy of the strike
weapon rather than for reasons of the shared benefits and reciprocal
power to be gained by secondary employees.
These implications of the Board's ruling in Grain Elevator reflect
what was termed here earlier the rationalization view of Section 7"O
as much as they reflect a particular view of Section 8(b)(4). Under
the rationalization view, mutuality in the sense of the motivation for
or the tendency of concerted activity is a requisite element of protection, but protection does not turn on mutuality. Protection turns,
rather, on a government decision about the desirability of that activity:
A sympathetic work stoppage is desirable to the extent that it ensures the efficacy of the primary strike and the stoppage will therefore
be protected on the purported grounds that it is either motivated
by or tends to further an honoring employee's desire for shared
benefits or reciprocal power. Such a stoppage is undesirable when
the efficacy of the primary strike is not available as an underlying
rationale for protection - and the absence of primary pickets indicates
that absence. More importantly, the secondary union's claim to shared
benefit or reciprocal power is not a claim which will be recognized
under the rationalization view even, as in Grain Elevator, where the
policy of protecting neutral employers from secondary activity does
not appear implicated by such a claim.A" The claim will not be recogniz-

340. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
341. One need not attack the Board's "purpose" analysis to come to the conclusion that protection of neutrals as a policy was not threatened in Grain Elevator.
One must recognize, however, that a union's primary and secondary purposes are almost
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ed because it is a claim grounded upon a distinct view of mutualitythat mutuality grants a license to pursue mutual ends without
reference to the immediate substantive policy question of the
desirability of those ends. In short, the Board will recognize a claim
to shared benefits and reciprocal power as a rationalization for protection of individual honoring employees who aid a primary union in
a primary strike at the instance of that union, but it will not recognize
that rationale where the rationale is asserted by the secondary union
and where the secondary seeks to use the rationale as a sword.
As a practical matter, one suspects that the primary effect of
the Grain Elevators doctrine has been to drive secondary union inducements underground and to encourage the manufacturing of a
"record" of secondary union neutrality through union official declarations to that effect" 2 in any circumstance in which the doctrine might
conceivably be applied. On a collective right premise, 3 the appropriate
means of approaching cases such as Interborough News and Grain
Elevator Workers is through the trial examiner's premise in his interpretation of the Section 8(b)(4) proviso in Interboro and through a nonliteral reading of that proviso.
always "mixed", and that this is so despite some Supreme Court indications to the
contrary. Compare National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 644 n.38
(1967) (purpose a function of circumstances and, implicitly, is therefore mixed) with
NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 530 n.17 (1977) (it is sufficient
if a purpose was secondary); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341
U.S. 675, 689 (1951) (same). On the premise that purpose is always mixed and that
effect is a relevant circumstance in testing purpose, my point in the text is that the
Board was simply wrong in finding an unlawful purpose.
342. Compare NLRB v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 477
F.2d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 1973)- (secondary union official's statement "I can't tell you
anything. You do as you please. You don't have to bandle no scab freight" held inducement) with Gould, Inc., Switchgear Division, 238 NLRB 618, 622 (1976) (AL) (union
officials advice that decision to take action would be the individual employee's choice
not an inducement), enforced, 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 930
(1981).
343. The closest the Board or courts have come to recognizing a collective
characterization as a premise in the secondary boycott context is their treatment of
picket line clauses in collective bargaining agreements under Section 8(e), 29 U.S.C.
S 158(e) (1976). The union argument in such a context is that the picket line clause
merely protects individual employees in the exercise of their individual consciences.
The response has been that such a clause is an agreement by a labor organization
(i.e., a secondary union) and employer which is unlawful to the extent that it may
be applied in secondary circumstances. See Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen Local
695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Truck Drivers Union Local 413 v. NLRB,
334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964). But see Truck Drivers Union
Local 413, 140 NLRB 1474, 1485 (1963) (dictum to the effect that waiver of employer
rights in a picket line clause is a waiver for the benefit of individual employees),
modified, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964).
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The trial examiner's premise was that the proviso refers to union
conduct and conceives of a refusal to enter the premises of an
employer subjected to a strike authorized by the exclusive representative of that employer's employees as a union refusal." A non-literal
interpretation of the proviso is necessary not because a literal reading
on the trial examiner's premise would make the Section 8(b)(4) prohibition too broad, 45 but because a literal reading on that premise
would make the prohibition too narrow by ignoring the primary-secondary distinction and, therefore, the related work doctrine. 6 It would
destroy that doctrine because a secondary union which induced secondary employees to refuse to enter the premises of a struck employer
could meet the terms of the proviso whether or not the work to be
done on those premises by secondary employees was related to the
normal operations of the struck employer and whether or not the
strike, albeit authorized by the exclusive representative of the striking employees, was called in a primary dispute with the struck
employer. 7 The non-literal interpretation of the proviso is that it was
intended to distinguish between secondary union conduct falling on
the licit side of the primary-secondary distinction from secondary union
conduct falling on the illicit side of that distinction.
The non-literal interpretation is preferable to reading the proviso out of the statute" s and is justified both by its consistency with
the policies of the statute and by the evident concern of the TaftHartley Congress to preserve the traditional strike authorized by an
exclusive representative.- 9 It is, moreover, the apparent intent of the
language of the provisio itself. On its face, it is difficult to conceive
of a clearer case of primary activity than a refusal to enter struck
premises where the strike is authorized by the exclusive representative of striking employees. It is only when one hypothesizes a common situs 35° that the meaning of struck premises seems in doubt, and
344.

90 NLRB 2148-49. See supra notes 320-24 and accompanying text.

345. See Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547,
550 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lesnick, supra note 253, at 1402 n.203. The too broad a prohibition fear would seem obviated, at least as of 1959, by the picket line proviso to
Section 8(b)(4XB), 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4)(B) (1976). See Truck Drivers Union Local 413
v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539, 542-46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964).
346. See Local 651, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
347. See Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547,
549-50 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (applying hot cargo clause meeting the proviso to Section 8(b)(4)).
348. Reading the proviso out of the statute was Professor Lesnick's prescrip-

tion, a prescription adopted by the D.C. Circuit in Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen
Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See Lesnick, supra note 253, at 1407.
349. See NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 672-73 (1951).
350.

See Building & Constr. Trades Council of New Orleans (Markwell & Hartz,
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it is only when one hypothesizes a strike authorized by an exclusive
representative for secondary purposes that the literal language of the
statute seems inadequate. 5' What Congress evidently had in mind was
therefore a refusal to enter struck premises where the strike is itself
primary and where the refusal is reasonably related to the operations
of the struck employer.
Does the incorporation of the primary-secondary distinction into
the proviso render the proviso redundant? If the trial examiner's
premise in Interborough News-that the proviso refer to unions acting in their capacities as secondary unions-is accepted, the proviso
is not redundant. It is not redundant because the proviso does not
merely seek to declare the protected status of individual employee
refusals unaffected by the Section 8(b)(4) prohibition, but also seeks
to declare the secondary union's refusal (a refusal made through inducements of the employees it represents) not prohibited by Section
8(b)(4). Nor is the proviso made redundant by the Landrum Griffin
Act's addition of the Section 8(b)(4)(B) primary picketing proviso. 2
Although that proviso explicitly incorporates the primary-secondary
distinction, and although its legislative history indicates that Congress
sought to avoid any inference that a refusal to cross a primary picket
line is rendered unprotected by Section 8(b)(4)(B), the focus of the
picketing proviso is on the strike and picketing conduct of the primary
union, not upon the conduct of a secondary union.3" The picketing
proviso's negation of an inference of non-protection is a negation of
derivative non-protection; it does not address the question of secondary union inducements.354
Inc.), 155 NLRB 319 (1965), enforced, 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
914 (1968).
351. The D.C. Circuit's failure to recognize this possibility in Truck Driver's
Union Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964)
and its overruling of its Truck Driver's dictum in Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen
Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966) suggests the point made in the text.
352. 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4)(B) (1976): "nothing contained in this clause (B) shall
be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or
primary picketing."
353. See H.R. Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1959) (proviso preserves
present rules "permitting picketing at the site of a primary labor dispute"); 105 Cong.
Rec. 15222 (1959) (Kennedy-Thompson Memorandum) (criticizing original House bill before
addition of the picketing proviso because it "destroys the right to picket a plant and
to honor a picket line"); A. Cox, The Landrum Griffin Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 271-73 (1959).
354. Derivative non-protection is to be distinguished from the problem of impermissible secondary union conduct even though the reasons for the latter, under
a non-literal interpretation of the Section 8(b)(4) proviso are similar to the reasons
for the former under the Section 8(bX4)(XB) picketing proviso. A refusal to cross a secon-
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The major impact of the suggested approach would be to-focus
inquiry on the conduct of the secondary union in cirumstances, such
as Grain Elevator Workers and InterboroughNews-s where that union
refuses

-

by acts of inducement - to perform related work and to pro-

vide as a premise for that inquiry an assumption that a secondary
union acts legitimately if it acts within the bounds of the proviso even
where it acts independently of a primary union's picket line. The proviso requires explicit consideration of the situs of a dispute, and the
presence of primary employer premises therefore may be crucial,3"
but there is no reason - other than the literal approach - that the term
"premises" cannot be given an interpretation inclusive of ambulatory
premises.35 The scant legislative history of the proviso suggests not
a literal intepretation, but an interpretation consistent with the policies
of the statute as a whole. Under the proposed interpretation, the secondary union does not control the occasion on which it may seek
mutual gain from a stranger dispute, for there must be a strike called
by the primary union.' The secondary union does, however, control
dary picket line is unprotected because the picket line violates the Act. A secondary
union's "refusal" by inducement to enter struck premises to do unrelated work is also
a violation of the Act.
355. Interborough involved the conduct of a union which represented both
primary and secondary employees. It is quite true that its inducement of secondary
employees occurred for the purpose of furthering the interests of primary employees,
but that circumstance is immaterial if it is accepted that unions may permissibly act
across employers. See supra notes 186, 244. What is material for present purposes
is that the union satisfied two conditions for application of the proviso: (1) it was a
union representing secondary employees and (2) it induced secondary employees to
cease related work.
356. Compare the proviso's emphasis upon premises with United Steelworkers
of America v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492 (1964- (geographical location of a dispute in only
one factor in applying related work doctrine).
357. Contra: Lesnick, supra note 253, at 1404. Professor Lesnick provides no
direct reason for his conclusion that the proviso would preclude "secondary site
picketing"-a phrase I take to include the ambulatory situs problem. He does suggest
at another point, however, that the Ball bill, which included the predecessor of the
proviso, focused upon situs rather than objective in banning the secondary boycott.
Id. at 1407 n.217. Accepting, for the present purposes, Professor Lesnick's characterization of the legislative history, see supra note 277 and accompanying text, the enacted
statute read as a whole does not reflect an emphasis upon situs, and the argument
made in the above text is that the proviso should be read as consistent with the statute
as a whole whatever its legislative origins. That conclusion is preferable both because
it gives the proviso content rather than reading it out of the statute and because
it gives the benefit of the doubt to a Congress which may be properly thought to
have intended internally consistent legislation.
358. Although a congressional concern in enacting the proviso was the problem of minority union authorized strikes, See Sen. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
23 (1947) reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRA 429 (19481. proponents of
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the seeking of such gain. Shared benefit and reciprocal power are not
under the interpretation mere rationalizations for conferring protection; they are objectives which define the license granted the secondary union once a stranger dispute occurs.
(2)

Employee Exposure To Discipline For Conduct
Inconsistent With Section 8(b)(4).

An employee who honors a picket line which is established in
violation of Section 8(b(4)-i.e. a secondary picket line-engages in
unprotected activity." 9 His employer may discharge or discipline that
employee for the refusal to cross without running afoul of Section
8(a)(1).1 The employer therefore has available a potential defense when
charged with a violation of Section 8(a)(1) for disciplining the honoring employee," and a secondary union which disciplines its member
for crossing a secondary picket line risks both Section 8(b)(1)(A) and
Section 8(b)(4) exposure.
Although it has been held in some contexts that individual
employee conduct is unprotected where that conduct would, if engaged
in by a union, amount to a union unfair labor practice,36 an employer's
Section 8(b)(4) defense to a Section 8(a)(1) allegation is dependent upon
a ban on minority picketing were unsuccessful in 1947, Lesnick, supra note 253, at
1405. In terms of the present analysis, the proviso would not preclude secondary union
exposure under Section 8(b)(4) where it seeks to induce action in support of organizational picketing or area standards picketing. The Section 8(b)(4)(B) picketing proviso
might, however, preclude exposure under such circumstances. See supra note 324.
359. Chevron USA, Inc., 244 NLRB 1081, 1086 (1979).
360. Id.
361. Id. There are three procedural aspects to the employer's Section 8(b)(4)
defense which should be noted. If the employer fails to litigate the 8(b)(4) issue, the
Board will not decide the question sua sponte. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 197 NLRB 534
(1972). If the employer fails to charge an 8(b)(4) violation but asserts it as a defense,
the Board will decide the question. Chevron USA, Inc., 244 NLRB 1081, 1085 (1979).
What is unclear is whether a General Counsel's dismissal of a Section 8(b)(4) charge
precludes assertion of the defense as a procedural matter or is merely taken into account, as a matter of deference, in the analysis of the Section 8(b)(4) defense. See Gould,
Inc., Switchgear Division, 238 NLRB 618, 622 (1978) (ALJ) and the court of appeals
decision enforcing the Board's order in Gould, NLRB v. Gould, Inc., 638 F.2d 159, 163
n.2 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 930 (1981). The obviously better rule-a rule
supported by the Gould litigation in the sense that both the court of appeals and the
Administrative Law Judge reached the merits of the 8(b4) issue-is that the employer
is entitled to fully litigate the point as a defense, an opportunity not provided in the
process by which the General Counsel makes a complaint decision. See NLRB v. Commercial Letter, Inc., 455 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1972).
362. See Perry Norvell Co., 80 NLRB 225, 241 (1948). See generally GORMAN,
supra note 8, at 303-05; A. Cox. supra note 121, at 325.
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establishing the elements of a Section 8(b)(4) violation. 3 One such element is that a union "induced or encouraged" the employee's action.
This element is easily established in a case in which the honored picket
line is secondary. It is not as easily established where the picket line
in issue is not secondary" 4 or where there is no picket line, but the
employer claims that the employee's action was of a secondary character and induced by the union representing that employee." 5 In such
circumstances, secondary employee work stoppages found not to have
been induced by either a primary or secondary union are characterized
as spontaneous concerted activity in sympathy with primary employees
and therefore protected under Section 7 even where those work stoppages, if induced by either the primary or secondary union, would
violate Section 8(b)(4).
Gould, Inc.3"' illustrates this line of cases. Gould, a manufacturing concern, was engaged in a plant expansion for which it used construction contractors, one of which was a non-union electrical contractor. Manufacturing employees of Gould were represented by Local
584 of The Electrical Workers, a union composed of autonomous construction, manufacturing and maintenance divisions. Gould's manufacturing employees were members of the manufacturing division. The
Electrical Workers established an informational picket line at the
Gould plant directed at the electrical contractor. Gould's manufacturing employees walked off the job shortly after the appearance of the
pickets. Gould discharged two of the striking employees, and was
charged with a Section 8(a)(1) violation for the discharges.
One of Gould's defenses was that the sympathy strike was unprotected because the union's objective in establishing the picket line
was "forcing [Gould] to stop doing business with the non-union electrical subcontractor, in violation of Section 8(b)(4) of the Act." 7 The
363. See Gould, Inc., 238 NLRB 618 (1978), enforced, 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 930 (1981).
364. See Gould, Inc., Switchgear Division, 238 NLRB 618, 622 (1978), enforced,
638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 930 (1981). But cf. Truck Drivers
Union Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964)
(8(e) violation where picket line clause purported to merely protect individual action).
365. See, e.g., Newbery Energy Corp., Indus. Division, 227 NLRB 436 (1976);
Congoleum Indus., Inc., 197 NLRB 534 (1972). On the question of what constitutes inducement, see generally International Bhd. Electrical Workers Local 501 v. NLRB, 341
U.S. 694 (1951); Building and Constr. Trades Council of Tampa, 132 NLRB 1564 (1961);
NLRB v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 477 F.2d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 1973).
366. 238 NLRB 618 (1978), enforced, 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 930 (1981).
367. 238 NLRB at 618-19.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss2/2

Cox: On Honoring Picket Lines: A Revisionist View

1983]

PICKET LINES

Administrative Law Judge, in a decision affirmed by the Board,
treated the picketing as lawful informational picketing under Section
8(b)(7)(C) of the Act 8 and focused on the conduct of the union's agents
independent of the picketing in analyzing the Section 8(b)(4) issue:
The walkout was the spontaneous action of about 85 of the
90 first-shift employees, who decided in unorganized
assemblages in the plant that they would not work behind
the picket line. The decision and action was not directed
by the Union, whose business manager... advised the shop
steward, and through her the employees, that whatever action the employes took would be their individual choice and
action. Such advice does not constitute union authorization
or union inducement within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)
of the Act.3"'
The rules which emerge from this recitation are (1) employees
are protected under Section 7 from employer retaliation where their
sympathy strike is secondary but the union representing those
employees frames its message in terms sufficiently neutral to avoid
a finding of inducement and (2) employees are not protected under
Section 7 in identical circumstances where their union errs by framing its message in terms which may be characterized as inducing the
sympathetic action.37 The question is whether these rules make any
sense.
A basis for a negative answer to that question is the proposition that, although Section 8(b)(4) prohibits union rather than individual
conduct, a function of the Section 8(b)(4) proviso is to confirm the protected status of secondary employee conduct only to the extent permitted by the proviso. It is possible to argue that the proviso, by
declaring only particular secondary conduct lawful, implicitly assumed
that secondary employee conduct not satisfying the proviso (and not
satisfying other independent bases for exception) was unlawful-that
368. Id. at 623. Section 8(b)(7)(C) contains a proviso exempting from the prohibitions of that subsection "picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public . . . that an employer does not employ members of, or have a
contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any
individual employed by any other person . . . not to perform any services." In Gould,
the proviso's caveat was circumvented by a finding that the manufacturing employee's
walkout lasted only six hours and therefore did not create a "substantial disruptive
effect." 238 NLRB at 623.
369. 238 NLRB at 622.
370. Compare Gould, 238 NLRB at 622 with NLRB v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 477 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1973).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1982

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 [1982], Art. 2
212

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

is, unprotected. The picket line in Gould could not lawfully have been
used for the purpose of inducing a complete sympathy strike by secondary employees and the sympathy strike did not satisfy the conditions previously discussed here for applying the Section 8(b)(4) proviso. The arguably secondary character of the "spontaneous" sympathy
strike would, under this interpretation, render that strike unprotected
because inconsistent with the policy of Section 8(b)(4)."'
One difficulty with this argument is that the preceding discussion here of the proviso characterized it as directed at a particular
form of person-a union acting in its capacity as a secondary union."7 2
Indeed, the trial examiner's opinion in InterboroughNews rejected the
"non-protection" interpretation of the proviso's use of the term
"unlawful." But a characterization of the proviso as contemplating secondary union conduct may be reconciled with a conclusion that
employees who engage in secondary conduct should not enjoy Section 7 protection even where their conduct is not union induced by
considering the function of nonprotection. The preceding discussion
of derivative non-protection suggested that its function was not deterrence of individual conduct inconsistent with the policies of the Act
because individual employees lack the resources to make the legal
calculations necessary to determinations about the legitimacy of picket
lines. 73 That suggestion is confirmed by Gould.
The employer's argument in Gould was that the disciplined
employees had been engaged in unprotected activity either because
the union's picket line violated Section 8(b)(7) or because the union,
in its capacity as the representative of the secondary employees, had
induced the sympathetic work stoppage in violation of Section 8(b)(4),
or because the sympathetic work stoppage violated the no strike clause
371. Contra., e.g.: NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111, 115 (2d
Cir. 1952), afrd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 71 (1953); Auto Parts Co., 107 NLRB 242,
246 (1953) (trial examiner). The argument for concluding that the employee strike in
Gould was secondary is that it constituted a total work stoppage; it was not limited
to work related to the operation of the picketed contractor.
372. See supra notes 314-58 and accompanying text. If it is assumed that
"unlawful" means "unprotected", the proviso cannot be explained except on the basis
of a congressional assumption that, absent the proviso, employee conduct would be
unprotected. Cf. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., Inc., 345 U.S. 71, 80 (1953) (The
proviso "clearly enables contracting parties to embody in their contract a provision
against requiring an employee to cross a picket line if they so agree."). By treating
the proviso as an enabling grant for contractual protection or for waiver of protection, the Court at least implicitly assumed that employee secondary conduct would
be unprotected absent the grant.
373. See supra notes 259-64 and accompanying text.
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of a collective bargaining agreement. 7 ' If any of those theories had
been accepted, the function of the non-protection doctrine in the Gould
circumstances could not have been deterrence of individual employee
conduct. The legitimacy of the picket line under Section 8(b)(7) and
of a sympathy work stoppage under the collective bargaining agreement turned on highly technical interpretations of the statute and
the contract the employees could not be expected to accurately anticipate. And the means by which the union avoided 8(b)(4) exposure
was the simple expedient of statements of neutrality. That neutrality
left employees to their own devices in calculating, if they calculated
at all, the protection Section 7 might afford their sympathy strike.
It therefore left employees in the position of risking non-protection
under all of the employer's theories. If the employees in Gould lacked
the capacity to assess that risk, the doctrine of nonprotection could
not serve a purpose of deterring individual conduct inconsistent with
statutory policy. Indeed, that inefficacy may be viewed as the unstated
motivation for the result in Gould: There was no violation of Section
8(b)(7) or of the no-strike clause because a finding of a violation would
have left the employees unprotected for no apparent purpose.
If the function of the doctrine of nonprotection is instead viewed
as generating risks of employer retaliation which will in turn generate
internal political costs for unions,375 a different result was warranted
in Gould. The paradigm case for nonprotection is individual employee
participation in a union unfair labor practice." In such a case, union
direction of employee conduct is assumed and the case for a political
costs of nonprotection rationale appears strongest. In Gould, union
direction of the sympathy strike did not occur; the union, in its capacity as a secondary union, purported to be neutral. Gould may
therefore be viewed as consistent with the rationale in the sense that
the Gould rule is that a union incurs the political costs of nonprotection only where it engages in an unfair labor practice.
But the conclusion that the union did not "induce" employee action for unfair labor practice purposes does not exhaust the question
of the union's responsibility for the sympathy strike. Under the Board's
resolution of that question in Gould, employees are free to "spontaneously" engage in a secondary strike and their union is free to
enjoy the fruits of that strike so long as its general encouragement
374. 238 NLRB at 622-23.
375. See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text.
376. See Local Union 707, Motor Freight Drivers (Claremont Polychemical Corp.),
196 NLRB 613 (1972).
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of union solidarity and loyalty is not expressed at the time of that
strike. A political costs rationale for nonprotection suggests a different
resolution of the question. Because sympathetic employee action is
action for and by the group, the union representing that group is
responsible for that action in the sense that the group's right to engage
in such action is measured by the union's right to engage in it. Where
the union induces a secondary sympathy strike, union responsibility
is enforced by means of the unfair labor practice prohibition and by
nonprotection of employees who participate in the unfair labor practice. Where union inducement cannot be established, the responsibility is enforced by nonprotection alone.377 There is, under such a rationale, an affirmative duty to prevent secondary activity imposed on
secondary unions, but the means by which that duty is enforced is
not, in the absence of affirmative union misconduct, either unfair labor
practice or civil damage action378 exposure.
The view earlier advocated here that the Section 8(b)(4) proviso
contemplates secondary union conduct may therefore be reconciled
with the proposition that the proviso implicitly assumes that individual
employee conduct inconsistent with the statute is unprotected conduct on three grounds.
First, the Landrum Griffin Act's use of the term "unlawful" in
the picketing proviso to Section 8(b)(4)(B) was intended by Congress
to protect primary union picketing from Section 8(b)(4)(B) exposure
and secondary employee refusals to cross primary picket lines from
nonprotection exposure." 9 The picketing proviso focuses on primary
union conduct; it contemplates a primary picket line appeal to secondary employees and clearly assumes that secondary employee Section
7 protection is dependent upon the legitimacy, under the primarysecondary distinction, of the primary picket line.' But the Taft-Hartley
Act's Section 8(b)(4) proviso is worded differently. It refers to the
refusal of a "person" to enter premises, and person is defined by the
Act to include both unions and individuals."s If Congress thought it
377. Cf. Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964) (recogniznig, for
preemption purposes, that particular remedies for misconduct created by Congress
themselves reflect a congressional balance dictating the degree to which misconduct
is to be prohibited); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (fact
that employee conduct was unprotected does not warrant unfair labor practice finding).
378. See 29 U.S.C. S 187 (1976).
379. See supra note 353.
380. That is the clear assumption because the primary picketing proviso refers
to picketing, not refusals to cross picket lines, and the legislative history discloses
an intent to protect both. See 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(4)(B) (1976); supra note 353.
381. 29 U.S.C. S 152(1) (1976).
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necessary to exempt some refusals by individuals to enter premises
from unlawfulness, it conceivably viewed such a refusal unlawful in
the absence of the exemption in the only sense relevant to an individual: non-protection under Section 7.2 To the extent that employee
action is not action which could be lawfully induced by a primary
picket line, it should enjoy neither the derivative protection afforded
the honoring of a primary picket line nor the direct protection afforded by the Section 8(b)(4) proviso.
Second, the legislative history of the Section 8(b)(4) proviso indicates that the proviso was originally a part of the Ball bill making
individual participation in the secondary boycott unlawful in a civil
or criminal, rather than unfair labor practice, sense. 83 Although this
history has been cited as a reason for ignoring the proviso on the
ground that it is incongruent with Section 8(b)(4) as enacted, 3" the
fact remains that the proviso was included in the enactment. While
it is true that Section 8(b)(4) as enacted makes only union conduct
unlawful in an unfair labor practice sense, 5 the retention of the earlier
382. The doctrine of derivative non-protection predates the Taft-Hartley Act,
and Congress was specifically aware of it. House Conference Rep. No. 510, 38-39 (1947),
reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. OF THE LMRA 542-43 (1948). See infra note 386.
Note that this argument assumes two grounds for protection: To the extent
that employee conduct is a response to a primary picket line within the scope of the
response which may be lawfully induced by such a picket line, it is protected by the
Section 8(b)(4B) primary picketing proviso. To the extent that the employee conduct
constitutes conduct falling on the primary side of the primary/secondary distinction
made by the related work doctrine, it is protected by the Section 8(b)(4) proviso whether
or not there is primary picketing. To the extent that neither of these conditions is
met, the conduct is unprotected.
383. See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
384. Lesnick, supra note 253, at 1406-07; Getman, supra note 8, at 1229 n.143
(1967).
385. Section 303 of Taft Hartley, 29 U.S.C. S 187 (1976), makes, and made in
its original Taft-Hartley form, only unions subject to judicial (civil damages) remedies.
See supra note 386. And Section 502 of Taft-Hartley, 29 U.S.C. S 143 (1976), makes
it clear that the Congress did not intend to subject individuals to civil remedies, but
it is not clear that its use of the term "illegal" in that section refers, as well, to
"unprotected":
Nothing in this Act shall be . . . construed to make the quitting of his
labor by an individual employee an illegal act . . . nor shall the quitting
of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such
employee or employees be deemed a strike under this Act.
Id. Indeed,
conditions,
distinction
policy. See

the special dispensation given the quitting of work in the face of dangerous
made in terms of a "strike", indicates a congressional awareness of the
between "illegal" and the concept of non-protection for breaching statutory
29 U.S.C. S 158(d).
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proviso to the Ball bill may be viewed as a retention of a concept
of individual exposure, again in the only manner in which the enacted
legislation conceived of individual conduct as unlawful. 6
386. Section 12 of the House Bill which eventually formed the basis for the
Taft-Hartley Act, H.R. 3020 S 12, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST.
LMRA 77-80 (1949), declared certain conduct to be "unlawful concerted activities", including "calling, authorizing, engaging in, or assisting" an "illegal boycott", and further provided for a civil damages action against the "person or persons" responsible
for such activity. Id. Moreover, that bill amended Section 7 of the NLRA by exempting from the protection of that statute activities "constituting unfair labor practices
under Section 8(b), unlawful concerted activities under Section 12, or violations of collective bargaining agreements." Id. S 7 reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA at 49.
The Senate version of Section 12-which as enacted became Section 303 of TaftHartley and which, as enacted, duplicated Section 8(b)(4), including the proviso to Section 8(b)(4)-was amended on the floor of the Senate to substitute the term "labor
organization" for the term "person" as the party to be sued for damages. That amendment was expressly grounded on the proposition that individual employees should not
be subject to civil liability. 93 CONG. REC. 5041-42 (1947) reprintedin 2 LEG. HIST. LMRA
1356-59 (1948).
In the Conference Committee, the House amendment to Section 7 and Section
12 of the House bill were rejected in favor of the provisions of the Senate bill. House
Conference Rep. No. 510, 38-40, 58-59 (1947) reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA 542-44,
562-63 (1948). The basis for that rejection was, however, not a rejection of the notion
that individual conduct of the sort rendered unprotected by the House version of the
legislation should be treated as protected. It was, rather, that a statutory declaration
of non-protection had been rendered unnecessary by Board decisions:
The first change in section 7 of the act made by the House bill
was inserted by reason of early decisions of the Board to the effect that
the language of section 7 protected concerted activities regardless of their
nature or objectives. An outstanding decision of this sort was the one
involving a "sit down" strike wherein the Board ordered the reinstatement of employees who engaged in this unlawful activity. Later the Board
ordered the reinstatement of certain employees whose concerted activities
constituted mutiny. In both of the above instances, however, the decision
of the Board was reversed by the Supreme Court. More recently, a decision of the Board ordering the reinstatement of individuals who had engaged in mass picketing was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
(Indiana Desk Co. v. NLRB, 149 Fed. 2d 987 (1944).
Thus the courts have firmly established the rule that under the
existing provisions of section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,
employees are not given any right to engage in unlawful or other improper conduct. In its most recent decisions the Board has been consistently
applying the principles established by the courts.
• * * By reason of the foregoing, it was believed that the specific
provisions in the House bill excepting unfair labor practices, unlawful concerted activities, and violation of collective bargaining agreements from
the protection of section 7 were unnecessary. Moreover, there was real
concern that the inclusion of such a provision might have a limiting effect and make improper conduct not specifically mentioned subject to the
protection of the act.
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Finally, on a collectivist view of the Section 7 right to honor
a picket line, the function of non-protection is influencing a secondary
union's conduct by generating risks of non-protection which, it is hoped,
In addition, other provisions of the conference agreement deal with
this particular problem in terms. For example, in the declaration of policy
to the amended National Labor Relations Act adopted by the conference
committee, it is stated in the new paragraph dealing with improper practices of labor organizations, their officers, and members, that the "elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to the assurance of the
rights herein guaranteed." This in and of itself demonstrates a clear intention that these undesirable concerted activities are not to have any
protection under the act and to the extent that the Board in the past
has accorded protection to such activities, the conference agreement makes
such protection no longer possible.
Id. at 38-39 (Leg. Hist. at 542-43).
Many of the matters covered in section 12 of the House bill are
also covered in the conference agreement in different form, as has been
pointed out above in the discussion of section 7 and section 8(b)(1) of the
conference agreement. Under existing principles of law developed by the
courts and recently applied by the Board, employees who engage in
violence, mass picketing, unfair labor practices, contract violations, or other
improper conduct, or who force the employer to violate the law, do not
have any immunity under the act and are subject to discharge without
right of reinstatement. The right of the employer to discharge an employee
for any such reason is protected in specific terms in section 10(c). Furthermore, under section 10(k) of the conference agreement, the Board is
given authority to apply to the district courts for temporary injunctions
restraining alleged unfair labor practices temporarily pending the decision of the Board on the merits.
Id. at 59 (Leg. Hist. at 563).
Three points of relevance to the present discussion may be derived from this
recitation. First, the Taft-Hartley Congress was well aware of both the doctrine that
individual employee misconduct may render that employee unprotected by Section 7
and the notion that participation in an unfair labor practice or participation in a strike
in breach of a no-strike clause would render an employee derivatively unprotected.
Second, Congress was well aware of the distinction between unlawful in the sense
of subject to civil damages remedies and unlawful in the sense of unfair labor practice
and non-protection. Third, although Congress made only labor organizations subject
to unfair labor practice prohibitions and, in some instances, to civil liability, it appears to have contemplated both non-protection of employees for participation in union
induced conduct amounting to an unfair labor practice and non-protection for "unlawful
or improper" conduct not induced by a union, but failed to clearly differentiate between these categories of conduct. That failure suggests that individual conduct amounting to secondary activity was viewed as "unlawful or improper" and therefore "unprotected." In short, "[tihe [Conference] Committee . . . opted for a discharge remedy
for violations of S 303 by individuals, rather than for the damages remedy that had
been proposed by the House." Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401, 415
(1981).
On these premises, the Section 8(b)(4) proviso's use of the terms "person" and
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will influence a union's exercise of that right."7 The rule that a union
has no duty to actively discourage secondary activity,388 a rule cited
by the Administrative Law Judge as authority for the result in Gould,
is warranted if one wishes to preserve the efficacy of the "induce
or encourage" element of Section 8(b)(4). Absent that rule, the requirement of affirmative union conduct is vitiated for purposes of unfair
labor practice exposure."' But a rule that employees who purport to
act "spontaneously" risk non-protection may well cause employees to
demand more in the way of direction from their union than occurred
in Gould. To be sure, the union may have a conflict of interest which
causes it to pursue institutional objectives inconsistent with the individual interests of the employees it represents. The conduct of the
union in Gould makes that point. And if one starts with the premise
that Section 7 rights are individual and fundamental, that possibility
is a powerful argument against the result advocated here. But that
premise and possibility also make a powerful argument both against
derivative non-protection in general and against the fortuity with
which non-protection is visited upon employees.39 Derivative nonprotection is the current state of the law, and non-protection, when
made dependent upon the form in which a union communicates, provides no incentive for that union to act responsibly. Indeed, adequately
advised unions are likely to exercise the right to honor when not exposed as institutions to substantial risks of Section 8(b)(4) liability and
to abdicate, as in Gould, where their participation would generate such
exposure.
"unlawful" are not incongruent with either the legislative history or the purposes of
Section 8(b)(4) and that Section's cousin, Section 303. The proviso is consistent with
both because intended to make it clear that secondary union and secondary employee
conduct falling within its terms would not be subject to either the unfair labor practice or non-protection remedies Congress assumed would otherwise apply.
387. See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text. Clf Truck Drivers Union
Local 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539, 542-46 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 916 (1964)
(union's attempt to protect employees by means of a picket line clause is permissible
under Section 8(e) to the extent picket line contemplated by the clause is primary).
388. Building and Constr. Trades Council of Los Angeles (Kon Lee Building
Co.), 162 NLRB 605, 608n09 (1967). Cf. Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444
U.S. 212 (1979) (in absence of express contractual undertaking, there is no Section
301 Taft-Hartley duty enforceable by damages action imposed on a union to take affirmative steps to stop wildcat strikes). But cf., e.g. Gould Inc. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 728
(3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1981) (Section 8(a)(3) not violated by discharge
of union official, but not other employees, for participation in a strike in breach of
contract because union officials have greater duties than rank and file in acting consistently with collective bargaining agreements); Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v.
NLRB, 599 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979) (same).
389. And for purposes of Section 303 exposure. 29 U.S.C. S 187 (1976).
390. See Schatzki, supra note 8, at 395-402.
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The argument assumes, of course, that it is desirable that unions
act "responsibly" and that acting responsibly entails obligation -albeit
an obligation not enforced by an affirmative declaration that its breach
is an unfair labor practice-to control the concerted activity of
employees where that activity is inconsistent with the policies of the
Act. The assumption is, however, the point: the implication of a
characterization of the right to honor as collective is, for Section 8(b)(4)
purposes, that its exercise is always collective, and that employees,
when they act concertedly, must look to the collective for the preservation of their individual interests.
(B)

Balancing "Employee" Interests In Protected Activity and
Employer Interests In Continuity of Operations

On its face, Section 8(a)(1) requires only an inquiry into whether
employer "interference, restraint or coercion" occurred. Employer
motive or intent is generally thought irrelevant to this inquiry; adverse
effect upon the exercise of Section 7 rights is sufficient for a
violation.39 ' But the inquiry under Section 8(a)(1) is not as abbreviated
as the statutory language would indicate, for employer conduct
adversely affecting the exercise of Section 7 rights may nevertheless
be lawful if sufficiently justified by the employer's business interests."
Business interests may be viewed as forming a kind of legal status
quo ante-as either generally protected or generally unregulated by
law before the enactment of the Wagner Act.393 The Section 8(a)(1)
analysis proceeds from the assumption that the enactment of Section
7 and Section 8(a)(1) was not intended as a total abrogation of that
status quo. The question is accommodation of the status quo and the
rights conferred by Section 7-an accommodation generally thought
to be derivable through a balancing of interests.
Indeed, analysis of Section 8(a)(1) and of Section 7 may be viewed
391. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964): Norten Concrete Co.,
249 NLRB 1270 (1980); Caterpillar Tractor Co., 242 NLRB 523 (1979), en.ibrced, 638
F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1981).
392. See. e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
393. It has been suggested that the Labor Act should be viewed as requiring
the recognition of employer rights. Barron, A Theory of Protected Employer Rights:
A Rerisionist Analysis of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the National Lobor Relalions Act, 59 TEx. L. REV. 421 (1981). Although there are examples of specifically recognized employer "rights" in the legislation, e.g., Section 8c, 29 U.S.C.
158(c) (1976),
the Court's interpretations of the Labor Act are in my view best seen not as recognizing an express grant of rights to employers but as assuming antecedent employer
rights and inquiring into the extent to which those "rights" have been limited by the
statute.
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as entailing in fact two distinct balancing processes. The "protected"
characterization is itself the product of a balancing of the conflicting
interests of employees, employers and society in the sense that'some
economic weapons are so disruptive that their use is deemed
unprotected.394 And a violation of Section 8(a)(1) turns on a balancing
of interests in the sense that an employer's interest in property395
or production and the continuity of production' are accommodated.
But, as Professor Haggard has pointed out,' the Section 8(a)(1) balance
is normally conducted in terms of the generalized interests of
employers writ large. 98 That balance generates general rules rebuttable in a particular case only where it can be shown that the interests of employers as a class assumed by the general rule to be
present are in fact not present in that case-a showing normally made
by establishing that the employer has discriminated against union
activity where both that activity and similar activity not union related
threatens assumed employer interests."'
Such is not the case in the context of employee refusals to cross
picket lines. ' In that context, the Board purports to undertake individualized balancing analyses-to consider employer interests writ
small."0 ' Balancing writ small has produced an ironic anomaly: an
employee who honors a stranger picket line in effect receives a greater

394. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1229, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 346 U.S.
464 (1953); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
395. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
396. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U.S. 793 (1945).
397. Haggard, Observance, supra note 8, at 86-93.
398. Id. See also Brousseau, supra note 4, at 43 n.189.
399. See P. Cox, supra note 5, at 170-76.
400. See Southern Cal. Edison Co., 243 NLRB 372 (1979), enforced, 646 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir. 1981); Torrington Const. Co., 235 NLRB 1540 (1978); Newbery Energy
Co., 227 NLRB 436 (1976).
401. Haggard, Observance, supra note 8, at 83-93. See, e.g., Overnite Transp.
Co., 154 NLRB 1271 (1965), enforced in part sub norn., Truck Drivers Local 728 v. NLRB,
364 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Redwing Carriers, Inc. and Rockana Carriers, Inc., 137
NLRB 1545 (1962), enforced sub nom., Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011
(D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964). It is, however, possible to describe
the Board's insistence upon balancing particular employer interests against the generalized interests of employees in honoring picket lines as in fact a mere reversal of the
more generalized process at work in other Section 8(a)(1) contexts: The employees'
interest is presumed to be ascendant and the general interest of employers as a class
in continuity of operations will be treated as overcoming that presumption only where
a particular employer can establish peculiar circumstances in which the threat to that
employer's interest in continuity of operations is uniquely harmful. See G & P Trucking Co., 216 NLRB 620 (1975), enforcement denied, 539 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1976).
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degree of Section 7 protection than an employee who participates in
primary economic strike against his employer." 2 A striking employee
may be temporarily or permanently replaced, '03 and although such an
employee has reinstatement rights, they are exercisable only upon
the departure of permanent replacements.40 ' By contrast, an honoring
employee may be "permanently replaced" or "discharged"'0 5 only if
the balance of interests in a particular case favor the employer.' 6 Actual replacement of the honoring employee is only one factor in strik40 7
ing that balance.
What distinguishes the replacement rules applicable in a primary
strike from the replacement rules applicable in a picket line case is
that the honoring of a picket line is a partial strike. The employer
faced with such a partial strike does not, where actual replacement
is a mere factor in a balancing test, have the clear privilege to insist
that the honoring employee either cease all work for the employer
(strike) or perform all that the employer requires (cross the picket
line). That insistence is precisely the employer's privilege in the strike
context, for there the presumption favoring the employer privilege
of permanent replacement is a general rule arguably the product of
a balancing analysis conducted writ large.0 8
Although the Board's balancing analysis is explicable as the position it was forced to take in response to Supreme Court dictum disapproving of the strike/replacement analogy in the picket line context,' 9
402. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 243 NLRB No. 62 (1979), enforced, 646 F.2d 1352
(9th Cir. 1981); Schatzki, supra note 8, at 393. See Carney & Florsheim, supra note
8, at 969-70.
403. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
404. Laidlaw Corp., 171 NLRB 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
405. See NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 75 (1953). The Board
has recently insisted that only replacement, not discharge, is permissible in the stranger
picket line context, and that the full panalopy of reinstatement rights are applicable
in such a context. See Torrington Constr. Co., 235 NLRB 1540 (1978). Torrington appears, however, to retain the balancing writ small test for invoking the employer's
replacement right. Id. See Southern Cal. Edison Co., 243 NLRB 372 (1979), enforced,
646 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1981).
406. See Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 NLRB 1545 (1962), enforced sub nom.,
Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
905 (1964).
407. G & P Trucking Co., 216 NLRB 620, 624 (1975), enforcement denied, 539
F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1976).
408. See Schatzki, supra note 8, at 382-92. See also P. Cox, supra note 5, at
202, 259 n.382.
409. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 75 (1953). See also NLRB
v. L.G. Everist, Inc., 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964).
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there are two substantial difficulties with that analysis. First, the
Board starts with the premise that the employee's right at stake is
individual and fundamental. 1 That premise is perhaps understandable
given that the Board is faced with a precept of union ethics it is at
best difficult to ignore."' But a balancing analysis which starts with
that premise starts automatically with a bias in favor of "individual
rights" which assigns too great a weight on that side of the scales 1 2
Second, the erroneous notion that the right to honor is individual
generates a failure to accurately analyze the nature both of the
employer's interest in continuity of operations and of the collective
interests of employees at stake in the act of honoring. The act of
honoring a stranger picket line is an act of economic coercion directed
at a stranger employer, but the "incidental" effects of that coercion
befall the honoring employee's employer. At stake from the point of
view of labor policy is the efficacy of the primary strike as a weapon,
but the honoring employee's employer is not a legitimate target of
that weapon. At stake from the standpoint of the collective consisting
of the honoring employee and his fellows is, by the terms of mutuality theory, long term and relatively remote gain. That gain lacks, on
the employee side of the scales, the immediacy which justifies the
use of economic warfare in a primary dispute413 and although the
employer cannot be said to be wholly indifferent to the possibility
of that employee gain, the gain is not, on the employer side of the
scales, gain the employer has power to confer. 14 Balancing writ small
by the Board ignores these dimensions of the problem by treating
the right to honor as individual and inviolable absent a showing of
business necessity-a necessity measured by the Board's judgment
in individual cases of the employer's ability to withstand the disruption generated by a refusal to cross.1 5 Such a balancing misconceives
410. See supra note 118.
411. See Schatzki, supra note 8, at 393.
412. See P. Cox, supra note 5, at 251-64.
413. Cf. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922) (local
versus non-local union motives in pre-Labor Act applications of antitrust laws); Duplex
Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (Clayton Act exemption of labor from Sherman Act applicable only to cases of disputes between employer and employee in relationship of employer and employee); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (in effect,
primary strike is lawful and secondary boycott is unlawful). It is not my purpose by
these citations to suggest a return to the good old days. The purpose, rather, is to
suggest that the notion of proximity has a long history which was not clearly overruled in toto by the Labor Act.
414. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
415. Thus, the Board focuses on such matters as the availability of other
employees to do the work, and the percentage of the employers' work done by sym-
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the problem by treating the employee interest at stake as a primary
value to be overcome only in extreme circumstances.' It is instead
the collective's interest in long term power and economic gain
distinguishable from the collective interest underlying other economic
weapons only by the remoteness of the gain and the employer's relative
neutrality. Not the least troublesome of the consequences of that
misconception is the employer's inability to predict the legal consequences of its response to the honoring of stranger picket lines." 7
The balancing writ small analysis was adopted in response to
Supreme Court disapproval of the Board's initial notion that the striker
replacement rule should be applied in picket line cases. The replacement rule, if replacement is presumptively lawful, in effect requires
the employer to offer the honoring employee the option of either performing all tasks assigned (i.e., of crossing the stranger picket line)
or of engaging in a full strike (i.e., of replacement)." 8 The rule was
criticized by the Court as a misapplication of the strike analogy in
a distinguishable circumstance.419 The stranger picket line case is sufficiently distinct from the primary strike case to make the analogy
strained. In addition to the distinctions previously noted, the employer
in the stranger picket line case may be expected to have less difficulty in obtaining a replacement for a single or a few honoring employees
than it would encounter in replacing an entire striking workforce. 2 '
But the presumptive lawfulness of replacement in the stranger
picket line context need not be viewed as the unthinking application
of a rule designed for other circumstances. Three considerations commend its application. First, the replacement rule is a rule of accommodation of general interests-the interests of employees and
employers writ large-founded on the assumption that the problem
it resolves is a problem of contending economic collectivities,"'" not
pathy strikers. See G & P Trucking Co., 216 NLRB 620 (1976), enforcement denied,
539 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1976).
416. See Rubin, supra note 8, at 433; Getman, supra note 8, at 1226-30; Harper,
supra note 8, at 372-80.
417. See Carney & Florsheim, supra note 8, at 959; Haggard, Observance, supra
note 8, at 86.
418. See Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 NLRB 336, (1951), enforcement denied,
197 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1952), affd, 345 U.S. 71 (1953); Cyril de Cordova & Bros. Constr.
Co., 91 NLRB 1121, 1137-38 (1950) (trial examiner).
419. 345 U.S. at 75.
420. Carney & Florsheim, supra note 8, at 954.
421. Compare Haggard, Observance, supra note 8, at 57 n.60 (favoring a firm
presumption that replacement is permissible in the strike context) with Mackay, The
Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity, 50 TEX. L. REV. 782, 795 (1972)
(criticizing the presumption); Schatzki, supra note 8, at 382-92 (same). Cf. Carney &
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a problem of fundamental individual rights. Second, the rule recognizes
the fundamental nature of the refusal to cross-a partial strikewithout invoking the usual rule that a partial strike is unprotected.
It therefore simultaneously recognizes that the act of honoring is
characterized by only one of the twin evils inherent in the partial
strike: it makes an employer response to the strike difficult, 22 but
it does not have as its objective the high degree of coercive leverage
that difficulty implies."3 Third, the rule places the decision to honor
or to not honor where it belongs-in the hands of the honoring
employee's union.
The last statement may seem odd given that the rule requires
the employer to give the honoring employee a choice before replacing that employee, but that choice is only superficially individual. If
the employee is a union member (a likelihood if he has honored or
intends to honor a stranger picket line) he is subject to the possibility of a discipline which effectively makes his choice his union's
choice.' The employee is therefore likely to refer to the contemporaneous or antecedent position of his exclusive representative on
the matter, and the exclusive representative is likely to be forced
by employee pressure to take a formal or informal position. If it fails
to do so, it is furthermore likely that the threat of replacement will
dissuade individual refusals-a result consistent with the proposition
that it is the collective's right to honor or to not honor because the
collective has in such circumstances decided that it will not honor.
Moreover, the rule places the choice, antecedently, in the hands of
the union and the employer at the bargaining table where resolution
of the question of the employer's future response properly may be
made the subject of trade offs which reflect the relative strength of
the parties and the relative importance of the issue to the parties. 25
Florsheim, supra note 8, at 969-70 (focusing on economic interests, but in a manner
inconsistent with the premise that the right to honor is not individual).
422. See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946); Cyril
de Cordova & Bros. Constr. Co., 91 NLRB 1121, 1137-38 (1950) (trial examiner). Cf.
United Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Employee Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245, 264 (1949)
(quickie strike disables management from self-help). Professor Archibald Cox at one
time found merit in the NLRB's original approach to the problem of quickie strikes
and partial strikes, to treat such activity as protected but to permit the employer
to exclude employees "until they offered to obey his instructions while they were on
the job." A. Cox, supra note 121, at 339, citing Mt. Clemons Pottery Co., 46 NLRB
714, 716 (1943), enforcement denied, 147 F.2d 262 (6th Cir. 1945).
423. See Getman, supra note 8, at 1226 n.133 (arguing that reasons for finding
partial strikes unprotected are not applicable in this context).
424. See supra notes 156-76 and accompanying text.
425. See generally Note, Picket Line Observance, supra note 8.
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Bargaining table resolution again places choice in the hands of the
parties who in fact are the repositories of the interests at stake-the
employer and the collective represented by the union-and removes
that choice from a Board exercising decision in. individual cases in
the guise of preserving an individual right.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has said that "[Section 7 rights] are, for the
most part, collective rights to act in concert with one's fellow
employees; they are protected not for their own sake but as an instrument of the national labor policy of minimizing industrial strife
by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining. "2'
The argument here has been that the Section 7 right to engage in
concerted activity for "other mutual aid or protection" is, like the
right to engage in such activity "for the purpose of collective bargaining," a eollective right. But the Supreme Court's notion that Section
7's collective rights are granted for instrumental reasons contains an
ambiguity which may constitute the source of the individual right conception of an employee's refusal to cross a picket line.
The ambiguity is that Section 7's instrumentalism may be viewed
either as licensing collective action and providing a measure of
statutory protection from employer interference with that action or
as authorizing administrative and judicial interpretation of Section 7
to serve, instrumentally, an administrative and judicial perception of
appropriate "labor policy.""' The first view interprets Section 7's function as instrumental, but the instrument by which ultimate statutory
ends are to be accomplished is to grant the collective both a measure
of legal protection and an autonomy with which the collective is to
pursue its self-generated ends. Both labor peace and industrial
democracy are, in short, to be achieved by means of a conflict between interests represented by autonomous collections of economic
power with only limited intrusion by government.
The second view treats Section 7 protection as instrumental as
well, but the instrumental conception is quite different: Administrative
or judicial recognition of a Section 7 right to protection in any given
circumstance is a matter of the efficacy of the right in furthering
authoritatively perceived labor policy in that circumstance. Under such
a view, a union's autonomy will be recognized only to the extent that
426. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420
U.S. 50, 62 (1975) (citing 29 U.S.C. S 151).
427. See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
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autonomy furthers desirable ends.42 And individual rights will be
recognized to the extent that such a recognition furthers such ends.'"
The result is a conceptual separation of union and individual employee
in the analysis adopted. In the present context, separation is illustrated
by the rule that an individual employee's sympathetic work stoppage
may be protected under Section 7 where his union's inducement of
such a stoppage would, if established, be prohibited and would, if
established, render the employee unprotected.' It is illustrated as
well by the rule that, although an individual employee's refusal to
cross a picket line is generally protected because viewed as activity
seeking shared benefit or reciprocal power, that employee's union may
not seek such ends independently of a primary picket line.'31 It is illustrated, finally, by the anomolous notions that the neutral employer's
interest in continued operation is to be balanced on an ad hoc basis
against an individual right when an individual honors a stranger picket
line,' 2 but that individual's union may impose internal discipline for
crossing such a line.'33
It is apparent that neither of these views has gained complete
ascendency. The second view arises from a perhaps commendable
desire to protect individuals from the harshness of a collective right
scheme and to therefore more directly and immediately achieve the
dignity and freedom for individual workers which is the ultimate objective of such a scheme. 3' It has been the contention here, however,
that the first view more closely comports with the means congress
selected to achieve those ends-individual dignity is to be achieved
(whether or not it can be so achieved) by licensing collective power.'35
428. See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
429. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 71, at 344-34, 355-37.
430. Gould Inc. v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
930 (1981), discussed here supra notes 366-91 and accompanying text.
431. Grain Elevator Workers, Local 418 (Continental Grain Co.), 155 NLRB 402
(1965), enfd, 376 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1967), discussed supra notes 325-58 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 391-425 and accompanying text.
433. See supra notes 156-76 and accompanying text.
434. See Gorman & Finkin, supra note 71, at 344. The point is perhaps best
illustrated by the facts that Professors Gorman and Finkin wish to provide Section
7 protection most particularly against discharges of employees merely for making complaints, id. at 356, and that they are willing to at least generally permit Board deferral to arbitration in individual protest, cases, id. at 357, while expressing some reservation about union willingness to press grievances in such cases. Id. at 358. These
points suggest that Professor Gorman's and Finkin's underlying concern is that the
collective system has failed in its ultimate task of preserving the individual; a more
direct government intervention for that end is necessary.
435. Contra: Id. at 339-46 (urging a non-literal interpretation of the concerted
element of Section 7).
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Whichever view is the preferrable view, it seems clear that they are
incompatible and that the incompatibility has generated a quagmire
of complexity which serves neither unions, employers nor individual
employees.
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